Is anybody really in charge in Aceh?

Saiful Mahdi, Banda Aceh

Preliminary survey results by Unifem (United Nations Development Fund for Women) involving around 6,500 Acehnese women, survivors of the tsunami, indicated that almost 70 percent of them make decisions on their own. Important decisions the survivors make range from simple daily choices, to livelihood options, to whether they want to return to their original villages, relocate, or stay in temporary shelters.

The remarkably high percentage has at least two interpretations. One might infer that Acehnese tsunami survivors, especially women, are very independent and self-resilient. They do not wait for the government to come along and tell them what to do. They also do not make decisions based on input from NGOs or UN agencies. Indeed, many who have been to Aceh's tsunami- affected areas have witnessed a rise in people's independence and resilience since the emergency period.

On the other hand, one can critically ask: Why do the survivors have to make most, if not all, decisions on their own? Where is the government? Where are the policymakers? Who is, and who should be, in charge of leading the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh? Is the Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) in charge? Or is it the "local government"? And who exactly is the local government?

It has been reported that many government offices did not function normally in many areas in Aceh during the conflict period, and also during the emergency period in the aftermath of the Dec. 24, 2004 earthquake and tsunami.

The problem with government in Aceh is not even a question of small or big government. It is a more basic question of whether people can really feel the presence -- other than the military -- of the government, and how much it supports this devastated society.

When the earthquake and tsunami happened, Aceh was still under a state of civil emergency. Amidst the great need for clear coordination and leadership to cope with a challenging humanitarian situation, Aceh witnessed a vacuum of local leadership on the one hand, and on the other, an ad-hoc, sometimes mutually exclusive, emergency response from the national authorities, international agencies and NGOs.

Based on the civil emergency status, it was the Aceh Police chief who was the highest-ranking local government official in Aceh. Despite the governor being in jail for corruption, the local civilian government, of which vice governor was the highest ranked official, was officially there too.

The military commanders, who gave up their official power role as martial law authorities in November 2005, are still very much active. Worst of all, there are the chronic overlapping responsibilities between the local government apparatus, the police and military, and central government instrumentalities, including the Finance Ministry, Immigration Office, the State Secretariat, Foreign Affairs Ministry, and even intelligence agencies -- to name just a few.

All are only concerned with protecting their bureaucratic turf, and have almost no concept of working together in the interests of the people of Aceh much less the nation as a whole. Only with strong, credible leadership from within Aceh itself can there be any hope of whipping this bureaucratic malaise into shape.

One might argue that ACeh was confronted with an emergency situation that no-one had ever been exposed to. The leadership failure and vacuum in Aceh, however, can be traced back to the conflict. Local leadership, be it formal or informal, was effectively put into dormancy -- allegedly on purpose -- by the warring parties in Aceh. The politics of antagonism -- "you are with us, or with the enemy" -- has destroyed once-vibrant local leadership.

Weak leadership and unclear authority continue to slow down the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Aceh.

There was a glimpse of hope when the BRR was installed in Aceh in March 2005. And Kuntoro Mangkubroto was right to ask for ministerial-level authority for his position as the director of BRR. He was applauded for his quick and decisive moves to be on the survivors side of the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. He let the people choose whether they wanted to return to their villages or not. He fast-tracked approval of all the projects from national and international agencies.

Kuntoro, however, was challenged in various ways by Jakarta's technical ministries and legislatures. He reportedly had to go back and forth in order to convince the House of Representatives (DPR) to disburse the allocated tsunami budget accordingly.

BRR did not receive any funds until June 2005, when the House approved the disbursement, and some donor countries realized part of their pledges following the positive results of the Helsinki talks.

The peace deal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed on Aug. 15, 2005, in Helsinki has of course brought optimism to the Acehnese. One of the points of agreement was that GAM could place members to oversee the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. And yet, somehow, this seems to have slowed down Kuntoro and his team.

Kuntoro was in a supposedly strong position as the director of BRR; a ministerial-level position. However, he does not have enough authority and machinery to direct all the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. It is said that the BRR is a coordinating agency, not an implementing actor.

Another problem that needs immediate clarification is the relationship between BRR and the local government of Aceh, especially after the forthcoming direct elections.

Clear and decisive government is critical after the Helsinki peace accord. The presence of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has been significant in maintaining the peace in Aceh.

Meanwhile, an Aceh Governance Bill (UUPA) is being drafted. The bill, expected to be decreed by Jakarta in April 2006 at the latest, will spell out, among other things, direct elections for the governor, mayors and regents.

Unless a popular leadership is elected directly and democratically at the earliest possible time, Aceh will always have ambiguous leadership. UN agencies, national, private and international institutions will then have to continue struggling to find and choose their counterparts for better coordination in the reconstruction of Aceh.

The writer is the coordinator of The Aceh Institute, and is a Ph.D student in planning at Cornell University in the U.S. He can be reached at saiful.mahdi@acehinstitute.org.