Fri, 17 Sep 1999

Is an East Timor reconciliation possible?

By Aleksius Jemadu

BANDUNG (JP): The placement of the United Nations peacekeeping force in East Timor may not automatically lead to a smooth transition to the establishment of an independent state of East Timor.

The process of healing the deep wounds caused by an endless exchange of vengeance will not come easy. What kind of political accommodations should be given to the prointegration group that can be accepted by all conflicting parties? Is it enough for them to be given a promise of full amnesty by the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) leader Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao?

Or should East Timor be divided into two with the Western part being integrated into Indonesia?

These are questions which demand immediate solutions so that permanent peace can be established in East Timor.

From the statements made by the prointegration leaders following the announcement of the final results of the vote, we learned that they accused the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) of being in favor of the interests of the proindependence group.

Before the referendum, prointegration leaders were optimistic about their chances of winning. Their optimism was based on the fact that most East Timorese were enthusiastic in using their political rights in the Indonesian general election held less than two months earlier. How could the same people choose to separate from Indonesia?

There is no doubt the prointegration group will fight for their political goals by peaceful means if possible and by physical force if necessary. When asked about the partition of East Timor, Lopez da Cruz, Indonesia's ambassador for East Timor, said that there should be new negotiations about the issue and some compromises should be reached (Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 9).

It is not going to be easy for the United Nations to ask the prointegration militias to accept unconditionally the victory of the proindependence group. Not only are the numbers of these militias large but they are also well-trained and equipped by the Indonesian Army. They have the capability to conduct a military provocation to draw the United Nations peacekeeping forces into an unnecessary armed conflict like the one in Somalia or Kosovo.

The prointegration leaders have rejected the presence of foreign peace-keepers in East Timor. They called instead for humanitarian aid for refugees. On top of that they could use human rights arguments to justify their political demands.

Otherwise, they would use guerrilla warfare tactics to make their message heard by the international community. If that was the case, East Timorese would only be prolonging their suffering.

The following is an alternative policy option to be considered as a peaceful mechanism to accommodate the political demands of the prointegration group.

First of all, the prointegration group has to accept the victory of the proindependence group in accordance with the agreement or consensus made before the vote.

But then the prointegration group should be given the opportunity to participate in the new government. Therefore, under the supervision of the United Nations, a general election should be conducted in East Timor. Thus, the victory of the proindependence group in the referendum may not be seen as a political mandate for monopolizing the whole structure of the new government.

In the spirit of reconciliation, some sort of power sharing can be arranged for the unity of the nation as a whole.

There are several political advantages if this policy option is adopted. First, it is in line with the political goals of proindependence leader Xanana Gusmao, who wants to unite the people of East Timor by letting bygones be bygones.

Moreover, the newly established government will have strong legitimacy because it is chosen through a democratic election. All eligible East Timorese should have the opportunity to participate in the election. Thus, they themselves decide the form of government suitable for their existing conditions.

The prointegration group which is most likely to lose in such an election could function as an opposition party.

Second, the incorporation of the prointegration group into the newly established government will minimize the risk of creating a new kind of civil war. The division of East Timor into two parts with the Western part being integrated into Indonesia cannot be justified because it would be a blatant denial of the results of the Aug. 30 referendum.

If the western part of East Timor should become part of Indonesia and the eastern part become an independent state then the latter will face a tremendous constraint to build a good relationship with Indonesia. And the conflict between the two could become a new source of regional instability in Southeast Asia.

Conversely, if there is a good relationship between Indonesia and the newly independent East Timor, the latter's incorporation into ASEAN can be facilitated.

Last but not least, like people of other nations the East Timorese also want lasting peace and order in their land. They cannot be forced to get involved in another aimless civil war just for the sake of the political ambitions of their political elite.

The limited economic resources of East Timor should be used for the greatest benefit of the people as a whole. It is now high time for East Timorese to start a new page in their political history. Why should they continue to write their history with blood?

Aleksius Jemadu Ph.D is a lecturer in international relations at the Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.