Is Amien Rais desperate?

By Benny Subianto

JAKARTA (JP): The House of Representatives (DPR) censured President Abdurrahman Wahid for his alleged involvement in two financial scandals on Feb. 1. Within about one hour, Amien Rais, the Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), said in an interview with a local television station that the President should declare his resignation.

Furthermore Amien stated that under different circumstances the Assembly could convene a special session that could be a precursor to an impeachment process against the President. The Speaker believes that convening a special session would be better than issuing the first memorandum.

Although eight out of the House's 10 factions have accepted the result of the special commission, and two factions (that of United Development and Reform) strongly urged the Assembly to convene a special session, DPR's plenary session finally agreed to issue a memorandum, instead of calling the Assembly to convene a special session.

The issuance of the first memorandum indicates that legislators have softened their political stance against the President. The House's memorandum is a warning to the President and the latter is given three months to respond. If the first memorandum goes unheeded, the House will issue the second memorandum that must be responded to within 30 days.

If the second memorandum is unheeded, the House can call the Assembly to convene a special session.

From his body language during the television interview that took place only a few hours before the House decided to issue the first memorandum, it was clear that Amien was desperate to convene the Assembly special session as a process to impeach the President.

It is very likely that Amien was displeased with the House decision to issue the first memorandum later that evening, which might provide loop-holes for Abdurrahman to survive.

Analysts and the man in the street realize that Amien has been quite embittered with the President. Apparently Amien and his "central axis" politicians realize that the Wahid administration does not meet their interests. The President's proposal to open direct trade relations with Israel and the lifting of the MPR 1966 Decree on the ban of communism has deeply disturbed those in the "central axis".

It is widely believed that the endorsement of Abdurrahman Wahid to become president by Amien and the central axis during the Assembly General Session in October 1999 was a tactical move to obstruct Megawati's chance for the presidency.

Amien argued that if Megawati were elected president, it would have created severe tension between her political supporters and opponents. Amien successfully convinced the Assembly members that Abdurrahman was the only political figure widely accepted by the contending political groups.

From the very beginning, nonetheless, politicians and political analysts have been suspicious over Amien's efforts to promote Abdurrahman. Amien and the Muslim-based political parties' strong political reluctance toward Megawati was due to the latter's secular-nationalist political platform, which was incompatible with their interests.

In addition, among the modernist Muslim politicians, in particular within the now defunct Masyumi Party, Megawati is seen as the successor of the late president Soekarno who banned their party in 1960 and jailed a number of its politicians.

In terms of personal relations, it is hard to imagine that Amien is a sincere supporter of Abdurrahman. First, each of them became the chairman of the two largest Muslim organizations, Amien, chairman of Muhammadiyah and Abdurrahman chairman of Nahdathul Ulama, that have been decade long rivals.

Until the last years of the New Order, the political stance of both Amien and Abdurrahman were diametrical, in particular concerning political pluralism, and the balance between Muslims and non Muslims, the role of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, and their relation to Soeharto's power.

In late 1996, Amien and Abdurrahman were still debating their political views and strategies at the Sunda Kelapa Mosque in Central Jakarta.

A few months before the downfall of Soeharto's New Order Government, Amien tactically switched his political strategies, swinging from being Muslim-oriented to pluralist.

During the outbreak of the anti-Chinese and anti-Christian riots in Jakarta and other areas, he strongly condemned the rioters and defended the minority groups. Soon he gained substantial political support from the minorities.

By that time many believed that Amien had abandoned his sectarian political stance. He was known as the engine of the reformasi movement.

His role in establishing and chairing the National Mandate Party (PAN) convinced the wider political audience that he was a real pluralist leader. This led Amien to declare that he was going to run for the presidential election.

Many analysts labeled him as one of the strongest presidential candidates or aspirants. Others cynically assumed that he was desperately seeking the presidential seat.

Having realized that his party only gained about 7 percent of popular votes, he dropped the plan.

It is quite true that Abdurrahman's administration has failed to meet the political expectations of most Indonesians, except for his staunch supporters from the circle of Nahdathul Ulama and the National Awakening Party (PKB) which he founded.

The President has not seriously taken stern actions against the New Order's corruption, collusion, and nepotism. At the same time his administration and inner circle have created its own practices of corruption and nepotism.

The wrongdoing of the administration, nonetheless, has not provided a legal base for the House and Assembly members to topple the President.

The House's special commission concluded that the President Abdurrahman allegedly played a role in the withdrawal and disbursement of Rp 35 billion from the Bulog foundation and the President had been inconsistent in explaining the US$2 million donation from the Sultan of Brunei.

Nonetheless, the plenary session of the House has twisted the allegation into the phrase "the President has indeed violated the Constitution and the Assembly Decree".

Such a twisted allegation seems to be the legal basis for Amien to promptly convene the Assembly special session. If this happens, it will create a new political tradition of toppling a president based on mere allegations.

Fortunately, the House finally decided to send the first memorandum that gives the President an opportunity to prove whether he violated the Constitution and Assembly Decree.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher.