Is a missile-defense system coming to SE Asia?

Is a missile-defense system coming to SE Asia?

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation
Asia News Network/Bangkok

On the day that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for arms
control Steve Rademaker was talking about the U.S. ballistic
missile-defense system to an ASEAN Regional Forum seminar in
Bangkok this past weekend, on the other side of the world it was
announced that Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, had got this year's Nobel Peace prize.

The two events highlight the importance of the threat of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both at the
regional and global level. Rademaker surprised the ARF delegates
with his detailed briefings on the U.S. deployment of nine
operational national missile-defense systems and 12 more to come
in the future. It was the first time the U.S. had provided such
extensive information on its missile-defense programs at an ARF
meeting. The ARF participants, especially China, reciprocated
with a willingness to discuss the pros and cons of various
missile-defense systems.

The U.S. delegation stressed at the outset that the system was
not aimed at China or Russia. The threat of weapons of mass
destruction comes from other countries, which the United States
did not name. In the past, the U.S. has expressed concern over
the nuclear capability of North Korea and has effectively sought
to reduce it. Washington seeks to prevent Pyongyang from getting
hold of the uranium and the technology needed to make nuclear or
dirty bombs.

In Asia, Japan has already invested about US$5 billion (Bt205
billion) in cooperating with the U.S. in missile-defense systems.
Certainly Japan's main missile threat comes from North Korea.
Pyongyang's repeated test-firing of the medium-range Taepodong
missile across the Sea of Japan has rattled Japanese defense
policy-makers into looking for new ways to counter these growing
threats.

Russia and China, two major nuclear powers, raised questions
about the effectiveness of all missile-defense systems. They
prefer diplomacy and dialogue as ways to deter the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. China has been active in persuading North
Korea to "denuclearize" its arsenal in the six-party talks.
Russia is also engaging Iran in a similar way, urging Teheran to
allow outside inspection and comply with international standards
and practices.

Moreover, for China, the missile-defense system means more
than just deterrence, as the destruction of weapons in the sky
would generate debris that could cause untold damage to people
and the environment.

Within Southeast Asia, only Singapore and Thailand have not
rejected the idea of missile-defense systems. Other key ASEAN
countries -- such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia -- have
opposed the systems, which they argue would lead to proliferation
and a greater threat from weapons of mass destruction rather than
limiting them.

They view the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile
Treaty as an indication that it does not want to restrict its
nuclear response options. Thailand's view is that the ABM Treaty
is a cornerstone in maintaining strategic balance and controlling
missile proliferation.

The U.S., the United Kingdom and France have repeatedly turned
down ASEAN's overture to accede to the Treaty of Southeast Asian
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, while Asian nuclear powers China,
India and Pakistan have expressed willingness to join. But
tangible progress has not yet been made.

Singapore, the only ASEAN country to join the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), and Thailand share a similar view that
the missile-defense systems serve a useful purpose in deterring
nuclear attacks, especially from rogue states and non-state
players such as terrorists.

During the visit of U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice to
Phuket in July, Thailand planned to join the PSI as part and
parcel of its overall effort to curb WMD proliferation in the
region. That effort includes the Container Security Initiative,
which it joined in June 2003. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
delayed the decision on the PSI and instead adopted "a wait-and-
see attitude" due to the worsening crisis in the South and the
lack of broader ASEAN support.

Thai authorities are concerned that the country could be used
as a transit point for fission materials to third countries by
ill-intentioned groups. In June 2003, the authorities intercepted
30 kilograms of highly radioactive Cesium137, a critical
component in the making of a dirty bomb, in Bangkok. The seizure
raised alarm about the possibility of illicit trafficking of this
dangerous material.

For the record, Thailand does have a history of good
compliance with international agreements on non-proliferation and
the peaceful uses of nuclear power, such as the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of
Biological and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction; the
Safeguards Agreement; and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty.

To many countries in the region, the NPT is considered a
"double standard" treaty since it recognizes those countries that
already posses nuclear weapons as the "status quo", while banning
others from having such weapons.

At present as a non-nuclear state, Thailand, which signed and
ratified the NPT in 1972, is actively seeking access to nuclear
technology and energy for peaceful use as part of the country's
future energy security strategy. Nobody knows if it will have an
impact on Thailand's firm policy not to develop or proliferate
any kind of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery
systems.