Is a missile-defense system coming to SE Asia?

Kavi Chongkittavorn The Nation Asia News Network/Bangkok

On the day that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for arms control Steve Rademaker was talking about the U.S. ballistic missile-defense system to an ASEAN Regional Forum seminar in Bangkok this past weekend, on the other side of the world it was announced that Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, had got this year's Nobel Peace prize.

The two events highlight the importance of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both at the regional and global level. Rademaker surprised the ARF delegates with his detailed briefings on the U.S. deployment of nine operational national missile-defense systems and 12 more to come in the future. It was the first time the U.S. had provided such extensive information on its missile-defense programs at an ARF meeting. The ARF participants, especially China, reciprocated with a willingness to discuss the pros and cons of various missile-defense systems.

The U.S. delegation stressed at the outset that the system was not aimed at China or Russia. The threat of weapons of mass destruction comes from other countries, which the United States did not name. In the past, the U.S. has expressed concern over the nuclear capability of North Korea and has effectively sought to reduce it. Washington seeks to prevent Pyongyang from getting hold of the uranium and the technology needed to make nuclear or dirty bombs.

In Asia, Japan has already invested about US$5 billion (Bt205 billion) in cooperating with the U.S. in missile-defense systems. Certainly Japan's main missile threat comes from North Korea. Pyongyang's repeated test-firing of the medium-range Taepodong missile across the Sea of Japan has rattled Japanese defense policy-makers into looking for new ways to counter these growing threats.

Russia and China, two major nuclear powers, raised questions about the effectiveness of all missile-defense systems. They prefer diplomacy and dialogue as ways to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China has been active in persuading North Korea to "denuclearize" its arsenal in the six-party talks. Russia is also engaging Iran in a similar way, urging Teheran to allow outside inspection and comply with international standards and practices.

Moreover, for China, the missile-defense system means more than just deterrence, as the destruction of weapons in the sky would generate debris that could cause untold damage to people and the environment.

Within Southeast Asia, only Singapore and Thailand have not rejected the idea of missile-defense systems. Other key ASEAN countries -- such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia -- have opposed the systems, which they argue would lead to proliferation and a greater threat from weapons of mass destruction rather than limiting them.

They view the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty as an indication that it does not want to restrict its nuclear response options. Thailand's view is that the ABM Treaty is a cornerstone in maintaining strategic balance and controlling missile proliferation.

The U.S., the United Kingdom and France have repeatedly turned down ASEAN's overture to accede to the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, while Asian nuclear powers China, India and Pakistan have expressed willingness to join. But tangible progress has not yet been made.

Singapore, the only ASEAN country to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Thailand share a similar view that the missile-defense systems serve a useful purpose in deterring nuclear attacks, especially from rogue states and non-state players such as terrorists.

During the visit of U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice to Phuket in July, Thailand planned to join the PSI as part and parcel of its overall effort to curb WMD proliferation in the region. That effort includes the Container Security Initiative, which it joined in June 2003. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra delayed the decision on the PSI and instead adopted "a wait-and- see attitude" due to the worsening crisis in the South and the lack of broader ASEAN support.

Thai authorities are concerned that the country could be used as a transit point for fission materials to third countries by ill-intentioned groups. In June 2003, the authorities intercepted 30 kilograms of highly radioactive Cesium137, a critical component in the making of a dirty bomb, in Bangkok. The seizure raised alarm about the possibility of illicit trafficking of this dangerous material.

For the record, Thailand does have a history of good compliance with international agreements on non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear power, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of Biological and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Safeguards Agreement; and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

To many countries in the region, the NPT is considered a "double standard" treaty since it recognizes those countries that already posses nuclear weapons as the "status quo", while banning others from having such weapons.

At present as a non-nuclear state, Thailand, which signed and ratified the NPT in 1972, is actively seeking access to nuclear technology and energy for peaceful use as part of the country's future energy security strategy. Nobody knows if it will have an impact on Thailand's firm policy not to develop or proliferate any kind of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems.