Iran's revolution, 20 years after
Iran's revolution, 20 years after
This is the first of two articles on the Iranian revolution by
Sidhesh Kaul, a commentator on regional economic and political
issues based in Jakarta.
JAKARTA (JP): Feb. 11, 1979 was the day when the Iranian
army's Supreme Council, after two days of bloody clashes between
government troops and pro-Khomeini demonstrators, declared
neutrality in the crisis and ordered the troops back to the
barracks.
The Bakhtiar government fell and the revolution led by the
frail, 76-year-old cleric from Qom, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
emerged triumphant.
From 1956 to 1961 continuous discontent and sporadic strikes
led to the "White Revolution", a series of economic and social
reforms.
The "White Revolution" had a hidden agenda as well -- it was
partly designed to reduce Islamic influence in society -- a fact
deeply resented by the Ayatollah and the deeply religious
Iranians at large.
The "White Revolution" also had land reform on the agenda,
carried out in three stages until 1971, though these strengthened
the landowners as an important pillar of the regime.
Yet economic growth and income disparity remained skewed.
Hence, despite promises of fundamental reforms, the first large
scale protests erupted in 1963 against the Shah's government.
The Shah reacted imperiously with increasingly brutal
measures. His reckless modernization campaign, focussed on the
purging of "decadent Islamic traditions" and his disdain for
religious and cultural sensitivities, further alienated his
regime.
Foreign policy also began to lean more towards the United
States even whilst undercutting the Friendship Treaty with the
erstwhile Soviet Union.
By the mid-1970s, over 50,000 tortured and maltreated
opponents of the regime languished in state prisons. The fettered
resentment reached volcanic proportions by the mid 1970s. Popular
protests and strikes reached such heights in early 1979 that the
Shah was forced into exile, leaving the country in the hands of a
caretaker government led by the Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar.
The Ayatollah, in exile since 1963 when he denounced the Shah in
a scathing speech at Qom as the "miserable wretch who violated
his oath to defend Islam", then seized the opportunity to return
triumphantly to Iran.
The theologists from Qom had won. They had won legitimacy to
establish an Islamic theocracy in response to the Shah's alien
western-style regime.
Iran now remains the world's only modern theocracy and the
revolution continues in more ways than one. It is a bundle of
contradictions as it experiments with greater freedoms, on
popular impetus, within a theocratic framework.
Iran's revolution and its aftermath is a stark reminder for
those who chose to ignore the importance of cultural factors as a
parameter of national stability, as well as a warning to those
who hold the view that revolution is the only way to reform.
Almost two decades have passed since the Iranian Revolution
and it is time to take stock.
Some scholars argue that it would not be entirely correct to
analyse the revolution in a purely religious framework or to
label it as merely an "Islamic Revolution", as they tend to
obscure other important reasons behind the movement.
The underlying socio-economic factors, the Shah's skewed
policies and his almost blind obsession with programs oriented
towards western-style growth models at the expense of socio-
cultural sensitivities, contributed heavily to the revolution's
momentum.
The ayatollahs and mullahs, who the Shah often referred to as
"religious fanatics", merely served to funnel the popular
upsurge. But to undervalue the role that Islam played in the
revolution is to oversimplify the analysis.
Iran's population is predominantly Shiite and Iranians are
sometimes referred to as the "Twelvers" because they venerate the
12 descendants of the Prophet Muhammad as the rightful spiritual
heirs or "imams".
The first Imam was Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet
Muhammad. His claim to the caliphate of the Arab empire was
usurped when he was assassinated by Uthman, a Sunni Muslim, of
the Umayyad clan in the mid-seventh century, thus laying the
foundations of the continuing deep schism between Sunni and
Shiite Islam.
Ali's death is mourned by Shiites the world over as an
appalling catastrophe, but even more significant is the killing
of the Third Imam Hussein by the Umayyads.
Some scholars see Hussein's death as a redeeming sacrifice
similar to Christ's crucifixion. Ashura, the day Hussein achieved
martyrdom, is an important day for Shiites and the devout
passionately mourn his death.
But the dramatization of the Hussein story has a more explicit
political resonance than the Christian Easter. Imam Hussein's
martyrdom symbolizes the wickedness of corrupt governments and
the flourishing of evil since the golden age of the prophet. This
belief is deeply embedded in the collective psyche of
predominantly Shiite Iran.
The 12th Imam was Muhammad al Muntazar who is believed not to
have died but to have disappeared. He has thus earned the title
of the "Hidden Imam" who, belief has it, would return as the
Mahdi (Messiah) to rid earth of oppression and tyranny and fill
it with equity and justice.
It is then not difficult to believe that rising up against
tyranny and oppression was an essential characteristic of the
guts and sinews of Iran, and the gatherings at Ashura were the
starting points for the revolution.
Iranian national consciousness is deeply wedded to Shiite
Islam and when the masses perceived a threat to the nation's
integrity symbolized by the Shah's injustice and oppression,
political protest in religious terms was imminent.
Ayatollah Khomeini was able to harness this energy and garner
support from all quarters of Iranian society.
The Ayatollah was a shrewd politician -- he carefully avoided
direct criticism of the Left to avoid alienating the vast
exploited working class, secular minded intellectuals and the
popular Marxist guerrillas or Fedayeen, and argued for the
restoration of the 1906 constitution right up to the time he came
to power.
He was the right man at the right time. He was always referred
to as "Imam Khomeini" and although it would have been blasphemous
to draw a connection with the "Hidden Twelfth Imam" or "Mahdi",
the title certainly gave him additional legitimacy and authority
among the Shiite Iran.
Khomeini played up to the messianic expectations of the
Iranians to the hilt.