Wed, 18 Feb 2004

Interplay between RI foreign policy and intelligence

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, "The Indonesian Quarterly", Centre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
bandoro@csis.or.id

We can make assessments. We can also make probability judgments on what will happen. But there will always be surprises, no matter how carefully we try to engineer our future. A surprise-free future is something that we all try to achieve.

But the reality reflects the fact that even the most sophisticated intelligence networking and architecture has failed to prevent future shocks caused by acts of terror. Intelligence is often called a thankless profession because it garners attention only through its failures.

In the months that followed the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the Marriott hotel and Bali in particular, extensive debate took place here over the role intelligence should play in preventing acts of terror. The public would agree that our greatest intelligence failures in recent times were the Bali and Marriott bombings, not to mention other undetected, small-scale acts of terror.

Since then, our policymakers seem to have been preoccupied mostly by the need to craft out a strategy for combating terrorism that relies on effective intelligence architecture.

In her recent address to the Bali conference on counterterrorism, President Megawati spoke out for more extensive intelligence cooperation between countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not only that. Our foreign policy communities have also expressed concern at the impact of terrorism on our international position and image.

It is thus understandable that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, since the Bali bombings, been in the forefront in diplomacy and organizing a series of international meetings on terrorism. The objective is to demonstrate our resoluteness in eradicating terrorism.

We cannot fight terrorism simply through the unilateral action of individual agencies. Internally, we should not allow ourselves to get bogged down by the issue of which agency is most appropriate to counter terrorism. Terrorism is an evil to be extinguished and must therefore be tackled collaboratively. The intelligence function certainly has a role in it, but terrorism also has some relevance to our foreign policy because of international terrorist links.

The function of institutionalized intelligence is to centralize, process and disseminate information useful to the formation and implementation of our foreign policy. But what kinds of information are useful will be subject to debate and change. What is clear is that foreign policy constitutes a government's attempt to advance its interests internationally.

So, when we carry out our international diplomacy, particularly when the world is united against terrorism, we should inevitably look to the information that is best suited to improving our foreign policy implementation.

To achieve foreign policy goals, as stated by the Constitution, that are designed on the basis of our changed strategic environment, we need to have leverage through leadership, either political or economic, which must be applied internationally through foreign policy.

Here is where intelligence fits in. Part of the supply of this needed information comes from intelligence. Intelligence support for the conduct and formulation of our foreign policy is not only desirable but also necessary, particularly at a time when we are attempting to convince our neighbors of our "no-compromise" stand on terrorism.

With regard to terrorism, it is important that our counterterrorism policy and strategy be made part of our broader effort to maintain national security; it should therefore be integrated into all foreign policy decision making.

After the Marriott hotel and Bali bombings, there appeared to be an impetus for consensus regarding ways we should develop to combat terrorism and how our international diplomacy should be geared to indicate our consistency in the fight against terrorism. It is, after all, a cross-border issue that must be combated jointly, where possible, through diplomatic channels. It is imperative for us, therefore, that we expand our cooperation with foreign intelligence services, to the extent that it is aimed at developing counterterrorism measures, in which process the foreign ministry can be instrumental.

When the issue of terrorism and foreign policy is discussed thoroughly, one cannot ignore the role of intelligence. Unlike the foreign policy of the U.S., in which counterterrorism is one of its main foreign policy objectives, our foreign policy should not in any way be dictated or dominated by the issue of terrorism.

This, however, is not to ignore the fact that our foreign policy needs to be continually supported by information from the intelligence services, if only to make sure that our foreign ministry send out the right messages, particularly when it has to counter criticism from overseas that the country is a safe haven for terrorist activities.

This is where we see the interplay between foreign policy and intelligence -- one that manifests the important role intelligence plays in the country's foreign relations.

As we are still trying to escape the economic crisis, economic intelligence could be very instrumental if we are to find out more about external resources that might be useful to our development.

Our foreign policy could be geared in such direction if policymakers decided to compete later on with any growing regional economic power. Political intelligence is also important to our foreign policymakers, particularly when they are tasked to defend, in the international forum, the country's policy on territorial integration.

Recent years have seen the reality that our leaders have recognized fundamental changes in our immediate and strategic environment. We can use intelligence, among other things, as a means to gather information on sources that might help us understand better domestic and international changes.

The reforms that we have initiated so far have been to recognize changes around us and what those changes mean for the kinds of information our foreign policymakers need to make good decisions. A substantial amount of intelligence is required if our foreign policy is to achieve a surprise-free future.