Intelligence capability and the Bali blasts

Intelligence capability and the Bali blasts

Imanuddin, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
iman@thejakartapost.com

The Oct. 12 bombing in Bali has shocked the world, not only
because it is considered a follow-up to a series of terrorist
acts which included Sept. 11, 2001 in the U.S., but also because
it occurred on Indonesia's tourist island, one of our few
remaining safe havens.

The bomb attacks in three separate places in Bali have
worsened Indonesia's image as an unsafe investment destination
and made it more difficult for the country to restore its
battered image and its economy since the economic crisis in 1997.

Immediately after the incident, the country's top security
authorities and analysts issued statements blaming the country's
poor intelligence system and security coordination for the
bombing attacks. President Megawati Soekarnoputri responded by
issuing a new presidential instruction No. 5/2002 on Oct. 22 that
assigned the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to coordinate
intelligence operations in the country.

Also issued was Presidential Instruction No. 4/2002,
appointing the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security
Affairs Bambang Yudhoyono to lead all related departments in the
war against terrorism, especially in the investigation into the
Bali bombings. The new Government Regulation no. 1/2002 also
gives the state extra powers to anticipate terror and arrest
suspected terrorists.

Currently Indonesia has four intelligence units -- BIN, the
Military Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), the Police
Intelligence Unit (Intelpam) and the one at the Attorney
General's Office.

In the past, there was the State Intelligence Coordinating
Agency (BAKIN), which coordinated intelligence operations in the
country. But BAKIN was disbanded by then president Abdurrahman
Wahid in 2000, who then set up BIN, which does not hold the role
as coordinator for all the country's intelligence units.

Apart from BAKIN, there was the Coordinating Agency to Support
the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas), which also
had its intelligence hands in its operations -- which together
with its regional units became notorious for becoming the tool of
then president Soeharto and his military commanders to ensure
full control of the country. Bakorstanas was disbanded by
Abdurrahman in April 2000.

Megawati's latest decision to upgrade BIN has undoubtedly
restored BAKIN's function and adopted it into BIN's tasks.

To a certain extent, most Indonesians perhaps could understand
and accept BIN's "new look" as it is meant to improve and restore
the intelligence units as the deterring elements against any
attempts to create terror and disorder in the country.

But along with high expectations that BIN could uncover the
Bali bombings, skepticism also increases as people still remember
past experiences when they dealt with repressive and powerful
hands of the intelligence units.

All arrests and questioning, conducted by intelligence
officers without prior warrants, were a common phenomenon in the
past, while outspoken statements or opinions could even be
declared as subversion.

Still fresh in their minds is that in the name of security
precautions, "elements" in the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI),
which was the previous name for the Indonesian Military (TNI),
and not BAKIN, took the initiatives in early 1998 to abduct
dozens of outspoken student and youth activists in the wake of
increasing calls for the newly reelected president Soeharto to
resign. Soeharto eventually announced his resignation on May 21,
1998.

So dreadful was their experience when dealing with the
intelligence units and the officers that most of the "alumni" of
the detention houses have chosen to keep their mouths shut when
asked about their days in detention.

Student activist Pius Lustrilanang, one of activists abducted
and released in mid 1998, gave a harrowing account of his
experience; but Haryanto Taslam, a loyalist of Megawati
Soekarnoputri who then led the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI),
only smiled and asked journalists to change the subject when
asked of his kidnapping and detention in early 1998.

And with BIN's current organizational structure, analysts also
doubt that BIN could perform its task as a coordinator, instead
leading to speculation that it could provoke the establishment of
"informal" intelligence units similar to what occurred in 1998.

Although it has yet to start its job as a coordinating agency,
BIN is under high expectations to solve the Bali bombings and
uncover the truth behind the incidents.

The fact that the powerful explosions have destroyed some of
the material evidence adds to difficulties in uncovering the Bali
incident.

Meanwhile, it has been reported that the C4, the explosive
material reportedly used along with ammonium nitrate and fuel, in
the Bali bombings, was originally manufactured in the United
States and sold to armed forces around the globe. Such reports
have increased speculation about whom may be directly or
indirectly responsible for the bombings.

Leaked intelligence reports also add to confusion. It is a
challenge for BIN whether it is capable to straighten up those
"unreliable reports" and uncover the truth.

Otherwise, Indonesia, especially certain groups in the
country, will remain mere scapegoats of any security disorder or
terror along with the country's inability to dismiss the
allegations.