Intelligence capability and the Bali blasts

Imanuddin, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, iman@thejakartapost.com

The Oct. 12 bombing in Bali has shocked the world, not only because it is considered a follow-up to a series of terrorist acts which included Sept. 11, 2001 in the U.S., but also because it occurred on Indonesia's tourist island, one of our few remaining safe havens.

The bomb attacks in three separate places in Bali have worsened Indonesia's image as an unsafe investment destination and made it more difficult for the country to restore its battered image and its economy since the economic crisis in 1997.

Immediately after the incident, the country's top security authorities and analysts issued statements blaming the country's poor intelligence system and security coordination for the bombing attacks. President Megawati Soekarnoputri responded by issuing a new presidential instruction No. 5/2002 on Oct. 22 that assigned the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to coordinate intelligence operations in the country.

Also issued was Presidential Instruction No. 4/2002, appointing the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Bambang Yudhoyono to lead all related departments in the war against terrorism, especially in the investigation into the Bali bombings. The new Government Regulation no. 1/2002 also gives the state extra powers to anticipate terror and arrest suspected terrorists.

Currently Indonesia has four intelligence units -- BIN, the Military Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), the Police Intelligence Unit (Intelpam) and the one at the Attorney General's Office.

In the past, there was the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), which coordinated intelligence operations in the country. But BAKIN was disbanded by then president Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000, who then set up BIN, which does not hold the role as coordinator for all the country's intelligence units.

Apart from BAKIN, there was the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstanas), which also had its intelligence hands in its operations -- which together with its regional units became notorious for becoming the tool of then president Soeharto and his military commanders to ensure full control of the country. Bakorstanas was disbanded by Abdurrahman in April 2000.

Megawati's latest decision to upgrade BIN has undoubtedly restored BAKIN's function and adopted it into BIN's tasks.

To a certain extent, most Indonesians perhaps could understand and accept BIN's "new look" as it is meant to improve and restore the intelligence units as the deterring elements against any attempts to create terror and disorder in the country.

But along with high expectations that BIN could uncover the Bali bombings, skepticism also increases as people still remember past experiences when they dealt with repressive and powerful hands of the intelligence units.

All arrests and questioning, conducted by intelligence officers without prior warrants, were a common phenomenon in the past, while outspoken statements or opinions could even be declared as subversion.

Still fresh in their minds is that in the name of security precautions, "elements" in the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), which was the previous name for the Indonesian Military (TNI), and not BAKIN, took the initiatives in early 1998 to abduct dozens of outspoken student and youth activists in the wake of increasing calls for the newly reelected president Soeharto to resign. Soeharto eventually announced his resignation on May 21, 1998.

So dreadful was their experience when dealing with the intelligence units and the officers that most of the "alumni" of the detention houses have chosen to keep their mouths shut when asked about their days in detention.

Student activist Pius Lustrilanang, one of activists abducted and released in mid 1998, gave a harrowing account of his experience; but Haryanto Taslam, a loyalist of Megawati Soekarnoputri who then led the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), only smiled and asked journalists to change the subject when asked of his kidnapping and detention in early 1998.

And with BIN's current organizational structure, analysts also doubt that BIN could perform its task as a coordinator, instead leading to speculation that it could provoke the establishment of "informal" intelligence units similar to what occurred in 1998.

Although it has yet to start its job as a coordinating agency, BIN is under high expectations to solve the Bali bombings and uncover the truth behind the incidents.

The fact that the powerful explosions have destroyed some of the material evidence adds to difficulties in uncovering the Bali incident.

Meanwhile, it has been reported that the C4, the explosive material reportedly used along with ammonium nitrate and fuel, in the Bali bombings, was originally manufactured in the United States and sold to armed forces around the globe. Such reports have increased speculation about whom may be directly or indirectly responsible for the bombings.

Leaked intelligence reports also add to confusion. It is a challenge for BIN whether it is capable to straighten up those "unreliable reports" and uncover the truth.

Otherwise, Indonesia, especially certain groups in the country, will remain mere scapegoats of any security disorder or terror along with the country's inability to dismiss the allegations.