Instability rocks Central Africa

LONDON: The huge upheaval which began in south Kivu, Zaire, in mid-October 1996, has had two far-reaching effects so far: the defeat of extremist Hutu militias in eastern Zaire, and the return to Rwanda of nearly one million Hutu refugees who fled after the genocide in 1994. Politically, the regimes in Rwanda and Burundi have been strengthened, although in the longer term both, whatever their plans for reconciliation, are dominated by Tutsi minorities and are, therefore, inherently unstable. But has the crisis also started, as many predict, an even more important event - the break-up of Zaire?

Eastern Zaire has been a low-level conflict zone for many years. The Banyamulenge, an ethnic Tutsi group, has lived in south Kivu for more than 200 years, but in 1981 their Zairean nationality was revoked by legislation. On Oct. 7, 1996, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji, the Deputy Governor of south Kivu, announced that more than 200,000 Banyamulenge had one week to leave the country. This announcement triggered a major revolt.

The Banyamulenge attack was well coordinated and overwhelmed the disorganized and demoralized Zairean army. With the capture of the towns and vital airports of Bukavu and Goma, supplies and reinforcements were prevented from reaching Zairean forces in the area. With no proper roads linking eastern Zaire with the rest of the country, Kinshasa was no longer a player in the conflict. The Hutu refugee camps were attacked near Goma by a wider rebel coalition spearheaded by the Banyamulenge and supported by Kigali, despite its denials.

Posing as a liberator, Laurent Kabila, the rebel leader, has advocated the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko, although he supports a unified Zaire. Kabila's forces have expanded their control westwards and northwards capturing provincial towns - including, Uvira, Kamanyola, Beni and Kasindi - and threatening the strategically important Zaire (Congo) River. The concern is that Kabila may trigger similar insurrections in other parts of the country.

As yet, however, the only visible effect has been to create a rarely seen sense of Zairean nationalism in Kinshasa. Anger at the rebellion has led many Zaireans to vent their feelings on the few Tutsi in other parts of the country. They suspect that the rebels are trying to create a Tutsi state in the Great Lakes. Even the previously most rebellious politicians and regions are not giving Kabila any support. Instead, they are using the failure of the Zairean army as a stick with which to beat Prime Minister Leon Kengo Wa Dondo and the government generally.

Of much greater importance than the crisis in Kivu is the absence - possibly permanently - of President Mobutu, who has ruled this vast empty country by personal contact for more than 30 years. In each major region of importance he has appointed a representative, who owes his position solely to the president. Mobutu has no successor - he has deliberately prevented any individual or institution from developing a power base beyond his control. Instead, he bequeaths Zaire a total power vacuum. Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo lacks a national or even regional power base - his mother was a Tutsi - and the leader of the opposition Union pour la democratie et le progres social, Etienne Tshisekedi, has no national following.

Zaire has almost no passable roads linking the center with the regions and has been in a state of partial collapse for many years. Communication is by radio; transport by air. Although Mobutu extracts his tithes, there is very little connection between the 'government' and the rest of the country. Many functions of state have been taken over by provincial governments, local organizations and, on a social level, the church. East Kasai, for example, is run by the local bishop and the head of the Miba diamond mine. They have set up a new university for the region and are working on a strategy for development.

Under these circumstances, the regions have become virtually autonomous. Huge resources at the center might restore cohesion, but there is little prospect of them ever existing unless some outside power provides them. Shaba (formerly Katanga), where copper, industrial diamonds, uranium and cobalt are found, enjoys almost de facto autonomy, although festering resentment lingers locally over the proportion of wealth which flows to Kinshasa. Like diamond-rich East Kasai, it has a history of wishing to secede from Zaire. At present, however, there is no sign of secessionism in Lubumbashi and Mbuji-Mayi. Residents are reported to be fearful for the future and are keen to maintain their semi- autonomous status but do not see the present power vacuum - or the rebellion in eastern Zaire - as an opportunity for leaving the country.

Should Kinshasa try to reimpose strong centralized rule, this situation might be reversed. But if the regions are allowed to continue in their own way in exchange for remaining nominally part of Zaire, it could, in theory, develop peacefully as a national federation of autonomous regions.

The existing regimes in Rwanda and Burundi have both benefited from the latest conflict, although the level of inter-ethnic violence in Burundi remains extremely high.

With its well-disciplined 40,000-plus-strong army, Rwanda will play a major role in the future stability of the region. The closure of the Zairean refugee camps, in which Rwanda played a direct part, has ended the cross-border insurgency raids which have plagued the country for the past 18 months. But Rwanda is faced with more than 500,000 returnees from Zaire and the prospect of more from Tanzania, many of whom are suspected of being involved in the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan justice system is still in disarray and unable to process those already in custody. The prison population exceeds 85,000 - all held without trial.

The interests of the Zairean rebels and Rwandan forces may now begin to diverge. While Rwanda has an interest in pursuing those involved in the 1994 genocide, it is less likely to support the political aspirations of Laurent Kabila to overthrow the Zairean government. But the maintenance of a friendly buffer zone inside eastern Zaire would directly benefit the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

Zaire's government and its regional allies suspect the development of an unofficial alliance between Burundi, Rwanda, the 'Zairean rebels' and Uganda. There are several links. Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame and many of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leaders were former senior officers in the Ugandan army that helped President Yoweri Museveni to power, and many in the Banyamulenge forces were either trained by, or former members of, the RPF.

Burundi has been isolated by East African countries since the Tutsi and former Chief-of-Staff Pierre Buyoya ousted Hutu President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya in July 1996. Led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who was leading peace negotiations on Burundi, sanctions were imposed. The rebel take- over of Uvira and parts of south Kivu, however, has meant that the border to the west of Bujumbura is no longer closed and the adverse effects of sanctions has therefore been reduced.

Even before the rebel advance there were indications that the embargo was weakening. A meeting in early December 1996 of Central African countries recommended lifting sanctions against Burundi. However, Tanzania and Kenya did not attend the meeting and their agreement is crucial for Burundi which relies primarily on the overland route to the ports of Dar-Es-Salaam and Mombassa.

Since the imposition of sanctions, there has been some softening of Buyoya's position on talks with Hutu opposition groups. Nevertheless, widespread violence continues in Burundi, even though the closure of the camps in Zaire has been a major setback for the hardline Hutu opposition groups in Burundi most notably the Conseil National pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD) led by former Interior Minister Leonard Nyangoma. Still, in early December, they managed to launch attacks from strong- holds within Burundi and they are now believed to be shifting their bases to Tanzania.

Over the coming months, increased attention will be directed at Zaire. Memories are still fresh of the consequences of Siad Barre's departure from Somalia - a long-lasting dictator who, like Mobutu, was a master at manipulating ethnic tensions to maintain a grip on power. Unlike Somalia, however, Zaire shares a border with nine other countries which will feel the effects of Zaire's ultimate destiny.