Insecurity complex clouds Indonesia-East Timor ties

Insecurity complex clouds Indonesia-East Timor ties

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): In her state-of-the-nation address before the
legislature on Aug. 16, President Megawati Soekarnoputri stated
that Indonesia recognized the secession of East Timor. In
response, independence leaders Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao and
Jose Ramos-Horta also offered conciliatory sentiment toward
Indonesia. Xanana acknowledged that "bilateral ties with
Indonesia are important, and that things would be good in the
future between Timor Lorosae and Indonesia".

Beyond such rhetoric, however, it will be hard for both sides
to reconstruct the relationship. One should not underestimate the
fact that East Timor's separation has raised a security void for
both Indonesia and East Timor.

First, tens of thousands of Timorese refugees remain in
Indonesia; and most of them, according to last June's
registration, will likely continue to stay in West Timor. Most
likely, relocation and repatriation will take quite some time,
due to lack of funding and some technical constraints.

Second, the Ombai-Wetar straits are now under the jurisdiction
of East Timor. The straits will become a passage for merchants
and Australia's navy to the Pacific, through the Maluku Sea. So
far, Indonesia has only strengthened defensive capabilities in
the region through new deployments of radar and other
surveillance systems. In the longer term, however, Indonesia will
be forced to allocate more defense forces to the region.

Those issues are to become crucial points of contention.
Jakarta's inability or unwillingness to disarm the militia living
among the refugees in West Timor, for example, would be seen in
Dili as a deliberate attempt by Indonesia to subvert and
destabilize East Timor. Furthermore, misperceptions over a
perceived imbalance of forces between Indonesia and East Timor
will determine the psyche of the relationship between Dili and
Jakarta.

That may become even more serious while the East Timorese
confront serious problems on their own. A viable state of East
Timor remains a big question mark. Despite the fact that more
than 80 percent of the population voted for secession from
Indonesia in August 1999, the East Timorese regime still has to
deal with social, cultural, and economic problems that may
threaten its domestic stability. Until then, there is always the
possibility for a revival of old problems of the pre-1975 Timor.

Unfortunately, it appears that the East Timorese do not have
sufficient capacity to resolve these problems appropriately. The
fledgling judicial system is in ruins. According to an Amnesty
International report, East Timor now has 24 judges, 13
prosecutors and nine public defenders. Most of them studied law
under the Indonesians, who used the East Timor judiciary systems
to suppress those in favor of independence.

Furthermore, the police training school in Dili has so far
succeeded in training only 1,073 officers to be assigned to all
13 districts of East Timor. The East Timor Defense Forces,
numbering 600 personnel, will not be able to protect the
territorial sovereignty of East Timor, including the Timor Gap.
They would not even be sufficient to patrol the 147-kilometer
long border between the two halves of the Timor island. This
alone will make the East Timorese retain the UN forces in East
Timor longer than the January 2002 timeline planned.

Thus, there is the serious predicament of an insecurity
complex that cannot be easily resolved. Possible disputes tie
into the domestic instabilities of both states and symbolize the
political threat that they pose to each other. In this case,
mutual perceptions will be extremely important. Conventional
wisdom has it that the larger country obliges to be more tolerant
and sensitive toward the smaller. Otherwise, the situation could
easily become much more messy and contentious.

Sadly, this is the outcome most likely to occur, at least in
the next three to five years.

Whilst coping with its own misgivings and loss of pride,
Indonesia would be apprehensive about the likelihood of East
Timor entering any kind of security agreement with Australia. At
the same time, the East Timorese would be nervous about Jakarta's
strengthening of infantry forces in West Timor. Both sides should
understand the other's legitimate concerns.

There is simply no formula to alleviate this insecurity
complex. Reconciliation may be the answer, a first step before
more functional relations can be established between Jakarta and
Dili. No one knows, thus far, what sort of reconciliation would
be acceptable to both sides.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is senior researcher with the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies and lecturer at the
postgraduate studies program, University of Indonesia.