Indonesia's progress in last four years
Indonesia's progress in last four years
The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
The constitutional changes approved last week by the
Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) are remarkable
for a country that has known rule by fiat for two generations.
So much that is inimical to national and neighborly interests
has happened in Indonesia since the fall of president Soeharto
that people tend to forget that that era ended only four years
ago.
In that period, Indonesia gave up East Timor (with its load of
oil and gas wealth), the rupiah has not been the same after the
1997 financial crash, religious strife and separatist tendencies
have got worse in some outer provinces. Despite the delicate
state the country is in, one factor has been constant.
This is the people's demand for full political accountability
that was given voice by the street rabble that brought Soeharto
down in 1998, and then got picked up by the more circumspect
intelligentsia.
All wanted a fairer system by which political leaders earn the
right to manage their lives and the nation's finances, and they
wanted the military's omnipotent power checked. That has now been
fixed with the latest set of amendments to the 1945 Constitution,
which provide for direct presidential elections (very likely from
2004) and an end to the practice of allotting automatic
parliamentary seats to the armed forces (TNI) and the police.
So, four years do seem swift for the country's democratic
evolution to move to this stage, but it was not a phase the MPR
could dare to drag out. Persistent street protests convinced the
legislators they were sitting on a volcano. Still, the
recognition the MPR accorded the inevitable is commendable.
It shows that adherence to the Pancasila's ideals of national
equilibrium is taken seriously. An objection to the old method by
which the president was chosen by the 700 members of the MPR
(more than 200 of them unelected) was that this was pretend-
democracy. Appointees and many elected legislators were in thrall
to the president, and the MPR merely put its seal on presidential
decrees and re-elected him every five years.
The counter argument could be made that this variant of
democracy ensured strong, undistracted rule that a huge
developing country of clashing interests needed. That was what
Soeharto provided, and pre-1997 Indonesia was coming along nicely
because the constitutional system partly made for it. But this
method has plainly outlived its historical role. There was no way
the MPR could stall the issue. It had to acknowledge the new
orthodoxy, or risk more protests.
Less certain is what to make of the TNI's role in the nation's
political life. It will obviously remain the force it has been,
if less visible, to take account of the new public mood. An irony
is that the generals had not been all that keen to hang on to the
38 "free" seats they share with the police. It has been suggested
the TNI is more concerned about exercising regional command, its
power node, and keeping control of its many business interests.
President Megawati Soekarnoputri was cool to the idea of
excising completely the military's role in choosing the
president, but she was wise not to press her case.
Expediency has brought her into a close working relationship
with the TNI to better deal with religiously parochial
presidential contenders, but the constitutional changes are
intended to address a nation's evolving needs. An outcome of the
1998 revolt had been to convince the military that it should show
its muscle only rarely. This has been taken care of partly by the
MPR vote. But it is a naive person who thinks losing
parliamentary representation will clip the army's wings.