Fri, 11 May 2001

Indonesia's problem today is the President

To move ahead from a likely return to square one, alternative agendas of a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly should be considered, writes Jakarta-based political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono.

JAKARTA (JP): Practically since the election of Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid to the presidency, Indonesian politics has been characterized mainly by bickering among the nation's political elite. And in the course of time, the bickering has been focused on a tug-of-war between the President and the legislative bodies, the House of Representatives and the People's Consultative Assembly.

Which side actually started the tug-of-war is hard to say. It's irrelevant, anyway.

The turn of events, however, with two memorandums of censure issued consecutively within three months by the House (DPR) but both ignored by the President, has focused on the issue of Gus Dur's presidency. The President is now the problem. This has raised expectations for a special session of the Assembly (MPR), which, with pressure mounting, now seems inevitable.

The crucial question is whether a special session of the MPR would result in the impeachment of the President. In principle, it is nothing extraordinary for a democratically elected President to resign or to be impeached, even after a short time in office.

A human being can change, for better or for worse, sooner or later. President Richard Nixon of the United States was about to be impeached after he had won a second term, and only his timely resignation saved him from impeachment. After winning his third term, President Fuji Mori of Peru tendered his resignation by facsimile from Japan, and the People's Assembly, which instead decided to fire him, rejected even this. President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines in his first and only term was eased out of office in the face of impending impeachment.

Voluntary resignation would save President Abdurrahman from possible impeachment. This, however, seems to be most unlikely. On the other hand, an impeachment of the President may have consequences most people fear, though as yet difficult to calculate. Indeed, democratization should not be hampered by threats of violence. The gamble, however, may be too costly for the nation.

It is in this context that attempts currently made by Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri, particularly as leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), to convene a meeting of political party leaders for consultations may be considered. Any agreement reached could not be other than a compromise. The meeting is probably aimed at avoiding an impeachment of the President by a special session of the MPR.

Still, speaking of the possibility of Megawati taking over the presidency and of a possible choice of a new vice president, House Speaker Akbar Tandjung clearly thought of President Abdurrahman either resigning or being impeached. Unfortunately, one of the possible candidates he mentioned is outside the political party circle.

Quite aside from the issue of either qualification -- which is of little relevance to democracy -- or of acceptability, nominating any such one for either president or vice president would be a bad precedent. The nomination and then election of President Abdurrahman, strictly speaking, was bad enough for democracy.

It was already a mockery of the general election, in which he was not even a contestant. It was an abuse of the MPR's powers. Anyone with a presidential ambition should join a political party. General -- later president -- Eisenhower of the U.S. is one example.

The resignation of President Abdurrahman being almost definitely out of question, however, his impeachment, apart from the incalculable risks, is not the only alternative. Moreover, the President is very good at pettifoggery and seems to enjoy it.

He brushed aside the first House memorandum simply by affirming that it was unconstitutional, for the establishment of the House special committee, the conclusion of which was the basis of the memorandum, was illegal.

More relevantly, he has more than once referred to a provision in the 1945 Constitution that the President shall submit his accountability report to the MPR at the end of his term. It would not seem inconceivable that he would not even attend the MPR special session.

Then to say the least, we would be back to square one. Bickering among the political elite would resume with a vengeance, and so would the tug-of-war between the President and the legislature. Under such a scenario, the likelihood is that the country would be in for a new crisis.

What would be another alternative now that a special session of the MPR seems in the offing and gaining momentum, barring the impeachment of the President? Two possibilities may be considered.

One is that the special session is convened not to impeach the President, but to call a much earlier election. This would be a lose-lose solution, of not really a win-win solution. It may, however, be very costly, particularly as one can hardly foresee what might happen in the interim between the decision to call an election and the actual ballot day.

The most acceptable, and probably the least costly choice, therefore, would be for the special session of the MPR to reaffirm the transfer of greater presidential powers to Vice President Megawati. Let President Abdurrahman carry on his presidency until the end of his term, but let him reign, as it were, not rule the country.