Indonesia's presidential crisis: Four Scenarios

The following is an excerpt from a February report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, presented last week in Jakarta.

JAKARTA: The future of President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, hangs on the positions taken by the five major blocs in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). His own National Awakening Party (PKB), can be relied on to support him to the end.

The loose alliance of Muslim parties, the Central Axis, will continue to take the lead in calling for his dismissal. The votes of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and Golkar, together a majority in both assemblies, will be decisive.

In a close contest, it is also possible that the 38 votes of the appointed military group might determine the president's fate.

The position of Golkar, with 120 seats in the DPR and 182 in the MPR, is ambivalent. As the electoral vehicle of the Soeharto regime, Golkar is still seen by many as a hangover from the discredited past.

Although there is no lack of individual Golkar members who would willingly accept ministerial and other appointments under Gus Dur, the leadership is conscious of the burden imposed by the party's identification with Soeharto's 32-year authoritarian rule.

Some believe that the best way to improve Golkar's vote in the 2004 election is to keep out of government. Led by the Speaker of the DPR, Akbar Tandjung, Golkar has not been in the forefront of attacks on Gus Dur.

It seems to be adopting a "wait-and-see" approach, although individual members are prominent among those demanding the president's dismissal.

The crucial party is the PDI Perjuangan, whose leader, Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri, would automatically succeed to the presidency if Gus Dur were impeached.

By early 2001, it was clear that many of the PDI Perjuangan's 153 parliamentarians (and its 185 members in the MPR) resented the president's dismissive treatment of the vice president and failure to include major leaders of Megawati's party in his cabinet.

But the party was deeply divided over its strategy for bringing Megawati to power. So far, Megawati, who has little taste for the backstabbing that would inevitably accompany a final onslaught on Gus Dur, has preferred to wait until the 2004 election when she is confident her party will improve its performance and thus carry her to the presidency.

She is also acutely aware of the danger of establishing a precedent that could be used against her. She realizes that a successful move against Gus Dur would make her dependent on the parties that backed impeachment, and she does not relish relying on the goodwill of Golkar and the Muslim parties of the Central Axis led by Amien Rais.

If Gus Dur is to fall, Megawati hopes that he will eventually be persuaded to resign or transfer full executive power rather than face the ignominy of dismissal.

But if he stands firm and refuses to make fundamental concessions, would the PDI Perjuangan, which voted unanimously to initiate impeachment, remain committed to bringing the process to conclusion by dismissing the president?

The decision of the previously neutral military to support the DPR resolution to issue a memorandum was a further ominous signal for Gus Dur. Although the military's tone in the debate was very moderate, it seems certain not to stand in the way if PDI Perjuangan and Golkar vote for the president's dismissal.

The most likely scenarios are the following:

According to the first scenario, the DPR will reject the president's responses to the first and second memoranda, and a Special Session of the MPR will be held in about August. If the line-up of political forces in the DPR on Feb. 1 remains unchanged, President Abdurrahman will be dismissed and automatically replaced by the Vice President, Megawati.

The risk is that the dismissal of Gus Dur will provoke extra- parliamentary clashes between his supporters and those they blame for his fall. It is Megawati's hope that in anticipation of this outcome, Gus Dur will resign and enable a smooth transition without conflict in the streets.

However, Gus Dur is famous for his stubbornness, and those who know him well believe that he is unlikely to follow this course.

A second scenario was proposed by the Supreme Advisory Council (a body of "elder statesmen"), which suggested two alternatives. The first envisaged appointment of the Vice President as head of government while leaving the president as head of state.

In contrast to Gus Dur's transfer of executive tasks to the vice president last August, this arrangement would be formalized in an MPR decree.

The second variant envisages Gus Dur declaring himself non- active on grounds of ill-health and handing authority both as head of state and head of government to the Vice President, again reinforced by an MPR decree. It is very unlikely that Gus Dur would accept either alternative at present but he may find one or the other more attractive if his position becomes more desperate during the next months.

A third scenario is one in which Gus Dur attempts to win over members of the DPR during the next three months. This would involve the formation of a new cabinet in which the PDI Perjuangan would be a major component.

But an alliance between Gus Dur's PKB and the PDI Perjuangan, even with military support, would still fall short of a majority in the DPR and MPR. A new government would need the participation of another major party.

The obvious choice would be Golkar but it is also possible that Gus Dur might try to entice the largest of the Central Axis parties, the United Development Party (PPP), to join the cabinet.

However, even if such a cabinet were formed, it is not certain that the component parties could guarantee that all their members would back it. Megawati's support, or at least acquiescence, would be crucial for the success of this scheme.

If she could be mollified, a large number of her party members would follow her lead. In the final analysis, Gus Dur hopes that Megawati will still be unwilling to go through the rigors of a full-scale challenge to his presidency.

However it is most unlikely that Megawati and her party would accept an arrangement that left Gus Dur in full control of the government.

The greatest fear is that the sort of street conflict seen in East Java in early February might spread to other regions. Political rivalries in Jakarta have an impact on party supporters throughout the country.

Since January, big demonstrations, both pro- and anti-Gus Dur, have been held in Jakarta while smaller ones have occurred in provincial centers. So far major outbreaks of violence have been avoided except in East Java where the PKB's main base of support lies.

Following the DPR's vote in favor of the memorandum, members of youth organizations affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic organization in which Gus Dur is a leader -Ed.) were mobilized, and in several places, including the provincial capital, Surabaya, Golkar offices have been burnt down.

Attacks were also launched on schools and buildings linked to the modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, which was previously led by Amien Rais.

All the main parties have para-military youth organizations that are intended to keep order during political rallies but can easily turn to violence in crises such as the present one. PKB and NU leaders assert that they have done their best to prevent violence but they are not always able to control their emotional supporters.

If the situation deteriorated badly, a fourth scenario could be envisaged in which the constitutional steps might be abandoned and an unconstitutional "Philippine" (Estrada-Arroyo) solution could be repeated in Jakarta. Although the armed forces are not in a position to carry out a coup, they would play an important role in such a scenario.