Indonesia's presidential crisis: Four Scenarios

Indonesia's presidential crisis: Four Scenarios

The following is an excerpt from a February report by the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group, presented last week in
Jakarta.

JAKARTA: The future of President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus
Dur, hangs on the positions taken by the five major blocs in the
House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR). His own National Awakening Party (PKB), can be
relied on to support him to the end.

The loose alliance of Muslim parties, the Central Axis, will
continue to take the lead in calling for his dismissal. The votes
of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan)
and Golkar, together a majority in both assemblies, will be
decisive.

In a close contest, it is also possible that the 38 votes of
the appointed military group might determine the president's
fate.

The position of Golkar, with 120 seats in the DPR and 182 in
the MPR, is ambivalent. As the electoral vehicle of the Soeharto
regime, Golkar is still seen by many as a hangover from the
discredited past.

Although there is no lack of individual Golkar members who
would willingly accept ministerial and other appointments under
Gus Dur, the leadership is conscious of the burden imposed by the
party's identification with Soeharto's 32-year authoritarian
rule.

Some believe that the best way to improve Golkar's vote in the
2004 election is to keep out of government. Led by the Speaker of
the DPR, Akbar Tandjung, Golkar has not been in the forefront of
attacks on Gus Dur.

It seems to be adopting a "wait-and-see" approach, although
individual members are prominent among those demanding the
president's dismissal.

The crucial party is the PDI Perjuangan, whose leader, Vice
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, would automatically succeed to
the presidency if Gus Dur were impeached.

By early 2001, it was clear that many of the PDI Perjuangan's
153 parliamentarians (and its 185 members in the MPR) resented
the president's dismissive treatment of the vice president and
failure to include major leaders of Megawati's party in his
cabinet.

But the party was deeply divided over its strategy for
bringing Megawati to power. So far, Megawati, who has little
taste for the backstabbing that would inevitably accompany a
final onslaught on Gus Dur, has preferred to wait until the 2004
election when she is confident her party will improve its
performance and thus carry her to the presidency.

She is also acutely aware of the danger of establishing a
precedent that could be used against her. She realizes that a
successful move against Gus Dur would make her dependent on the
parties that backed impeachment, and she does not relish relying
on the goodwill of Golkar and the Muslim parties of the Central
Axis led by Amien Rais.

If Gus Dur is to fall, Megawati hopes that he will eventually
be persuaded to resign or transfer full executive power rather
than face the ignominy of dismissal.

But if he stands firm and refuses to make fundamental
concessions, would the PDI Perjuangan, which voted unanimously to
initiate impeachment, remain committed to bringing the process to
conclusion by dismissing the president?

The decision of the previously neutral military to support the
DPR resolution to issue a memorandum was a further ominous signal
for Gus Dur. Although the military's tone in the debate was very
moderate, it seems certain not to stand in the way if PDI
Perjuangan and Golkar vote for the president's dismissal.

The most likely scenarios are the following:

According to the first scenario, the DPR will reject the
president's responses to the first and second memoranda, and a
Special Session of the MPR will be held in about August. If the
line-up of political forces in the DPR on Feb. 1 remains
unchanged, President Abdurrahman will be dismissed and
automatically replaced by the Vice President, Megawati.

The risk is that the dismissal of Gus Dur will provoke extra-
parliamentary clashes between his supporters and those they blame
for his fall. It is Megawati's hope that in anticipation of this
outcome, Gus Dur will resign and enable a smooth transition
without conflict in the streets.

However, Gus Dur is famous for his stubbornness, and those who
know him well believe that he is unlikely to follow this course.

A second scenario was proposed by the Supreme Advisory Council
(a body of "elder statesmen"), which suggested two alternatives.
The first envisaged appointment of the Vice President as head of
government while leaving the president as head of state.

In contrast to Gus Dur's transfer of executive tasks to the
vice president last August, this arrangement would be formalized
in an MPR decree.

The second variant envisages Gus Dur declaring himself non-
active on grounds of ill-health and handing authority both as
head of state and head of government to the Vice President, again
reinforced by an MPR decree. It is very unlikely that Gus Dur
would accept either alternative at present but he may find one or
the other more attractive if his position becomes more desperate
during the next months.

A third scenario is one in which Gus Dur attempts to win over
members of the DPR during the next three months. This would
involve the formation of a new cabinet in which the PDI
Perjuangan would be a major component.

But an alliance between Gus Dur's PKB and the PDI Perjuangan,
even with military support, would still fall short of a majority
in the DPR and MPR. A new government would need the participation
of another major party.

The obvious choice would be Golkar but it is also possible
that Gus Dur might try to entice the largest of the Central Axis
parties, the United Development Party (PPP), to join the cabinet.

However, even if such a cabinet were formed, it is not certain
that the component parties could guarantee that all their members
would back it. Megawati's support, or at least acquiescence,
would be crucial for the success of this scheme.

If she could be mollified, a large number of her party members
would follow her lead. In the final analysis, Gus Dur hopes that
Megawati will still be unwilling to go through the rigors of a
full-scale challenge to his presidency.

However it is most unlikely that Megawati and her party would
accept an arrangement that left Gus Dur in full control of the
government.

The greatest fear is that the sort of street conflict seen in
East Java in early February might spread to other regions.
Political rivalries in Jakarta have an impact on party supporters
throughout the country.

Since January, big demonstrations, both pro- and anti-Gus Dur,
have been held in Jakarta while smaller ones have occurred in
provincial centers. So far major outbreaks of violence have been
avoided except in East Java where the PKB's main base of support
lies.

Following the DPR's vote in favor of the memorandum, members
of youth organizations affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic
organization in which Gus Dur is a leader -Ed.) were mobilized,
and in several places, including the provincial capital,
Surabaya, Golkar offices have been burnt down.

Attacks were also launched on schools and buildings linked to
the modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, which was
previously led by Amien Rais.

All the main parties have para-military youth organizations
that are intended to keep order during political rallies but can
easily turn to violence in crises such as the present one. PKB
and NU leaders assert that they have done their best to prevent
violence but they are not always able to control their emotional
supporters.

If the situation deteriorated badly, a fourth scenario could
be envisaged in which the constitutional steps might be abandoned
and an unconstitutional "Philippine" (Estrada-Arroyo) solution
could be repeated in Jakarta. Although the armed forces are not
in a position to carry out a coup, they would play an important
role in such a scenario.