Indonesia's politics enters new ball game
Indonesia's politics enters new ball game
By Gerry van Klinken
SYDNEY (JP): It still is not clear what kind of government
will emerge from the elections whose results were declared last
week. Some powerful Jakarta elites, unhappy with the people's
choice, may manage to form a government that ignores the
elections. Even so, the results give a rare snapshot of the
political map at the grassroots. In particular, the regional
distribution of seats won by various parties helps answer the
question many asked beforehand: "Will these elections heal
Indonesia's weakened politics body?"
The first impression is encouraging for all those who had
hoped for a simple result to reflect the national mind. Defying
pessimists, who said 48 parties would only produce chaos, the
results are almost as simple as a New Order election, but with a
huge swing away from Golkar toward Megawati Sukarnoputri's
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). The
three New Order parties -- Golkar, United Development Party (PPP)
and PDI Perjuangan -- wrapped up among them 72 percent of the
seats. They each won seats in practically every province. The big
five -- the New Order three plus Abdurrahman Wahid's National
Awakening Party (PKB) and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party
(PAN) -- won over 90 percent of all seats. Just eight parties won
over 96 percent of them.
The swing against Golkar of 50 percent compared with the 1997
elections was strong right across the nation. Golkar achieved its
highest result in South Sulawesi, but even there it suffered a
swing of 25 percent. PDI Perjuangan at 33 percent of the vote won
half as many votes again as its nearest rival Golkar, though less
than a third as many seats because of the heavier weighting for
votes outside Java. PDI Perjuangan, we must conclude, was the
people's choice. This result does not suggest Indonesia is
incapable of achieving a national mind under conditions of
freedom.
However, there is a regional pattern to the distribution of
seats. While Golkar took a pummeling nationwide, the areas where
Golkar obtained more than the national average of 26 percent of
the seats were all outside the Java heartland. In Java-Bali,
Golkar obtained 17 percent of the seats in each province, whereas
in the outer islands it was 36 percent. In as much as it was
saved at all, Golkar's bacon was saved in the outer islands.
Moreover, Golkar's votes were strongest in rural areas. Town
voters, also outside Java, often protested by choosing other
parties.
In the past, Golkar relied on two things to win elections:
military force and spreading the largess among local elites. This
was the first time when both were in short supply. The military
mostly stood back and let this election run its course. And the
economic crisis left Golkar short of the necessary generosity.
The huge swing against Golkar indicates it never really won the
people's heart.
The swing to PDI Perjuangan, with little money to throw
around, suggested a rediscovered force in Indonesian electoral
politics -- the force of charisma. But the swing was greatest in
Java, while a strong Golkar vote persisted in outer island rural
areas. This is an interesting pattern, one with a long history.
Golkar's approach to politics was reminiscent of the colonial
Dutch: paternalistic, nonparticipatory and development-oriented.
It worked for both Golkar and the Dutch in the outer islands, a
thinly populated frontier region of plantations and mines. Both
felt nervous about the potentially explosive populism of Java.
The Dutch only once came close to panicking -- that was when the
communist party, PKI, launched an uprising on Java and
West Sumatra in 1926/1927. Golkar always won below average votes
on Java.
During their brief occupation of the archipelago, only the
Japanese 16th Army on Java felt compelled to swing with Java's
populism by coopting Sukarno. Elsewhere, the Japanese ran an
entirely nonparticipatory regime. The revolutionary republic of
the late 1940s was largely confined to Java.
The perennially strong Golkar vote in the outer islands
reflects that region's frontier "colonial" character. In its
poorer parts, much of the urban elite is dependent on employment
in the civil service. In the resource-rich western part of the
archipelago, other elites benefit from export industries such as
cash crops, mining and forestry. These industries were not badly
affected by the economic crisis that brought so much misery
to the cities of Java and that brought down Soeharto. Such local
elites in turn played their part in ensuring a Golkar victory
there.
But these areas are also wracked with "colonial" violence.
Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya are outer island regions where
ruling elites have lost touch with the aspirations of the people.
If the New Order appears to linger in the outer islands, the
heartland experienced a renewal in this election. A friend in
Bali's Ubud described to me a "golden, crystalline feeling" on
the day. People lined up quietly for hours waiting to cast their
vote. They were determined to set right the wrongs they felt were
committed under Golkar. Afterwards, they felt proud of what they
did in that booth. The PDI Perjuangan protest vote in Bali was
strong in rural as well as urban areas. Clearly, democracy should
consist of more than a huge protest vote, but it was an inspiring
start. Most of Java, where half the country's population lives,
was the same, as were parts of Sumatra.
However, the pattern of "renewal in Java-Bali" versus
"conservatism in the outer islands" cannot be the last word on
this election result. The reason is simple. Golkar can no longer
be a party of hegemony in the periphery if it has lost control of
the center. This is the end of an era. Golkar might well become
like Australia's National Party, a struggling rural party
looking for coalition partners. However impressed local elites in
the outer islands may have been by the long experience of
Golkar's hegemonic powers, that is today just a memory.
We now need to think of Indonesia as a multiparty patchwork.
PDI Perjuangan dominance extends far beyond Java into parts of
Sumatra, Kalimantan and Maluku. We see the PPP emerging as a
credible party in Aceh. PAN, a completely new party, is a
creative and credible force in the towns of western Sumatra, as
well as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The PKB, another new party,
dominates East Java.
Golkar can't run Indonesia from a base in Sulawesi and a
contested foothold elsewhere in the eastern archipelago. Not even
PDI Perjuangan has hegemony. Politics has entered a new ball
game, a shake up at least, one that moves from city to country,
and which might bring back a salutary interest in what goes on on
the ground. That's always provided Jakarta doesn't ignore the
whole thing.
Gerry van Klinken Ph D. (editor@insideindonesia.org) edits
Inside Indonesia magazine.
By Gerry van Klinken
SYDNEY (JP): It still is not clear what kind of government
will emerge from the elections whose results were declared last
week. Some powerful Jakarta elites, unhappy with the people's
choice, may manage to form a government that ignores the
elections. Even so, the results give a rare snapshot of the
political map at the grassroots. In particular, the regional
distribution of seats won by various parties helps answer the
question many asked beforehand: "Will these elections heal
Indonesia's weakened politics body?"
The first impression is encouraging for all those who had
hoped for a simple result to reflect the national mind. Defying
pessimists, who said 48 parties would only produce chaos, the
results are almost as simple as a New Order election, but with a
huge swing away from Golkar toward Megawati Sukarnoputri's
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). The
three New Order parties -- Golkar, United Development Party (PPP)
and PDI Perjuangan -- wrapped up among them 72 percent of the
seats. They each won seats in practically every province. The big
five -- the New Order three plus Abdurrahman Wahid's National
Awakening Party (PKB) and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party
(PAN) -- won over 90 percent of all seats. Just eight parties won
over 96 percent of them.
The swing against Golkar of 50 percent compared with the 1997
elections was strong right across the nation. Golkar achieved its
highest result in South Sulawesi, but even there it suffered a
swing of 25 percent. PDI Perjuangan at 33 percent of the vote won
half as many votes again as its nearest rival Golkar, though less
than a third as many seats because of the heavier weighting for
votes outside Java. PDI Perjuangan, we must conclude, was the
people's choice. This result does not suggest Indonesia is
incapable of achieving a national mind under conditions of
freedom.
However, there is a regional pattern to the distribution of
seats. While Golkar took a pummeling nationwide, the areas where
Golkar obtained more than the national average of 26 percent of
the seats were all outside the Java heartland. In Java-Bali,
Golkar obtained 17 percent of the seats in each province, whereas
in the outer islands it was 36 percent. In as much as it was
saved at all, Golkar's bacon was saved in the outer islands.
Moreover, Golkar's votes were strongest in rural areas. Town
voters, also outside Java, often protested by choosing other
parties.
In the past, Golkar relied on two things to win elections:
military force and spreading the largess among local elites. This
was the first time when both were in short supply. The military
mostly stood back and let this election run its course. And the
economic crisis left Golkar short of the necessary generosity.
The huge swing against Golkar indicates it never really won the
people's heart.
The swing to PDI Perjuangan, with little money to throw
around, suggested a rediscovered force in Indonesian electoral
politics -- the force of charisma. But the swing was greatest in
Java, while a strong Golkar vote persisted in outer island rural
areas. This is an interesting pattern, one with a long history.
Golkar's approach to politics was reminiscent of the colonial
Dutch: paternalistic, nonparticipatory and development-oriented.
It worked for both Golkar and the Dutch in the outer islands, a
thinly populated frontier region of plantations and mines. Both
felt nervous about the potentially explosive populism of Java.
The Dutch only once came close to panicking -- that was when the
communist party, PKI, launched an uprising on Java and
West Sumatra in 1926/1927. Golkar always won below average votes
on Java.
During their brief occupation of the archipelago, only the
Japanese 16th Army on Java felt compelled to swing with Java's
populism by coopting Sukarno. Elsewhere, the Japanese ran an
entirely nonparticipatory regime. The revolutionary republic of
the late 1940s was largely confined to Java.
The perennially strong Golkar vote in the outer islands
reflects that region's frontier "colonial" character. In its
poorer parts, much of the urban elite is dependent on employment
in the civil service. In the resource-rich western part of the
archipelago, other elites benefit from export industries such as
cash crops, mining and forestry. These industries were not badly
affected by the economic crisis that brought so much misery
to the cities of Java and that brought down Soeharto. Such local
elites in turn played their part in ensuring a Golkar victory
there.
But these areas are also wracked with "colonial" violence.
Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya are outer island regions where
ruling elites have lost touch with the aspirations of the people.
If the New Order appears to linger in the outer islands, the
heartland experienced a renewal in this election. A friend in
Bali's Ubud described to me a "golden, crystalline feeling" on
the day. People lined up quietly for hours waiting to cast their
vote. They were determined to set right the wrongs they felt were
committed under Golkar. Afterwards, they felt proud of what they
did in that booth. The PDI Perjuangan protest vote in Bali was
strong in rural as well as urban areas. Clearly, democracy should
consist of more than a huge protest vote, but it was an inspiring
start. Most of Java, where half the country's population lives,
was the same, as were parts of Sumatra.
However, the pattern of "renewal in Java-Bali" versus
"conservatism in the outer islands" cannot be the last word on
this election result. The reason is simple. Golkar can no longer
be a party of hegemony in the periphery if it has lost control of
the center. This is the end of an era. Golkar might well become
like Australia's National Party, a struggling rural party
looking for coalition partners. However impressed local elites in
the outer islands may have been by the long experience of
Golkar's hegemonic powers, that is today just a memory.
We now need to think of Indonesia as a multiparty patchwork.
PDI Perjuangan dominance extends far beyond Java into parts of
Sumatra, Kalimantan and Maluku. We see the PPP emerging as a
credible party in Aceh. PAN, a completely new party, is a
creative and credible force in the towns of western Sumatra, as
well as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The PKB, another new party,
dominates East Java.
Golkar can't run Indonesia from a base in Sulawesi and a
contested foothold elsewhere in the eastern archipelago. Not even
PDI Perjuangan has hegemony. Politics has entered a new ball
game, a shake up at least, one that moves from city to country,
and which might bring back a salutary interest in what goes on on
the ground. That's always provided Jakarta doesn't ignore the
whole thing.
Gerry van Klinken Ph D. (editor@insideindonesia.org) edits
Inside Indonesia magazine.