Indonesia's political Islam finds voice, limitations

Endy M. Bayuni, Deputy Chief Editor, The Jakarta Post, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Political Islam has been making significant inroads ever since Indonesia embarked on democracy in 1998. To the casual observer, the specter of Islamist political forces overrunning secular parties in democratic elections seems all too real in a country where nearly 90 percent of its 220 million people are Muslims.

If it happened in predominantly Muslim countries like Algeria and Turkey (where the military intervened and trampled democracy), then it could also happen in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, so the argument goes.

The reality on the ground portrays quite a different picture. As Islamist political parties discover their voice in a democratic Indonesia, they also find limitations of their influence in a nation that has had a long tradition of religious pluralism and tolerance.

Political Islam today may play a greater role than in the past in charting Indonesia's course, but it is unlikely that it will become the dominant force anytime soon. The ground will continue to be dominated by the secular nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), chaired by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Golkar, the party that kept Soeharto in power for more than 30 years until his downfall in 1998.

Still, there are concerns that Islam is rapidly intruding into the political arena. These concerns are founded on indicators and trends that typically include the following:

Bolder, open expressions that call for turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, or for the introduction of sharia (Islamic law).

An aggressive campaign to have sharia written into the Constitution.

Hamzah Haz' election as vice president in 2001. Haz chairs the Islamist United Development Party (PPP), which came third in the 1999 elections.

The emergence of new political parties, besides PPP, and of organizations that use Islamic attributes.

The adoption of sharia at local levels, starting in Aceh and, more recently, in a number of regencies.

The establishment of Islamic paramilitary groups like Laskar Jihad, which sent its volunteers to Maluku and Central Sulawesi to fight in wars between Christians and Muslims, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), whose members vandalized bars and nightclubs.

The bomb attacks, including the ones in Bali nightclubs that killed over 200, mostly Western tourists last year, perpetrated by radical Islamic groups.

Most of these are phenomena that would have been hard to find during Soeharto's rule between 1966 and 1998. Soeharto regarded political Islam the greatest threat to national security next to communism, and he used the Army effectively to decimate Islamic political forces, including moderate voices, from the outset of his rule.

Today, with freedom of expression and of association guaranteed by the Constitution, Muslims and political Islam no longer need to suppress their aspirations. Now that the lid has been lifted, we find various kinds of political expression from Indonesian Muslims. And we also learn that political Islam comes in several voices. Some, unfortunately, use violence as a means to achieve their goals.

The radical groups operate from the fringes. But because they have been proven deadly, and very vocal, their voice often drowns out those of the moderate Islamic political forces, which make up the majority of political Islam in Indonesia.

It is, however, erroneous to lump radical groups with the political forces that fight for their goals by peaceful means. Political Islam has a legitimate claim to existence in a democratic Indonesia. The radical groups, whose actions border on crime or terrorism, are undermining democracy. Banishing the former will produce fodder for more radicalism. Banishing the latter is a necessity to protect democracy.

Leading the pack of Islamist parties is Hamzah Haz' PPP, a party that Soeharto created in 1972 through forced amalgamation of nine Islamic political parties. While professing to represent the interests of Muslims throughout the Soeharto years, PPP was barred from calling itself an Islamic party, or from using Islamic banners and symbols. Since 1998, however, PPP has started to call itself an Islamist party, and made the introduction of sharia in the country one of its political goals.

PPP does not have a monopoly over political Islam. Other groups -- dozens, in fact -- have their own ideas about how best to represent Muslims. The second-largest Islamist party is the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) whose founders claim to be the true heirs of the Masjumi, the unified Islamist party that was banned by Sukarno in the 1950s. Third is the Justice Party (PK), which draws its support chiefly from educated young urban Muslims. In all, more than 10 other Islamist parties emerged after 1998.

The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), by far the largest Muslim social organization in the country with more than 40 million loyal followers, has its own idea. The group founded the National Awakening Party (PKB), but its leaders were quick to establish its pluralist-nationalist credentials. Since it is not campaigning for an Islamic state or for sharia, PKB could hardly be counted as an Islamist party.

Islamist parties learned of their limitations as early as 1999, when Indonesia held its first democratic elections in over 40 years. Only three Islamist parties out of the pack won seats in the legislature. PPP, PBB and PKS pooled barely 15 percent of the vote between them.

PDI Perjuangan and Golkar, the two nationalist forces, polled more than 55 percent. The National Awakening Party (PKB) came fourth behind PPP, adding another 11 percent of voters who did not agree with the idea of an Islamic state in the country. PKB chief patron Abdurrahman Wahid, a dedicated pluralist, was elected president in 1999.

Compared with Indonesia's only other democratic elections in 1955, the 1999 outcome was a setback for political Islam. Then, the Islamist forces, which contested the elections under one party, the Masjumi, polled just over 20 percent of the vote.

More than any other phenomenon or trend, the election outcome is the best indicator of the popularity (or unpopularity) of Islamist parties and their causes. Going by the two elections, political Islam was not all that popular in 1955, and is even less popular today. All surveys in the run-up to the April 2004 elections point to the Islamist parties barely making progress. Religious pluralism and political inclusivism, as represented by the nationalist-secular parties, it appear, will still carry the day for Indonesia for the foreseeable future.

But past election outcomes tell us another aspect about voters: Between 15 percent and 20 percent of the population support the causes that are represented by political Islam. That means that there will continue to be a role for Islamist political parties in Indonesia. These parties will continue to push their Islamist agenda, even from a position of minority, because that is what is expected of them by their constituents. It is up to these parties to articulate the aspirations of their Muslim constituents.

Islamist parties were repeatedly defeated in their campaign to write sharia into the Constitution, but they have had occasional victories in other areas. This year, for example, they succeeded in promoting the national education law, which requires Christian schools to hire Muslim teachers to teach Muslim students.

Political Islam is the logical consequence of an Indonesia that is moving toward democracy. It will remain a significant minority force, but one that is certainly more vocal than it was five years ago, and one that will flex its political muscle from time to time. Hopefully, like the rest of the political forces in the country, it is also a maturing force, one that plays a constructive role in building a democratic Indonesia.

The writer is currently a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University, U.S.