Indonesia's political Islam finds voice, limitations

Indonesia's political Islam finds voice, limitations

Endy M. Bayuni, Deputy Chief Editor, The Jakarta Post,
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Political Islam has been making significant inroads ever since
Indonesia embarked on democracy in 1998. To the casual observer,
the specter of Islamist political forces overrunning secular
parties in democratic elections seems all too real in a country
where nearly 90 percent of its 220 million people are Muslims.

If it happened in predominantly Muslim countries like Algeria and
Turkey (where the military intervened and trampled democracy),
then it could also happen in Indonesia, the country with the
world's largest Muslim population, so the argument goes.

The reality on the ground portrays quite a different picture.
As Islamist political parties discover their voice in a
democratic Indonesia, they also find limitations of their
influence in a nation that has had a long tradition of religious
pluralism and tolerance.

Political Islam today may play a greater role than in the past
in charting Indonesia's course, but it is unlikely that it will
become the dominant force anytime soon. The ground will continue
to be dominated by the secular nationalist Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), chaired by President Megawati
Soekarnoputri, and Golkar, the party that kept Soeharto in power
for more than 30 years until his downfall in 1998.

Still, there are concerns that Islam is rapidly intruding into
the political arena. These concerns are founded on indicators and
trends that typically include the following:

Bolder, open expressions that call for turning Indonesia into
an Islamic state, or for the introduction of sharia (Islamic
law).

An aggressive campaign to have sharia written into the
Constitution.

Hamzah Haz' election as vice president in 2001. Haz chairs the
Islamist United Development Party (PPP), which came third in the
1999 elections.

The emergence of new political parties, besides PPP, and of
organizations that use Islamic attributes.

The adoption of sharia at local levels, starting in Aceh and,
more recently, in a number of regencies.

The establishment of Islamic paramilitary groups like Laskar
Jihad, which sent its volunteers to Maluku and Central Sulawesi
to fight in wars between Christians and Muslims, and the Islamic
Defenders Front (FPI), whose members vandalized bars and
nightclubs.

The bomb attacks, including the ones in Bali nightclubs that
killed over 200, mostly Western tourists last year, perpetrated
by radical Islamic groups.

Most of these are phenomena that would have been hard to find
during Soeharto's rule between 1966 and 1998. Soeharto regarded
political Islam the greatest threat to national security next to
communism, and he used the Army effectively to decimate Islamic
political forces, including moderate voices, from the outset of
his rule.

Today, with freedom of expression and of association
guaranteed by the Constitution, Muslims and political Islam no
longer need to suppress their aspirations. Now that the lid has
been lifted, we find various kinds of political expression from
Indonesian Muslims. And we also learn that political Islam comes
in several voices. Some, unfortunately, use violence as a means
to achieve their goals.

The radical groups operate from the fringes. But because they
have been proven deadly, and very vocal, their voice often drowns
out those of the moderate Islamic political forces, which make up
the majority of political Islam in Indonesia.

It is, however, erroneous to lump radical groups with the
political forces that fight for their goals by peaceful means.
Political Islam has a legitimate claim to existence in a
democratic Indonesia. The radical groups, whose actions border on
crime or terrorism, are undermining democracy. Banishing the
former will produce fodder for more radicalism. Banishing the
latter is a necessity to protect democracy.

Leading the pack of Islamist parties is Hamzah Haz' PPP, a
party that Soeharto created in 1972 through forced amalgamation
of nine Islamic political parties. While professing to represent
the interests of Muslims throughout the Soeharto years, PPP was
barred from calling itself an Islamic party, or from using
Islamic banners and symbols. Since 1998, however, PPP has started
to call itself an Islamist party, and made the introduction of
sharia in the country one of its political goals.

PPP does not have a monopoly over political Islam. Other
groups -- dozens, in fact -- have their own ideas about how best
to represent Muslims. The second-largest Islamist party is the
Crescent and Star Party (PBB) whose founders claim to be the true
heirs of the Masjumi, the unified Islamist party that was banned
by Sukarno in the 1950s. Third is the Justice Party (PK), which
draws its support chiefly from educated young urban Muslims. In
all, more than 10 other Islamist parties emerged after 1998.

The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), by far the largest Muslim social
organization in the country with more than 40 million loyal
followers, has its own idea. The group founded the National
Awakening Party (PKB), but its leaders were quick to establish
its pluralist-nationalist credentials. Since it is not
campaigning for an Islamic state or for sharia, PKB could hardly
be counted as an Islamist party.

Islamist parties learned of their limitations as early as
1999, when Indonesia held its first democratic elections in over
40 years. Only three Islamist parties out of the pack won seats
in the legislature. PPP, PBB and PKS pooled barely 15 percent of
the vote between them.

PDI Perjuangan and Golkar, the two nationalist forces, polled
more than 55 percent. The National Awakening Party (PKB) came
fourth behind PPP, adding another 11 percent of voters who did
not agree with the idea of an Islamic state in the country. PKB
chief patron Abdurrahman Wahid, a dedicated pluralist, was
elected president in 1999.

Compared with Indonesia's only other democratic elections in
1955, the 1999 outcome was a setback for political Islam. Then,
the Islamist forces, which contested the elections under one
party, the Masjumi, polled just over 20 percent of the vote.

More than any other phenomenon or trend, the election outcome
is the best indicator of the popularity (or unpopularity) of
Islamist parties and their causes. Going by the two elections,
political Islam was not all that popular in 1955, and is even
less popular today. All surveys in the run-up to the April 2004
elections point to the Islamist parties barely making progress.
Religious pluralism and political inclusivism, as represented by
the nationalist-secular parties, it appear, will still carry the
day for Indonesia for the foreseeable future.

But past election outcomes tell us another aspect about
voters: Between 15 percent and 20 percent of the population
support the causes that are represented by political Islam. That
means that there will continue to be a role for Islamist
political parties in Indonesia. These parties will continue to
push their Islamist agenda, even from a position of minority,
because that is what is expected of them by their constituents.
It is up to these parties to articulate the aspirations of their
Muslim constituents.

Islamist parties were repeatedly defeated in their campaign to
write sharia into the Constitution, but they have had occasional
victories in other areas. This year, for example, they succeeded
in promoting the national education law, which requires Christian
schools to hire Muslim teachers to teach Muslim students.

Political Islam is the logical consequence of an Indonesia
that is moving toward democracy. It will remain a significant
minority force, but one that is certainly more vocal than it was
five years ago, and one that will flex its political muscle from
time to time. Hopefully, like the rest of the political forces in
the country, it is also a maturing force, one that plays a
constructive role in building a democratic Indonesia.

The writer is currently a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University,
U.S.