Indonesia's long-term objectives

Indonesia's long-term objectives

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): The country has been in a state of fervor since
the onset of the financial crisis in July 1997. Rapid changes
have occurred across the board and affected every segment of
society.

Yet, change is taking place in a very disorderly way. It is
because the political system stalled during the last 20 years of
Soeharto's reign due to his constant refusal to accept any
change, which he considered a threat to his retention of power.

The pace of change is chaotic because political institutions
are weak. Under Soeharto, the political system became rigid so
that when change becomes unavoidable, it takes place in a
volatile and explosive way.

Chaos and anarchy are detrimental to efforts to revive the
economy. The transitional government under President B.J. Habibie
-- merely a continuation of the Soeharto regime without Soeharto
-- is unable to handle the situation. It is because it lacks the
legitimacy and authority, as well as the political will, to
undertake the necessary reforms, except under pressure from the
public, especially opposition forces and the students.

Much more is needed to overcome the crisis than those
reactive, ad hoc and temporary measures. Above all, the
Indonesian leaders and public have to have a clear vision of what
they want to achieve for the country's future so that they are
not easily swayed and influenced by focusing only on short-term
needs to resolve the crisis. And this will also help to overcome
the pessimism and feelings of despair in facing the crisis. This
is important because it may take a decade before the nation can
overcome its main challenges.

Considering the demands of the people -- expressed during the
last 20 months in reaction to the abuses and misdeeds of the
Soeharto regime -- three main objectives for the future are
immediately obvious.

The first is democracy. This does not simply mean a formal
participatory political system with a general election of
representatives based on a multiparty system, but materially a
guarantee of political rights. These include freedom of speech
and organization; the rule of law and not of men; the right to
change governments and, last but not least, an active civil
society to give meaning to democracy.

The most immediate task now is to have fair elections on June
7. This is a prerequisite to the rebuilding of Indonesia, because
only through a fair general election can the country have a new
legitimate government. Only then will the government be able to
undertake the critical reforms in the political and economic
fields, which are in themselves very difficult and which need a
lot of sacrifices from everybody.

One general election cannot solve all the problems in the
political, social and economic fields. Patience could only be
expected from the general populace if it was asked for by a
solid, legitimate government with majority support. A simple
majority, with a vote of 50 percent plus, will not do the job.

Therefore, the new government must be a broad-based government
with at least two-thirds of the seats in the legislature. This
means that the three big parties -- Megawati Soekarnoputri's
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan),
Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB), and
Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN) -- have to cooperate and
form a viable coalition government.

Ideally, this should be announced before the election. It will
function as a guarantee to the Indonesian people and the
international community that a solid government is possible after
the elections. It should also help calm down the political
atmosphere before the elections and during the campaign that
otherwise could become uncontrollable.

Of course, it is anybody's guess whether the three big parties
could establish a strong coalition. They are potentially the big
winners in the elections because their leaders have certain name
recognition and they have an infrastructure based on well
established social or political organizations. PDI Perjuangan is
based on the old Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), established
in 1927, and PKB is an outgrowth of the largest Muslim
organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926. PAN relies on
the support of the second largest Muslim organization,
Muhammadiyah, established in 1912.

The three parties are already cooperating at the working level
in putting pressure on legislation for general elections and on
political parties, which helped produce decent political laws
that are critical for a level playing field for the holding of
general elections. The real problem concerns relations among the
leaders of the three parties but, in a survival situation, they
are bound to cooperate.

Another problem in establishing a democracy is the role of the
judiciary in implementing the rule of law. This is an urgent
matter because the Indonesian judiciary is archaic and corrupt.

Political rights, especially freedom of speech, are of
critical importance, and efforts to curb them by the government
should be challenged. Granted, there is always the possibility of
irresponsibility by a member of the mass media, which should then
be taken to court. But censorship in whatever form should be
avoided because freedom of speech and opinion is a political
right that should always be guarded jealously by the people,
especially civil society.

The second objective is full autonomy of the regions. In fact,
the idea of federalism is not a bad one for a country as big and
diverse as Indonesia. Historically, it was an anathema to the
freedom fighters of 1945 because it was proposed by the Dutch as
a neocolonialist tactic. However, it does make sense to debate
this thoroughly in the future. For now, full autonomy for the
provinces is a political imperative; otherwise the center can no
longer hold following the heavy-handedness during the past three
decades.

The newly approved law on decentralization and autonomy does
include full-fledged autonomy, where the central government only
has defense, foreign affairs, the judiciary, monetary affairs and
some fiscal policies under its control. The rest will be in the
hands of provinces. This is a good start, but its presence should
not be an excuse to limit future developments.

East Timor is, of course, a special case. The right of self-
determination after a few years of transition with full autonomy
is still an option for Indonesians and the East Timorese after
the general election and with a new government in charge. It is
clear that both the offer of special status as a final solution
and independence in early 2000 is not a realistic or honorable
solution.

In the end, Indonesians still believe in the one Indonesian
state and nation that is based on the strong sense of nationalism
that emerged in 1908, something which cannot be discarded easily.
However, this sense of nationalism must be nurtured into a
democratic and just society to take root and flourish.

The third objective is social justice. This is a long-term
objective and should be undertaken gradually and with
transparency based on the rule of law. It should not involve a
forced transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor.

The challenge is to have more inclusive economic development
and empowering the small people, while at the same time
guaranteeing there is healthy competition among the big
enterprises. This is a politically loaded issue in Indonesia.

At issue is not only the establishment of economic democracy,
but also the racial connotations of the problem. It has been
argued, wrongly, that the Chinese-Indonesian minority controls up
to 70 percent of the economy. It is a myth. At the most, about 30
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) is contributed by
activities under the control of Chinese-Indonesians. And this
appears to be rapidly diminishing because many of their companies
that have been severely affected by the financial crisis will
soon end up becoming foreign owned.

However, their involvement in the economy will remain
significant. They also believe that it is important to
progressively increase the share of indigenous Indonesians in the
economy, as long as this is undertaken in a transparent way and
based on the rule of law.

Malaysia's affirmative policy for the bumiputra is one model,
although it would result in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic
(KKN) practices if not implemented correctly. Nelson Mandela's
model for South Africa also has been mentioned as an alternative,
where big White African companies are placed under a better
competition regulation while small Black African companies are
given greater opportunities and are being empowered.

Whatever strategy is chosen, it should result from a thorough
examination among mainstream economists and then among the public
in order to get the necessary support for its implementation.
But, first, the economic reforms have to be resolutely in place.

And a new team of economists, partly technocratic and partly
political, has to cooperate in implementing a common strategy of
economic reforms and development.

Adoption of different and conflicting strategies and policies,
which is characteristic of the Habibie Cabinet, is damaging to
the economy and to restoring confidence in the economy. Indonesia
will be in a critical state of affairs economically for some time
to come, and it just cannot afford a division among its policy
makers.

The proposed group of economists in the new coalition
government has to be able to formulate a new strategy and propose
it to the public for debate. Among the issues involved should be
the new strategy of overcoming discrepancies in income among
groups in society, including among ethnic groups.

Additionally, there is the issue of establishing a social
safety net and the future social welfare system.

The new strategy also should be based on the recognition that
globalization is here to stay and that the Indonesian economy is
inevitably going to become more integrated into the global
economy. The challenge is to be able to involve the Indonesian
people at large, and in so doing make them aware of and accept
these new realities. They must realize that there is no
alternative to growth and development in the future than by
riding the wave of globalization.

The writer is chairman of the supervisory board of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.