Indonesia's image problem overseas: Can SBY fix it?

S.P. Seth, Sydney

Among the myriad problems facing President Susilo Bambang Yudhhoyono, the one that doesn't receive adequate attention concerns its external image. Frankly, Indonesia has an image problem abroad.

After independence, the country had its ups and downs. Under President Sukarno Indonesia became one of the pioneers of the non-aligned movement, starting with the Bandung conference of 1955. However, it tended to drift into lost causes, partly dictated by its internal political compulsions. The growth of a large communist movement, inclined towards communist China, became a factor in President Sukarno's honeymoon with Beijing. Which put Indonesia at odds with the United States-led free world.

But the abortive communist coup of 1965 radically altered the internal political landscape. It brought in Soeharto's dictatorship. The communist party and its supporters were systematically hunted. China was shunned, being somehow connected with the communist coup. The new Soeharto regime won US support, with its embassy and intelligence community reportedly helping the military regime (they supplied lists of communist members and their sympathizers) with the extermination of their communist foes.

Indonesia thus became an honorary member of the free-world during the Cold War period. Since it didn't join any formal security pact or alliance, it also remained non-aligned.

At the same time, it sought to expand its regional role through the formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN too came to be viewed by some as a regional extension of the free world, a political counter of sorts to stem the tide of communism in Asia.

Much later, in the nineties, Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) became a promising regional forum to promote free trade. Indonesia became quite prominent with the Bogor Conference, considered significant in the free trade trajectory.

There was no Cold War in the nineties. APEC was spawned to advance the cause of regional trade liberalization. Asia-Pacific was experiencing high economic growth rates, and there was much talk of the approaching 21st century being the Pacific century.

Indonesia was among the front ranks of the upcoming Asian economies, and Soeharto was the father of its modernization. There was a lot of buzz in Asia about the relevance and uniqueness of Asian values, accounting for its political stability and economic growth.

But that was a spurious debate, and the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998 put paid to it. Indonesia became its largest victim, with Soeharto forced to quit.

The two things going in Indonesia's favor no longer operated. The Cold War had been over for some years now, and Indonesia was no longer a strategic asset in that context. Its economic miracle (as it was) too disappeared. It was now plunged into an uncertain transition-its future anybody's guess.

In this state of vulnerability, Indonesia found itself having to grapple with East Timor. In 1975 when it annexed the former Portuguese colony, it didn't create much international furor. The independence movement there was left-leaning. The 'free world' didn't want to take a chance on East Timor's independence lest it might complicate the Cold War strategic balance in the region.

Therefore it looked the other way, allowing Jakarta to get on with the task of incorporating and managing it. It would have been very difficult for Indonesia to annex East Timor in the midst of opposition from the United States and Australia and the rest of the Western camp.

But with Indonesia in turmoil after the Asian economic crisis and Soeharto's fall, East Timorese resistance now had an actively sympathetic international constituency. It is no secret that Jakarta's rule was very unpopular in East Timor. It held a referendum (with President B.J. Habibie apparently keen on it-- in a state of pique it would seem) and lost it.

With reports of large scale militia killings and devastation (with TNI's alleged encouragement/involvement), Indonesia's image got another battering. Indonesia was also plunged into communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and elsewhere. Aceh and Papua continue to complicate the picture.

Indonesia, therefore, has some time been seen as a failing state; though the recent direct election of Susilo as the new President has raised hopes. Internationally (in the United States and Australia, particularly), Susilo is seen in a positive light as someone committed to fight terrorism.

Which brings us to a new facet of Indonesia's international image as the ideological center of South East Asian terrorism, inspired and directed by Jamaah Islamiyah. The organization is believed to be headed by the cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who is on trial for Bali and Marriott hotel bombings. It seems that Susilo's credibility with the United States and Australia would depend on having Ba'asyir convicted of terrorism and put behind the bars forever.

Undoubtedly, Ba'asyir deserves to be convicted if found guilty by proper judicial procedures and processes. Otherwise, it only creates a halo around him as someone fighting valiantly against not only his own government but also the mighty United States and its regional ally, Australia. And he is making good use of playing to the popular gallery.

Appearing before the relevant court to deny charges of his involvement in the Bali and Marriott hotel bombings, dismissing them as a "joke, he said, "Many charges that were cleared in the previous trial are again being repeated with reckless abandon. Legal boundaries are being crushed for the sake of accommodating God's enemy, the Bush regime..." Ba'asyir's eight-page political/judicial defense might sound like a rant, but it would look to many in Indonesia as pitting David against Goliath.

Most Indonesians are moderate in their religious views and are against terrorism. But they have many more pressing problems of day to day living, and terrorism is not an overriding priority. It is certainly an important issue but not something which should subsume all the nation's energies. And they don't like their country and their religion being portrayed as the source of regional terrorism.

Therefore, it is not wise for the United States and its allies to portray Susilo as their guy doing their bidding to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. This will simply erode his image and credibility over a period of time among his people. And that is not what the United States would want.

The author, freelance writer, can be reached at SushilPSeth@aol.com