Indonesia's Foreign Policy -- Quo Vadis?

Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Di bawah Soeharto (Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soeharto); By Leo Suryadinata; LP3ES, Jakarta, 1998; 271 + x pp; Rp 25,000

JAKARTA (JP): As a large and influential country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia assumes a strategic position, both economically and politically. Understandably, the crisis has prompted many foreign leaders and heads of international organizations to visit Indonesia and to contribute ways of overcoming the crisis.

Such a strategic position has been important in determining Indonesia's foreign policy, indicated by its role in various forums and organizations of international cooperation.

Indonesia's first two presidents, Sukarno (1901-1970) and Soeharto (1921-...) both aspired to see Indonesia assume a position of regional and international leadership.

For instance, Sukarno's perception of Indonesia as a leader among Asian and African countries, led this country to host the Asia-Africa Conference I in Bandung in 1955.

Under Soeharto the initiative to set up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the desire to chair the Non- Aligned Movement and the decision to host the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference I were some indications of the perception of how Indonesia saw its international role.

In this book, author Leo Suryadinata, associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, tries to provide a framework to the foreign policy road traversed in the last three decades, i.e. the era under Soeharto.

The book records Indonesia's dynamics and political challenges and the ambition to attain an international role.

He writes that new presidents after Soeharto will have to weigh two important factors when determining the course of the country's future foreign policy; the type of leadership and the economic conditions after Soeharto. Economic development supported by political stability will take center stage in Indonesia's foreign policy development.

The present situation suffices to illustrate the difficulties this country will have to surmount to develop its foreign policy, let alone fulfill its obsession of becoming a world leader. Certainly during his presidency of more than 30 years, Soeharto strove to reinforce the country's economic structure and create political stability.

His personal role became apparent in the early 1980s and was later intensified. Many saw that Soeharto's efforts to put Indonesia under the international spotlight were related to his ambition to be remembered as a leader of international repute.

In the 1982 general election the ruling Golkar organization won a landslide victory and voting was not preceded by any violence or demonstrations. This could only point to the absence of an effective opposition.

The East Timor question seemed to be well under control, too. So in the 1980s Indonesia strove to play an active role in international affairs: such as hosting the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference I (1985), and hosting the Third ASEAN Meeting and the Jakarta Informal Meeting (1987).

So, who played a role in Indonesia's foreign policy between 1965 and 1982, before Soeharto led the picture? To answer this we must first note the differences in foreign policy during the Sukarno and Soeharto eras.

Sukarno's foreign policy tended to be aggressive, as was evident from his campaign to wrest back West Irian from the Dutch and his confrontation against Malaysia. Soeharto, meanwhile, adopted a softer attitude, prioritizing the development of Indonesia's economy.

In the early days of the New Order at least two groups were involved in formulating Indonesia's foreign policy: the military, through the Ministry of Defense and Security, the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) and the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin) on the one hand and the foreign ministry on the other.

These two groups did not always see eye to eye up to the mid- 1980s. If the military disagreed on a certain issue, it would proceed on its own. The restoration of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) was a case in point. The foreign ministry wanted to mend fences with the PRC but the military was against this idea.

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China were finally restored only when Soeharto decided to end the enmity between Jakarta and Beijing.

The role of the military in foreign policy was evident not only under late minister of foreign affairs Adam Malik but also under his successors, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas, the present minister. Obviously the military remains the key player in foreign policy, particularly in issues pertaining to security and ideology.

After the failed 1965 coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party and the military's emergence as the dominant political force, the relationship between Indonesia and the United States began to improve.

When the inflation rate reached 900 percent, the new government realized that economic rehabilitation was the prerequisite to political stability. Efforts to stabilize the economy legitimized Soeharto's administration. The easiest way was to seek loans from Western countries and Japan.

As soon as he assumed power, Soeharto dispatched technocrats from the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) to approach Western countries and Japan. The result was that Indonesia's loans were rescheduled over 30 years, interest-free, and fresh loans were made available.

Both the West and Japan realized that if aid was not forthcoming, Indonesia would collapse. This economic assistance was significant to Indonesia's survival and proved that Indonesia could never adopt a hostile attitude to the United States.

The crisis now virtually destroying Indonesia's economic structure dealt a big blow to Soeharto's administration. When the chaos struck all efforts became devoted to consolidating the economy, such as the search for fresh loans and rescheduling of debts.

Toward the end of his presidency Soeharto began to encounter increasingly difficult problems in the international arena. He maintained Ali Alatas as foreign minister. Juwono Sudarsono, a respected scholar and now minister of education and culture, was appointed state minister of environment. And B.J. Habibie, as the vice president, was assigned to handle geopolitical matters.

The author writes that Habibie's new task gave the impression that he was being prepared to replace President Soeharto as the decision maker in Indonesia's foreign policy.

Soeharto, feeling his age more and more with each passing day, would continue, though, to determine the foreign policy of Indonesia and Habibie would only implement the decisions.

Unfortunately, another factor was not taken into account: the students. All plans for a smooth succession of the national leadership after the end of Soeharto's five-year term crashed into pieces. The dream to be a regional and world leader is still but a dream.

-- A. Ariobimo Nusantara

The reviewer is a publishing house editor