Indonesia's Foreign Policy -- Quo Vadis?

Indonesia's Foreign Policy -- Quo Vadis?

Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Di bawah Soeharto (Indonesia's
Foreign Policy Under Soeharto);
By Leo Suryadinata;
LP3ES, Jakarta, 1998;
271 + x pp;
Rp 25,000

JAKARTA (JP): As a large and influential country in Southeast
Asia, Indonesia assumes a strategic position, both economically
and politically. Understandably, the crisis has prompted many
foreign leaders and heads of international organizations to visit
Indonesia and to contribute ways of overcoming the crisis.

Such a strategic position has been important in determining
Indonesia's foreign policy, indicated by its role in various
forums and organizations of international cooperation.

Indonesia's first two presidents, Sukarno (1901-1970) and
Soeharto (1921-...) both aspired to see Indonesia assume a
position of regional and international leadership.

For instance, Sukarno's perception of Indonesia as a leader
among Asian and African countries, led this country to host the
Asia-Africa Conference I in Bandung in 1955.

Under Soeharto the initiative to set up the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the desire to chair the Non-
Aligned Movement and the decision to host the commemoration of
the 30th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference I were some
indications of the perception of how Indonesia saw its
international role.

In this book, author Leo Suryadinata, associate professor of
political science at the National University of Singapore, tries
to provide a framework to the foreign policy road traversed in
the last three decades, i.e. the era under Soeharto.

The book records Indonesia's dynamics and political challenges
and the ambition to attain an international role.

He writes that new presidents after Soeharto will have to
weigh two important factors when determining the course of the
country's future foreign policy; the type of leadership and the
economic conditions after Soeharto. Economic development
supported by political stability will take center stage in
Indonesia's foreign policy development.

The present situation suffices to illustrate the difficulties
this country will have to surmount to develop its foreign policy,
let alone fulfill its obsession of becoming a world leader.
Certainly during his presidency of more than 30 years, Soeharto
strove to reinforce the country's economic structure and create
political stability.

His personal role became apparent in the early 1980s and was
later intensified. Many saw that Soeharto's efforts to put
Indonesia under the international spotlight were related to his
ambition to be remembered as a leader of international repute.

In the 1982 general election the ruling Golkar organization
won a landslide victory and voting was not preceded by any
violence or demonstrations. This could only point to the absence
of an effective opposition.

The East Timor question seemed to be well under control, too.
So in the 1980s Indonesia strove to play an active role in
international affairs: such as hosting the commemoration of the
30th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference I (1985), and
hosting the Third ASEAN Meeting and the Jakarta Informal Meeting
(1987).

So, who played a role in Indonesia's foreign policy between
1965 and 1982, before Soeharto led the picture? To answer this we
must first note the differences in foreign policy during the
Sukarno and Soeharto eras.

Sukarno's foreign policy tended to be aggressive, as was
evident from his campaign to wrest back West Irian from the Dutch
and his confrontation against Malaysia. Soeharto, meanwhile,
adopted a softer attitude, prioritizing the development of
Indonesia's economy.

In the early days of the New Order at least two groups were
involved in formulating Indonesia's foreign policy: the military,
through the Ministry of Defense and Security, the National
Resilience Institute (Lemhanas) and the State Intelligence
Coordinating Agency (Bakin) on the one hand and the foreign
ministry on the other.

These two groups did not always see eye to eye up to the mid-
1980s. If the military disagreed on a certain issue, it would
proceed on its own. The restoration of diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China (PRC) was a case in point. The
foreign ministry wanted to mend fences with the PRC but the
military was against this idea.

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China were finally
restored only when Soeharto decided to end the enmity between
Jakarta and Beijing.

The role of the military in foreign policy was evident not
only under late minister of foreign affairs Adam Malik but also
under his successors, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas, the
present minister. Obviously the military remains the key player
in foreign policy, particularly in issues pertaining to security
and ideology.

After the failed 1965 coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist
Party and the military's emergence as the dominant political
force, the relationship between Indonesia and the United States
began to improve.

When the inflation rate reached 900 percent, the new
government realized that economic rehabilitation was the
prerequisite to political stability. Efforts to stabilize the
economy legitimized Soeharto's administration. The easiest way
was to seek loans from Western countries and Japan.

As soon as he assumed power, Soeharto dispatched technocrats
from the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) to
approach Western countries and Japan. The result was that
Indonesia's loans were rescheduled over 30 years, interest-free,
and fresh loans were made available.

Both the West and Japan realized that if aid was not
forthcoming, Indonesia would collapse. This economic assistance
was significant to Indonesia's survival and proved that Indonesia
could never adopt a hostile attitude to the United States.

The crisis now virtually destroying Indonesia's economic
structure dealt a big blow to Soeharto's administration. When the
chaos struck all efforts became devoted to consolidating the
economy, such as the search for fresh loans and rescheduling of
debts.

Toward the end of his presidency Soeharto began to
encounter increasingly difficult problems in the international
arena. He maintained Ali Alatas as foreign minister. Juwono
Sudarsono, a respected scholar and now minister of education and
culture, was appointed state minister of environment. And B.J.
Habibie, as the vice president, was assigned to handle
geopolitical matters.

The author writes that Habibie's new task gave the impression
that he was being prepared to replace President Soeharto as the
decision maker in Indonesia's foreign policy.

Soeharto, feeling his age more and more with each passing
day, would continue, though, to determine the foreign policy of
Indonesia and Habibie would only implement the decisions.

Unfortunately, another factor was not taken into account: the
students. All plans for a smooth succession of the national
leadership after the end of Soeharto's five-year term crashed
into pieces. The dream to be a regional and world leader is still
but a dream.

-- A. Ariobimo Nusantara

The reviewer is a publishing house editor