Indonesia's army remains a closed corporate group

Indonesia's army remains a closed corporate group

R. William Liddle, Professor of Politics, The Ohio State University

How likely is it that Indonesia will once again be ruled by the
Indonesian Military (TNI)? In Jakarta several weeks ago a young
reformist intellectual assured me that it can't happen here, that
Indonesians now understand fully the terrible cost paid in human
rights violations and denial of democratic freedoms during the 40
years of Sukarno's and Soeharto's army-based dictatorships. For
him, Indonesian democracy is already consolidated.

A more senior civilian observer predicted that if the army
does return to politics, it will be as a powerful behind-the-
scenes force, shaping government policies in which it has an
interest. In his view, Indonesian democracy may soon become,
perhaps has already become, a permanent half-way house, without
civilian supremacy but also without military rule.

Since May 1998 I have been more appreciative than critical of
the TNI, at least in terms of its domestic activities (East Timor
is another matter). Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto did not
attempt to prevent then Vice-President B. J. Habibie, a civilian
disliked by the military, from becoming president.

Over the next year the TNI did not undermine president
Habibie's project to democratize Indonesia by holding free
parliamentary elections, the first since 1955. Indeed, during
this period it formally rescinded its twin-functions doctrine.

The TNI/Polri delegation took a back seat when the civilian
fractions in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) chose
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as president in October 1999 and when
they dismissed him in July 2001. Laudably, the generals rejected
Gus Dur's last-ditch attempt to save himself by staging a
Sukarno-style coup against the MPR.

After a recent trip to Jakarta, however, I am increasingly
concerned that progress toward civilian supremacy, a vital pillar
of a democratic Indonesia, has been stopped if not reversed. My
concern stems not from the TNI's new offensive against the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM), although that could make the generals more
powerful politically (if they win a quick victory) or more
frustrated and angry at civilian politicians (if they bog down
and are pulled out by a government sensitive to accusations of
brutality). Nor am I especially worried about the "coup article"
in the proposed armed forces law, which would enable the TNI to
shoot first, in an emergency situation, and report to the
president later.

My concern is more basic. It comes from a slowly dawning
recognition that nothing fundamental has in fact changed since
1998. TNI, or more accurately army, leaders (the navy and air
force have not been significant players for decades), continue to
hold a self-image and possess resources that predispose and
enable them to intervene in national political life in a manner
and at a time of their own choosing. Moreover, they have been
steadily accumulating a list of grievances against civilian
politicians that can serve as the justification, to themselves
and others, for eventually taking power.

The self-image has two parts. Looking inward, officers see
the army not only as a highly-valued institution but also as a
corporate or nearly free-standing entity whose internal coherence
and unity they must protect from outsiders. To use a military
metaphor, they live in a fortress whose walls are constantly in
danger of being breached. They must therefore be built ever
higher and stronger.

Looking outward, they identify their own integrity and
security with the integrity and security of the whole state and
of the Indonesian people or nation. Whatever threatens the
nation and state, external or internal to Indonesia, threatens
the army.

Since the Revolution, those threats have come almost entirely
from inside the country, mainly in the forms of regional
separatism, radical Islam, and communism. The army must be ever
vigilant against domestic threats from these sources in order to
protect itself institutionally.

To return to the military metaphor, not only do officers have
to build high walls against outsiders, they must also pacify a
broad swath of territory beyond the fortress. That is the
ultimate persuasive inside-the-army justification for
intervention in matters of state and nation.

What resources does the army possess that might enable it to
intervene directly in civilian politics at some time in the
relatively near future? The most obvious, beyond its near-
monopoly over the instruments of violence, are the territorial
system and the foundations that provide perhaps 70 percent of the
army's total income (the remaining 30 percent comes from the
state budget). A government that does not pay its soldiers can
not control their actions.

The territorial system is both a major source of income,
enabling the army to build the fortress walls higher, and a
powerful tool for controlling hostile groups and mobilizing
friendly ones in society (for example, the so-called militias
that have terrorized local populations in several regions).
Unfortunately, the defense ministry's recent white paper has made
it plain that the territorial system will not be dismantled any
time soon. "We are not yet a stable modern country like the
United States or Britain," said the ministry's director-general
for defense strategy. "The TNI needs to know the territorial
situation."

A less noticed characteristic of the army today is that it is
virtually a state within the state. This was also formally the
case during the New Order, but the concentration of power in
Soeharto's hands at that time meant that no state agencies,
especially the army, were effectively autonomous of presidential
control. Today, the TNI is structurally separate from the
defense ministry. The armed forces commander (an army general)
has his own seat in the cabinet, next to the politically-
appointed defense minister. In violation of the most basic
principle of civilian supremacy, the armed forces commander has
policy making as well as policy implementing responsibilities.

The army also controls its own portion of the state budget.
No other state agency exercises effective oversight over army
expenditures. Not even the armed forces commander, let alone the
minister of defense and the president on the executive side or
the members of Commission I in the House of Representatives on
the legislative side play a significant role.

As one close observer of the budget process told me, "the army
leaders make it very clear to all concerned that their budget is
their business."

Army grievances against the actions of civilian politicians
post-1998 are legion. The main story line has been familiar
since the late 1940s, but the examples are new. Former president
Habibie gave up East Timor, breaking a sacred Soeharto promise
now inscribed for eternity in the East Timor memorial at armed
forces headquarters in Cilangkap. Presidents Habibie and Gus Dur
supported a governmental decentralization program that is leading
to chaos if not national disintegration.

At the end of the Habibie period, the police were separated
from the armed forces, whose duties are now restricted to
national defense. As events have proven, according to the
defense ministry's white paper, the police are incapable of
maintaining domestic security without army help.

The constitutional amendment process, for which many civilian
politicians are responsible, is deeply flawed. Among other
things, it produced federalism -- the first step on the road to
national breakup -- in the form of the Regional Representative
Council. Finally, like Habibie and East Timor, Gus Dur and
Megawati Soekarnoputri allowed the Aceh problem to be
internationalized, increasing the power of GAM.

My conclusions are not alarmist. I have no personal knowledge
that today's officers are plotting a coup against the
democratically elected government. Nonetheless, a realistic
appraisal of the current state of civil-military relations should
conclude that the army, five years into reformasi, remains a
closed corporate group willing and able to protect its
prerogatives, if need be at the expense of others.

Partisans of democracy should not despair but rather take
stock of their own goals, strategies and resources. The contest
has just begun.