Indonesian politics in 2006
Indonesian politics in 2006
Rizal Sukma
Jakarta
As Indonesia enters 2006, the general political outlook
presents a rather positive picture. There are strong grounds to
believe that national politics will be characterized more by
continuity than by change. In other words, no major political
upheavals are expected over the next year.
One issue that will continue to catch the attention of the
general public is the relationship between President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (JK). It
is likely that their relationship will continue to be locked into
the politics of adjustment, compromise and cooperation. Judging
from past events -- especially during the process of Cabinet
reshuffle -- it is clear that both leaders are capable of
accommodating each other's political interests. While JK's
political influence is still strong, he has demonstrated his
ability to compromise. Meanwhile, there have also been signs of
growing assertiveness on the part of President SBY. Whether this
trend will continue, however, remains to be seen.
The structure of the relationship between the executive and
legislature will not undergo significant change. However, sources
of contention and occasional tension remain possible on numerous
issues, especially on the question of Aceh. In 2006, the role of
the House of Representatives (DPR) will be critical in consolidating
peace in the province. For example, if the DPR fails to pass the
new proposed bill on Aceh, especially on the issue of local
political parties, then the future of peace process could be put
in jeopardy.
Such an act from the DPR would make the government's position
difficult, both in the eyes of the Acehnese and the international
community. Indonesia's government would be seen as the party that
wrecked the peace process to which it committed itself on Aug.
15, 2005. That would certainly strengthen the position of GAM and
facilitate the return of conflict to Aceh.
It is unlikely that political parties, and for that matter the
DPR, would play a more effective role that what they have already
been so far. Political fractions in the DPR, which still serve as
representatives of their respective parent political parties,
will be obliged to follow the party line. Consequently, the DPR
will continue to face the same old problem of how to serve as an
effective counter-balance to the government.
Moreover, major political parties -- such as the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the National Awakening
Party (PKB), and the Democratic Party -- will continue to be
preoccupied by the need for internal consolidation, as a result
of protracted internal friction within the parties. Especially
for the Democratic Party, an additional challenge is how to
transform its constituency from a "SBY Fan Club" into a real
political power base.
A rather different challenge is going to be faced by the
rising of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The PKS is becoming
increasingly fond of the taste of power by being a supporter of
the government. As a party that still relies on its image as a
"clean and caring" party, the main challenge for PKS is how to
find a balance between the desire to be part of the ruling
government on the one hand, and the need to maintain its image as
a critical party before the constituency.
The involvement of PKS cadres in the government, however,
would severely limit the party's ability to be independent, and
could serve as a source of friction for the party. If this issue
is not managed well, the image of PKS as a "solid" party would
for the first time face a serious challenge.
This question of how to position itself within the power
structure would have an effect on PKS' vote in the 2009
elections. However, the PKS still occupies a unique position
among Islamic parties or parties with Islamic base. It is
expected that the support base for the PKS will grow stronger.
The new source of support for the PKS would likely come from
the "exodus" of supporters of the National Mandate Party (PAN),
which has begun to lose its attractiveness in the post-Amien
Rais era.
Meanwhile, the nature of the PKB as an East Java-based party would
not undergo significant change. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that
the United Development Party (PPP) and Crescent Star Party (PBB)
will change their positive attitudes towards the SBY-JK
government.
The position of Indonesian Military (TNI) in 2006 is
interesting to watch for two reasons.
First, the image and confidence of the TNI will be greatly
improved, especially due to its commitment to the peace process
in Aceh, and also to the lifting of the military embargo by the
government of the United States.
Second, the question of the replacement of the commander of
the TNI would again be on the agenda. On the state of military
reform, however, it is difficult to expect any major progress. As
the Minister of Defense himself continues to glorify the role and
political importance of the TNI while looking down on the ability
and credibility of civilian political forces, there are reasons
to believe that military reform would still move at a snail's
pace.
On policy issues, the challenge of democratic consolidation
will continue to be the most important item on the political
agenda. Major progress in this area -- such as the
institutionalization of political succession through elections
and the freedom of speech -- have been well recognized.
However, these minimum criteria of democracy need to be
supplemented by a strong judiciary, good governance, effective
law enforcement, respect for human rights, and the
internalization of democratic norms by the state apparatus and
society at large. As these qualities of a democratic society
strengthen, the quality of security and public order will follow
suit, and the threat of terrorism and extremism will be better
managed. And, as a government equipped with strong legitimacy and
mandate from the people, the SBY-JK government should be well
placed to push these agenda items.
Overall, it is unlikely that Indonesia's politics in 2006 will
enter a year of turmoil. On the contrary, there are reasons to
believe that the sense of stability will continue to strengthen.
Whether the government will be able to stimulate economic
progress out of this positive political environment, however, is
an entirely a different matter.
The writer is deputy executive director, CSIS, Jakarta.