Sat, 24 Dec 2005

Indonesian politics in 2006

Rizal Sukma Jakarta

As Indonesia enters 2006, the general political outlook presents a rather positive picture. There are strong grounds to believe that national politics will be characterized more by continuity than by change. In other words, no major political upheavals are expected over the next year.

One issue that will continue to catch the attention of the general public is the relationship between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (JK). It is likely that their relationship will continue to be locked into the politics of adjustment, compromise and cooperation. Judging from past events -- especially during the process of Cabinet reshuffle -- it is clear that both leaders are capable of accommodating each other's political interests. While JK's political influence is still strong, he has demonstrated his ability to compromise. Meanwhile, there have also been signs of growing assertiveness on the part of President SBY. Whether this trend will continue, however, remains to be seen.

The structure of the relationship between the executive and legislature will not undergo significant change. However, sources of contention and occasional tension remain possible on numerous issues, especially on the question of Aceh. In 2006, the role of the House of Representatives (DPR) will be critical in consolidating peace in the province. For example, if the DPR fails to pass the new proposed bill on Aceh, especially on the issue of local political parties, then the future of peace process could be put in jeopardy.

Such an act from the DPR would make the government's position difficult, both in the eyes of the Acehnese and the international community. Indonesia's government would be seen as the party that wrecked the peace process to which it committed itself on Aug. 15, 2005. That would certainly strengthen the position of GAM and facilitate the return of conflict to Aceh.

It is unlikely that political parties, and for that matter the DPR, would play a more effective role that what they have already been so far. Political fractions in the DPR, which still serve as representatives of their respective parent political parties, will be obliged to follow the party line. Consequently, the DPR will continue to face the same old problem of how to serve as an effective counter-balance to the government.

Moreover, major political parties -- such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the Democratic Party -- will continue to be preoccupied by the need for internal consolidation, as a result of protracted internal friction within the parties. Especially for the Democratic Party, an additional challenge is how to transform its constituency from a "SBY Fan Club" into a real political power base.

A rather different challenge is going to be faced by the rising of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The PKS is becoming increasingly fond of the taste of power by being a supporter of the government. As a party that still relies on its image as a "clean and caring" party, the main challenge for PKS is how to find a balance between the desire to be part of the ruling government on the one hand, and the need to maintain its image as a critical party before the constituency.

The involvement of PKS cadres in the government, however, would severely limit the party's ability to be independent, and could serve as a source of friction for the party. If this issue is not managed well, the image of PKS as a "solid" party would for the first time face a serious challenge.

This question of how to position itself within the power structure would have an effect on PKS' vote in the 2009 elections. However, the PKS still occupies a unique position among Islamic parties or parties with Islamic base. It is expected that the support base for the PKS will grow stronger.

The new source of support for the PKS would likely come from the "exodus" of supporters of the National Mandate Party (PAN), which has begun to lose its attractiveness in the post-Amien Rais era.

Meanwhile, the nature of the PKB as an East Java-based party would not undergo significant change. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the United Development Party (PPP) and Crescent Star Party (PBB) will change their positive attitudes towards the SBY-JK government.

The position of Indonesian Military (TNI) in 2006 is interesting to watch for two reasons.

First, the image and confidence of the TNI will be greatly improved, especially due to its commitment to the peace process in Aceh, and also to the lifting of the military embargo by the government of the United States.

Second, the question of the replacement of the commander of the TNI would again be on the agenda. On the state of military reform, however, it is difficult to expect any major progress. As the Minister of Defense himself continues to glorify the role and political importance of the TNI while looking down on the ability and credibility of civilian political forces, there are reasons to believe that military reform would still move at a snail's pace.

On policy issues, the challenge of democratic consolidation will continue to be the most important item on the political agenda. Major progress in this area -- such as the institutionalization of political succession through elections and the freedom of speech -- have been well recognized.

However, these minimum criteria of democracy need to be supplemented by a strong judiciary, good governance, effective law enforcement, respect for human rights, and the internalization of democratic norms by the state apparatus and society at large. As these qualities of a democratic society strengthen, the quality of security and public order will follow suit, and the threat of terrorism and extremism will be better managed. And, as a government equipped with strong legitimacy and mandate from the people, the SBY-JK government should be well placed to push these agenda items.

Overall, it is unlikely that Indonesia's politics in 2006 will enter a year of turmoil. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that the sense of stability will continue to strengthen. Whether the government will be able to stimulate economic progress out of this positive political environment, however, is an entirely a different matter.

The writer is deputy executive director, CSIS, Jakarta.