Indonesian military turning its back on reforms

Lee Kim Chew The Straits Times Asia News Network Singapore

Thinking of reforms in the Indonesian military? Banish the thought -- for now at least.

To the chagrin of many Indonesians, the country's once- omnipotent generals are seeking new laws to enhance a power that was whittled down after former president Soeharto's fall.

The generals are pushing for a controversial bill which, among other things, authorizes the military commander to deploy troops in an emergency without the President's approval.

The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, argues that the military's internal role should be restored to deal with the threat of separatism and other security problems -- a sharp reminder of the dwifungsi role (the dual function as a security- cum-sociopolitical force) the military had during Soeharto times.

Politicians and academics say this will set back the democratization process to put the military firmly under civilian authority.

Going by the current trend, the fate of military reforms seems clear: This far and no further.

Whatever that could be done was done at the peak of the reformist fervor during the Gus Dur presidency, but this mood has largely dissipated and few military reforms are expected from President Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration.

The most significant changes in the military's fortunes after the fall of then-president Soeharto in 1998 are the end of its dwifungsi role; the removal of about 2,000 military representatives from the central and regional parliaments; the removal of 3,000 to 4,000 active military officers from the bureaucracy; the separation of the military from the former ruling Golkar party; and the removal of the police from military control.

Provincial governors and district heads are no longer appointed, thus making it much harder for retired military men to hold such posts.

Since the loss of East Timor, the trial of military officers in the civilian courts for human rights abuses subjects them to the rule of law.

These are substantial changes which pare down the military's influence, notes Dr Harold Crouch, a specialist on the Indonesian military at the Australian National University in Canberra.

He says: "Many military officers might be unhappy about the reforms, but they seem to have accepted them.

"However, the prospects of further reform -- particularly, the dismantling of the territorial system and the removal of control of domestic intelligence from the military -- are not strong, not to speak of reforming the military budget."

Thus, key areas have been left untouched, even though the abolition of military representation in parliament is a major step towards democratic reform.

The dwifungsi concept may have been scrapped officially, but the truth is that Indonesia's military has never really abandoned it.

Historian John Roosa, guest editor of Inside Indonesia, a quarterly magazine produced by Australian scholars, notes: "They all still believe that the military should have a policing role within Indonesia, meaning at least that the territorial structure should remain intact."

One of the most crucial questions is whether the territorial command structure, which extends military control right down to the villages, is going to be dismantled.

The military is not keen on this because it reduces the ambit of its authority throughout the Indonesian archipelago. A smaller turf will also cut into its wide-ranging business interests, from which the military derives income for its budget.

Under intense public pressure, some generals have toyed with the idea of introducing gradual reforms to the territorial command by withdrawing troops from the lowest rung first, and from certain regions that are peaceful.

But this never happened.

Their powers have been curtailed somewhat with the formal separation of the military and police roles. The division of labour, however, aggravates a turf war between the two sides over their commercial projects and protection rackets.

Since President Megawati took office in 2001, the top military brass has stopped contemplating reforms, says Roosa.

What the generals want now is non-interference from the civilians in military matters, particularly in the way they raise funds and plan their budget. Strong political leadership is needed to impose its will on the military, but this is not on the cards.

To be sure, the Indonesian military's stalled reforms will adversely affect its image, which is already battered by its East Timor atrocities and its excesses in Aceh and Papua.

But Indonesia's generals, who have mostly got over the crisis facing their institution in the wake of East Timor's independence, aren't particularly bothered. This is yet another reason for the status quo.

"I don't see any sign of reform in the near future," says Roosa.