Indonesian democracy and defense

Juwono Sudarsono, Norwich, UK

Indonesia is currently still undergoing the "multifaceted consequences" of the multidimensional Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997 and 1998.

From an authoritarian, centralized government backed by the military for more than 30 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia became the focus of attention of many policymakers and academics.

The questions posed were: Can civilian-based politics take root in Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in a country that has the largest Muslim population in the world?

Can democratic government facing multiple economic and financial crises recover sufficiently quickly to release itself from the vicious circle of political instability, economic stagnation and social conflict?

What is the role of the military in the new political environment? Will the defense force's repositioning in the new political system enhance both democracy and development? Finally, how efficiently will Indonesians utilize to the full their endowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable development in an increasingly competitive regional and global environment?

Most social scientists would agree that a functioning democracy would require the following underpinnings:

o An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is it to be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of 300 ethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in the densely populated island of Java (65 percent of the population in 15 percent of the land area) and the outer islands where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated and have less political leverage against central government.

Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, provided that basis for state identity, Pancasila.

Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the vitality of that state identity and the notion of Indonesian-ness through broader socioeconomic justice and political participation.

As the world's fourth-most populous country and third-largest democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the democracy to which we have committed ourselves will be able to deliver the goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.

o A "critical mass" of locally defined middle class, ideally comprising at least 30 percent to 40 percent of the population who define civic government and become the "transmission belt" between the very rich and the very poor. While comparisons can be misleading, democracies generally function with agreement on fundamentals only if a committed middle class enjoys access to basic human needs (food, shelter and clothing) and public goods: electricity, roads, harbors, public education and primary health care.

The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita should ideally be at least US$3,000 to $4,000, with monthly household spending ranging from $500 to $1,500 per month.

Unfortunately, our GDP per capita of $950 and a 10 percent to 15 percent middle class shows that our path toward a functioning democracy will be full of glitches and the crashing of social and cultural gears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines before it gets better in 10 to 15 years.

o A competent and professional national and local bureaucracy that enables government to function as a provider of public goods in terms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal measures, in order to provide utilities (road, harbors, electricity, telecommunications, potable water) to the larger population.

In this respect, Indonesia's four-million-strong bureaucracy still leaves much to be desired. Though we have competent first- echelon professionals in government and the private sector, our public administrators are still largely undertrained and lack the capacity to run a functioning administration that effectively allocates public services. For a nation of 230 million there are currently only 5,000 PhDs in all fields, ranging from biotechnology to the arts.

Then, the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI). For more than 30 years (1966 to 1998) it defined the parameters of governance at all levels: national, provincial, district, local.

Because the system lacked the fundamentals of democratic government (organized political parties, civic groups, a politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive in defining domestic security and external defense.

Its all-encompassing national security doctrine sanctioned that active and retired officers gain prominent roles in the ruling political party, the bureaucracy, the legislature, the judiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system.

As recently as 1999 to 2000 the police came under the authority of the TNI Headquarters. Each service had independent sources of extrabudgetary funding through clusters of foundations, enterprises and cooperatives.

After President Soeharto fell from office in May 1998, the TNI redefined its role as the following:

a. Adoption of the TNI "new paradigm", in which it would support and encourage, rather than lead, civilian politics in government, the legislature, judiciary and the local bureaucracy. The TNI has redefined itself as facilitator rather than initiator of state policy. It relinquished its position in the recent April legislative elections. b. Repositioning of its role by ceding to the police prime responsibility for domestic security while emphasizing external defense and military professionalism. In real terms, however, the TNI has continued to play its newly calibrated domestic security role because the police will need at last 10 years before they can achieve their projected standard of professionalism and competence.

c. Reviewing its intelligence, command and territorial doctrine to emphasize its commitment to improve each service's mission capability, with a focus on defense capacity rather than on assessment of external threats.

d. For a defense force comprising roughly "450,000"? uniformed personnel, and an official budget of barely 1 percent of GDP (8 percent to 9 percent of the annual budget), the TNI is the most underfunded force among those of the larger nations of Southeast Asia.

Clearly, in terms of capital spending on new equipment, maintenance and repairs, the logistical stretch to link the 5,000 kilometers between north Sumatra and Papua and the "rotational cover" by naval and air forces, the TNI can barely reach an adequate standard of military preparedness.

The strategic waterways and archipelagic sea lanes, which account for roughly 46 percent of sea-borne trade in and through East Asia, need to be defended by an accountable and credible defense force.

The writer is the Indonesian Ambassador to the UK and a former minister of defense. This article has been condensed from a presentation he made at the School of Development Studies, University of Norwich, East Anglia, on June 24.