Indonesian democracy and defense

Indonesian democracy and defense

Juwono Sudarsono, Norwich, UK

Indonesia is currently still undergoing the "multifaceted
consequences" of the multidimensional Asian economic and
financial crisis of 1997 and 1998.

From an authoritarian, centralized government backed by the
military for more than 30 years under President Soeharto,
Indonesia became the focus of attention of many policymakers and
academics.

The questions posed were: Can civilian-based politics take
root in Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic
government in a country that has the largest Muslim population in
the world?

Can democratic government facing multiple economic and
financial crises recover sufficiently quickly to release itself
from the vicious circle of political instability, economic
stagnation and social conflict?

What is the role of the military in the new political
environment? Will the defense force's repositioning in the new
political system enhance both democracy and development? Finally,
how efficiently will Indonesians utilize to the full their
endowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable
development in an increasingly competitive regional and global
environment?

Most social scientists would agree that a functioning
democracy would require the following underpinnings:

o An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is
it to be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of
300 ethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in
the densely populated island of Java (65 percent of the
population in 15 percent of the land area) and the outer islands
where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan,
Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated and have less
political leverage against central government.

Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, provided that basis for
state identity, Pancasila.

Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the
vitality of that state identity and the notion of Indonesian-ness
through broader socioeconomic justice and political
participation.

As the world's fourth-most populous country and third-largest
democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the democracy to
which we have committed ourselves will be able to deliver the
goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.

o A "critical mass" of locally defined middle class, ideally
comprising at least 30 percent to 40 percent of the population
who define civic government and become the "transmission belt"
between the very rich and the very poor. While comparisons can be
misleading, democracies generally function with agreement on
fundamentals only if a committed middle class enjoys access to
basic human needs (food, shelter and clothing) and public goods:
electricity, roads, harbors, public education and primary health
care.

The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita should ideally be
at least US$3,000 to $4,000, with monthly household spending
ranging from $500 to $1,500 per month.

Unfortunately, our GDP per capita of $950 and a 10 percent to
15 percent middle class shows that our path toward a functioning
democracy will be full of glitches and the crashing of social and
cultural gears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines
before it gets better in 10 to 15 years.

o A competent and professional national and local bureaucracy
that enables government to function as a provider of public goods
in terms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal
measures, in order to provide utilities (road, harbors,
electricity, telecommunications, potable water) to the larger
population.

In this respect, Indonesia's four-million-strong bureaucracy
still leaves much to be desired. Though we have competent first-
echelon professionals in government and the private sector, our
public administrators are still largely undertrained and lack the
capacity to run a functioning administration that effectively
allocates public services. For a nation of 230 million there are
currently only 5,000 PhDs in all fields, ranging from
biotechnology to the arts.

Then, the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI). For more than
30 years (1966 to 1998) it defined the parameters of governance
at all levels: national, provincial, district, local.

Because the system lacked the fundamentals of democratic
government (organized political parties, civic groups, a
politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive
in defining domestic security and external defense.

Its all-encompassing national security doctrine sanctioned
that active and retired officers gain prominent roles in the
ruling political party, the bureaucracy, the legislature, the
judiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system.

As recently as 1999 to 2000 the police came under the
authority of the TNI Headquarters. Each service had independent
sources of extrabudgetary funding through clusters of
foundations, enterprises and cooperatives.

After President Soeharto fell from office in May 1998, the TNI
redefined its role as the following:

a. Adoption of the TNI "new paradigm", in which it would
support and encourage, rather than lead, civilian politics in
government, the legislature, judiciary and the local bureaucracy.
The TNI has redefined itself as facilitator rather than initiator
of state policy. It relinquished its position in the recent April
legislative elections.
b. Repositioning of its role by ceding to the police prime
responsibility for domestic security while emphasizing external
defense and military professionalism. In real terms, however, the
TNI has continued to play its newly calibrated domestic security
role because the police will need at last 10 years before they
can achieve their projected standard of professionalism and
competence.

c. Reviewing its intelligence, command and territorial
doctrine to emphasize its commitment to improve each service's
mission capability, with a focus on defense capacity rather than
on assessment of external threats.

d. For a defense force comprising roughly "450,000"? uniformed
personnel, and an official budget of barely 1 percent of GDP (8
percent to 9 percent of the annual budget), the TNI is the most
underfunded force among those of the larger nations of Southeast
Asia.

Clearly, in terms of capital spending on new equipment,
maintenance and repairs, the logistical stretch to link the 5,000
kilometers between north Sumatra and Papua and the "rotational
cover" by naval and air forces, the TNI can barely reach an
adequate standard of military preparedness.

The strategic waterways and archipelagic sea lanes, which
account for roughly 46 percent of sea-borne trade in and through
East Asia, need to be defended by an accountable and credible
defense force.

The writer is the Indonesian Ambassador to the UK and a former
minister of defense. This article has been condensed from a
presentation he made at the School of Development Studies,
University of Norwich, East Anglia, on June 24.