Indonesia versus GAM: A diplomatic puzzle

Teuku Faizasyah, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomatic History and Conflict Resolution, Waikato University, Hamilton, New Zealand

The hardening position of the Indonesian government over the recalcitrant Free Aceh Movement (GAM) raises the question: Is a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict still feasible? Undeniably, efforts to prepare the public for a military operation take place on a daily basis. The military establishment, officials and also legislators appear to favor the military option. A "declaration of war" by the government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri is only a matter of time.

Apparently, today's hawkish attitude has sidelined the peace efforts, and so the concern of Indonesian doves seems irrelevant. Unfortunately, we are now living in an international structure that places faith in "military might". Is there still hope for diplomacy and peaceful negotiation? And can the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) remain a reliable third party?

Questioning the validity of military operations when the general mood is for punitive action, would appear less than nationalistic. But, to go for war without pondering other alternatives is suicidal for at least two reasons.

Firstly, a military operation would not guarantee a quick and a lasting solution to the problem.

Secondly, a prolonged military conflict with excessive "collateral damage" will further tarnish Indonesia's reputation internationally and renew domestic debate on the government's approach to the Aceh problem. Moreover, the government and political parties need to calculate the political cost of a possible prolonged military conflict when an election year is on the horizon.

So why what prevents us from giving peace through diplomacy another chance? Although diplomacy is concerned with peace, its traditional sphere is mainly in international relations. Therefore, to use diplomacy in dealing with domestic problems, especially on the issue of separatism, is susceptible to criticism. Any contact is interpreted as a tacit recognition of the separatists.

Indeed, by negotiating peace with GAM, assisted by the HDC, Indonesia's diplomatic community dares to challenge the rigidity of the established convention. At the least, from the perspective of humanitarian concerns, the government with their good intention and purpose signaled a willingness to meet their enemy face to face.

Indonesia is not the first country in Southeast Asia which has initiated a dialog with its enemy. The Philippines, under the then government of president Fidel Ramos was willing to explore conflict resolution with all separatist groups in that country. Ramos was very resolute in his peace efforts because he knew that stability was a prerequisite for his development program.

To achieve stability, Ramos let his special envoys meet the separatists. They met not only to touch base, but also to try to understand their differing positions and concerns.

In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), President Ramos went further by approaching Indonesia to facilitate the peace process under the umbrella of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). He let Indonesia assist the conflicting parties in building the edifice for peace, brick by brick, and even spearheaded the peace campaign in his country.

His efforts helped the domestic constituents and the Philippines military establishment share a similar understanding on the peace process. Most importantly, they trusted the diplomatic process.

To a certain extent, in their dealings with GAM, Indonesia did try to utilize the experience gained from assisting the Filipinos. Two of the leading players in the current dialog process, current Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirayuda and Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, are veterans from the Moro peace process.

They know that any peace dialog is not a linear process, that there will be trepidation; thus "patience" is the key word. The parties' differing interpretation of "an agreed text" is a normal feature of any negotiation. It is the role of the negotiators to discuss all the differences and build consensus gradually.

Although the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed in Geneva on Dec. 9, 2002 is still far from conclusive, the process leading to its signing was an achievement in itself. The meetings provided the two parties with the opportunity to sit and talk directly for the first time.

To scrap the COHA, and perhaps the negotiating forum itself, because of some flaws during the implementation stage, is not considered wise. Similarly, to question the impartiality of the HDC, in the wake of its inability to persuade GAM to attend the recently aborted Joint Council meeting on a prescribed date, is a setback for the process. Through the HDC's assistance, both GAM and the government are now aware of their individual positions, on what is and is not negotiable.

The controversy surrounding the role of the HDC places their future role in limbo. In theory, all parties to a conflict need to put faith in their facilitator and trust its impartiality. At present, HDC's popularity is on the decline, but to discard its future role in the peace process is, again, unwise.

Over the past few years, the HDC, GAM and the government have developed their working relationship and this is an asset for the peace process. To look for a new facilitator is a big gamble, and most likely this will put the negotiation process back to square one.

Wise men tell us not to burn a house to kill a mouse. Although some blame GAM for being recalcitrant and for deteriorating security in Aceh, still it is not sensible to reject further assistance from the HDC and to burn the Agreement to ashes. As the government's chief negotiator Wiryono pointed out succinctly that the Agreement was a modest but significant victory for both sides, but both sides still have to work hard (The Jakarta Post, May 7).

If at the moment that seems rather bleak, we should not let go of any opportunity. Nowadays the role of diplomacy -- through quiet, or informal, diplomacy -- is far more significant. The Indonesian diplomatic community must observe the right timing to renew the negotiation process.

Every conflict has its own life cycle and therefore, the third party and those involved in the conflict need to pay close attention to the cycle. Now the cycle of the Aceh conflict is on its high and usually in the face of possible armed conflict, new stimuli and initiatives for dialog increase. Hopefully, all parties to the conflict and the third party (the HDC) are prepared to swing the pendulum back from the military option to diplomacy.

For this to work, both the Indonesian government and GAM need to tone down their war rhetoric. Although a firm position is a good strategy for negotiation, it does not benefit peace efforts. In fact, it could diminish the chance for dialog.

And just like former president Ramos, the Indonesian diplomatic community needs to increase public diplomacy. They need to let the various groups in Indonesian society become aware of the cost of a prolonged armed conflict to Indonesia's image internationally, as well as how it would impact the sustainability of our development program.