Indonesia versus GAM: A diplomatic puzzle

Indonesia versus GAM: A diplomatic puzzle

Teuku Faizasyah, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomatic History
and Conflict Resolution, Waikato University, Hamilton, New Zealand

The hardening position of the Indonesian government over the
recalcitrant Free Aceh Movement (GAM) raises the question: Is a
peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict still feasible?
Undeniably, efforts to prepare the public for a military
operation take place on a daily basis. The military
establishment, officials and also legislators appear to favor the
military option. A "declaration of war" by the government of
President Megawati Soekarnoputri is only a matter of time.

Apparently, today's hawkish attitude has sidelined the peace
efforts, and so the concern of Indonesian doves seems irrelevant.
Unfortunately, we are now living in an international structure
that places faith in "military might". Is there still hope for
diplomacy and peaceful negotiation? And can the Geneva-based
Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) remain a reliable third party?

Questioning the validity of military operations when the
general mood is for punitive action, would appear less than
nationalistic. But, to go for war without pondering other
alternatives is suicidal for at least two reasons.

Firstly, a military operation would not guarantee a quick and
a lasting solution to the problem.

Secondly, a prolonged military conflict with excessive
"collateral damage" will further tarnish Indonesia's reputation
internationally and renew domestic debate on the government's
approach to the Aceh problem. Moreover, the government and
political parties need to calculate the political cost of a
possible prolonged military conflict when an election year is on
the horizon.

So why what prevents us from giving peace through diplomacy
another chance? Although diplomacy is concerned with peace, its
traditional sphere is mainly in international relations.
Therefore, to use diplomacy in dealing with domestic problems,
especially on the issue of separatism, is susceptible to
criticism. Any contact is interpreted as a tacit recognition of
the separatists.

Indeed, by negotiating peace with GAM, assisted by the HDC,
Indonesia's diplomatic community dares to challenge the rigidity
of the established convention. At the least, from the perspective
of humanitarian concerns, the government with their good
intention and purpose signaled a willingness to meet their enemy
face to face.

Indonesia is not the first country in Southeast Asia which has
initiated a dialog with its enemy. The Philippines, under the
then government of president Fidel Ramos was willing to explore
conflict resolution with all separatist groups in that country.
Ramos was very resolute in his peace efforts because he knew that
stability was a prerequisite for his development program.

To achieve stability, Ramos let his special envoys meet the
separatists. They met not only to touch base, but also to try to
understand their differing positions and concerns.

In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),
President Ramos went further by approaching Indonesia to
facilitate the peace process under the umbrella of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). He let Indonesia assist
the conflicting parties in building the edifice for peace, brick
by brick, and even spearheaded the peace campaign in his country.

His efforts helped the domestic constituents and the
Philippines military establishment share a similar understanding
on the peace process. Most importantly, they trusted the
diplomatic process.

To a certain extent, in their dealings with GAM, Indonesia did
try to utilize the experience gained from assisting the
Filipinos. Two of the leading players in the current dialog
process, current Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirayuda and
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, are veterans from the Moro peace process.

They know that any peace dialog is not a linear process, that
there will be trepidation; thus "patience" is the key word. The
parties' differing interpretation of "an agreed text" is a normal
feature of any negotiation. It is the role of the negotiators to
discuss all the differences and build consensus gradually.

Although the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed
in Geneva on Dec. 9, 2002 is still far from conclusive, the
process leading to its signing was an achievement in itself. The
meetings provided the two parties with the opportunity to sit and
talk directly for the first time.

To scrap the COHA, and perhaps the negotiating forum itself,
because of some flaws during the implementation stage, is not
considered wise. Similarly, to question the impartiality of the
HDC, in the wake of its inability to persuade GAM to attend the
recently aborted Joint Council meeting on a prescribed date, is a
setback for the process. Through the HDC's assistance, both GAM
and the government are now aware of their individual positions,
on what is and is not negotiable.

The controversy surrounding the role of the HDC places their
future role in limbo. In theory, all parties to a conflict need
to put faith in their facilitator and trust its impartiality. At
present, HDC's popularity is on the decline, but to discard its
future role in the peace process is, again, unwise.

Over the past few years, the HDC, GAM and the government have
developed their working relationship and this is an asset for the
peace process. To look for a new facilitator is a big gamble, and
most likely this will put the negotiation process back to square
one.

Wise men tell us not to burn a house to kill a mouse. Although
some blame GAM for being recalcitrant and for deteriorating
security in Aceh, still it is not sensible to reject further
assistance from the HDC and to burn the Agreement to ashes. As
the government's chief negotiator Wiryono pointed out succinctly
that the Agreement was a modest but significant victory for both
sides, but both sides still have to work hard (The Jakarta Post,
May 7).

If at the moment that seems rather bleak, we should not let go
of any opportunity. Nowadays the role of diplomacy -- through
quiet, or informal, diplomacy -- is far more significant. The
Indonesian diplomatic community must observe the right timing to
renew the negotiation process.

Every conflict has its own life cycle and therefore, the third
party and those involved in the conflict need to pay close
attention to the cycle. Now the cycle of the Aceh conflict is on
its high and usually in the face of possible armed conflict, new
stimuli and initiatives for dialog increase. Hopefully, all
parties to the conflict and the third party (the HDC) are
prepared to swing the pendulum back from the military option to
diplomacy.

For this to work, both the Indonesian government and GAM need
to tone down their war rhetoric. Although a firm position is a
good strategy for negotiation, it does not benefit peace efforts.
In fact, it could diminish the chance for dialog.

And just like former president Ramos, the Indonesian
diplomatic community needs to increase public diplomacy. They
need to let the various groups in Indonesian society become aware
of the cost of a prolonged armed conflict to Indonesia's image
internationally, as well as how it would impact the
sustainability of our development program.