Indonesia, the Philippines and anti-U.S. sentiment

Max Lane, Visiting Fellow, Center for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

In the 1980s, there was a strong anti-American movement active in Southeast Asia. The center of this movement in the 1980s was the Philippines. The United States maintained two of its largest naval and air bases in the world in the Philippines, at Subic Bay and Clarke Air Base.

The Philippines was often referred to as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the U.S., which the latter used in a policy of containment against the Peoples' Republic of China.

What made the Philippines an even greater center of anti-U.S. sentiment was the U.S.' strong support for the Marcos dictatorship. U.S. support continued even during the early 1980s when the Marcos regime resorted to large scale state terror, in the form of state-armed vigilantes, against a protesting peasantry. Even after the brazen assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino at Manila Airport, U.S. support continued.

Abuses against women in the townships around the two U.S. bases by U.S. servicemen also further fueled anti-U.S. sentiment. After the people's power movement forced the ouster of Marcos and then later, through the Senate, the expulsion of the U.S. bases, active anti-U.S. sentiment subsided.

It appears, however, that a new anti-U.S. movement may be emerging again in the Philippines and, for that matter, around Asia. The immediate cause of this is the increased U.S. military presence in Asia in the aftermath of the U.S. "war against terrorism. The first sign of this was the founding assembly of the Asia Peace Alliance in Manila between Aug. 28-31.

More than 57 people and organizations from around Asia and another 50 from the Philippines attended, including two from Indonesia representing Jendela Budaya in Yogyakarta and the Peoples' Democratic Party (PRD).

In the 1970s and 1980s there was almost no anti-U.S. movement in Indonesia. The 1960s saw the height of anti-American campaigning as a part of the Sukarnoist movement against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) and neo-colonialism. The setting in the 1960s was very much the Cold War. In this sense, Indonesia and the Philippines have a different history on this issue.

An essential reason for this difference was that the Marcos dictatorship was a clearly identifiable client government of the U.S.. Marcos signed various treaties with the U.S. that gave the U.S. government extraordinary influence in Manila. When Gen. Soeharto came to power, he too was supported by the U.S. and the Central Intelligence Agency.

However, Soeharto was able to play off the various Western governments, as well as Japan, against each other. Soeharto avoided becoming a total client regime of one country. Furthermore, Indonesia's oil money enabled the Soeharto government to create an image that it was not economically dependent on any foreign power.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 and its aftermath has brought Indonesia and the Philippines closer together in respect to the role of the U.S.The Indonesian political elite surrendered the management of the country's economy to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1997, thereby massively increasing the influence of Washington in Jakarta. The IMF and World Bank grip of the Philippines is no less great.

However, the movement against the IMF and World Bank dominance of their economies remains stronger in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The movement of the 1980s left a heritage which is still felt in the Philippines. One significant representation of this is the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), which was formed in the 1980s but still maintains broad support today.

In Indonesia the formation of coalitions such as the FDC is still at an early stage coming after a prolonged period where public discontent was focused primarily on the Soeharto dictatorship, with little consciousness of the role of its foreign supporters.

The Asian Peace Alliance Assembly also clearly focused opposition against the rise in U.S. presence in the region, including the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and U.S. support for Israeli operations against the Palestinian territories.

Opposition to the increased U.S. presence and aggressiveness united delegates from Japan and Korea to India and Pakistan. But the Assembly also focused much criticism on the resort to military force to resolve a whole range of political conflicts throughout the region.

The Assembly called for an end to the military option in Kashmir, Aceh and Mindanao for example. These questions also pointed to another developing common bond: The resort to force to solve unresolved legacies of the anti-colonial struggles. In all these cases, the ruling governments are resorting to military solutions.

The resort to military solutions also raises issues of the depth of democratic transformations in these countries and the ties between the depth of democratic consolidation and militarization.

The Asian Peace Alliance Assembly appears to point to the likelihood of a region-wide campaign emerging with two basic foci. The first will be the emphasis on ending U.S. military presence in Asia and the second will stress and end to using military methods to solve long standing political conflicts.

In the 1970s and 1980s Indonesia largely escaped involvement in the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment throughout Asia. In this decade, however, the increased and obvious role of Washington, through the IMF, combined with the campaign by Washington to restore military ties with Jakarta, means that it is likely that this time Indonesians will also play an important role in such campaigns.