Indonesia struggles with its own war on terror

Peter Milne, Managing editor of the Van Zorge Report, Jakarta

As the American "War on Terror" moves from its first to second stage, Indonesia is once again under the international spotlight- this time for purportedly not doing enough to track down possible terrorist cells in the country. But in all the media frenzy over the existence, or non-existence, of terrorists in what Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbors see as the "weak link" of the region, a struggle against home-grown terror has been partly obscured.

Indonesia's local war against terror, which the country has been fighting since May 1998, is one struggle that the people of Indonesia appear to be losing. The recent attempts by the Commission of Enquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) to summon several high-ranking military and police generals for questioning over the involvement of the security forces in the Trisakti and Semanggi I and II tragedies (in 1999 and 1999) seem to be foundering. Despite the supposed era of democracy and civilian supremacy in Indonesia, the generals involved have refused to adhere to their summonses-last week for the second time. The total deaths of 30 students in the three incidents, who were hailed as heroes of reformasi at the time, are being passed over to save a handful of retired generals and senior officers from answering a few questions.

True, the DPR did issue a decision last year that the generals involved had not violated human rights-after intense lobbying from the TNI/Polri faction. But this was only a recommendation and not a legally binding decision. To assuage some of the public furor over the DPR decision at the time, then President Wahid authorized the National Commission on Human Rights to establish an enquiry into the events under Human Rights Law No. 39/1999. This is exactly what the Commission is now following through with. According to the military, however, Law No. 26/2000 on human rights courts entitles the DPR to recommend which violations should be brought before the Human Rights Court. The result of this technicality is deadlock: The generals refuse to attend the Commission's hearings. Even by exercising subpoena rights through the Central Jakarta District Court, the Commission is unlikely to get its way. The generals concerned are unlikely to ever be punished for disregarding a subpoena with the normal six to nine months prison sentence. Plainly, political interference at the expense of the due process of law has the upper hand.

Bravery and doing one's duty are revered qualities in military circles, but when serving civilians these codes of behavior no longer seem to apply. Important civilians such as Vice-President Hamzah Haz and Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil have appealed to the errant generals to do the right thing, but to no avail. Moral suasion has no effect against political interference in administering of the law.

If appearing before the KPP HAM is such an unbearably terrifying ordeal for hardened men in green, then what can we seriously expect when (or if) the East Timor human rights trial eventually start? Unfortunately the writing already appears to be on the wall: No high-ranking prosecutions in Aceh's human rights trials and a new military command in the province, the murder of Papuan leader Theys Eluay, and now the refusal to face a few questions before the KPP HAM. Some carefully choreographed appearances of senior officers implicated in the East Timor atrocities might attempt give the impression of due legal process. But the handing down of heavy sentences is difficult to imagine, no matter how much these might be hoped for or desirable. The truth is that even in the age of civilian democracy and supremacy, ultimate supremacy, and therefore impunity, still remains with the military.

Some of those preoccupied with fighting the international "War on Terror" may sympathize with the Indonesian military and its inability to purchase hardware and training from the U.S. Admittedly, the ban on military ties with Indonesia does get in the way of fighting the good fight against global terrorism. But in the U.S. the executive and the military, fortunately, do not make all the decisions. The U.S. Congress, which has banned the sale of arms and military assistance to the Indonesian military under the Leahy amendment, is quite specific in its requirements for justice and the prosecution of those responsible for the human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. There is very little prospect that Congress will lift the restrictions on the Indonesian military unless serious reprimands and some prison sentences are handed out to senior officers by the human rights court. Senior people in the U.S. close to the Indonesian government have been trying to get this message across. But the difference between executive and legislature in the U.S. may be lost on many within the Indonesian military and government. The assumption seems to be that the U.S. government will forgive and forget Indonesian military wrongdoings in its obsession to cull the threat of global terrorism. This is almost certainly a miscalculation.

Another danger for Indonesia is that a failure to be seen to do justice in the East Timor trials could lead to the International Criminal Court being convened by the UN to judge the case, bringing Indonesia into further conflict with the international community. This is possible in trials where the "local proceedings are being conducted in such a manner which is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice" (Article 17 para 2c, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).

While the global "War on Terror" may have made significant progress in a relatively short time since Sept. 11, 2001, the Indonesian struggle against the terror employed by those in power against their own people is taking an interminably long time, and now seems to be slowly losing momentum. If this trend continues, Indonesia's reputation will remain tarnished and the military will continue to go without American hardware and training. The upshot of this is that Indonesia will find it harder to defend its integrity and stability from external and internal threats. Terrorists, pirates and those intent on weakening the country's integrity, will all be able to breathe easier-along with a handful of retired generals and senior serving officers.