Indonesia still prone to sectarian conflict

Dwi Atmanta, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

As the year draws to a close, 2001 might best be remembered for its dark chapter when the bloody rampages pitting Muslim against Christian in Maluku and Poso ran unchecked.

Thousands have been killed and many others displaced since the sectarian conflict first erupted in the capital of Ambon in 1999 and spread across the Maluku islands to the remote Central Sulawesi town of Poso.

In the time since, critics have assailed the government for its inability to return peace to the two territories, where the balance between Christians and Muslims is almost even.

The clashes came against the backdrop of a renewal of Indonesian society following the fall of the authoritarian regime of the now-ailing president Soeharto and a presidential election billed as the most democratic ever.

Speculation abounds that those facts were not coincidental. Political analyst Juwono Sudarsono, a former minister in the cabinets of ex-presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and BJ Habibie, is among those who sees the hand of Soeharto's cronies in the conflicts.

While Juwono has not named any masterminds, his University of Indonesia colleague, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, has publicly come to the conclusion that former Indonesian Military chief and defense minister Gen. (ret.) Wiranto is responsible for the ongoing sectarian strife.

Wiranto has since initiated a defamation lawsuit against the sociologist, a North Maluku native. But the Cibinong District Court in West Java where the litigation was filed turned down the lawsuit in November, citing lack of evidence.

Those opinions remain open to debate but, to some extent, they also show how complicated the Maluku and Poso conflict is, in that three different administrations succeeding Soeharto have failed to effectively deal with the situation.

Fatal clashes also broke out intermittently in the Maluku capital of Ambon this year -- despite the fact that a civil state of emergency has been imposed in the province and its neighbor, North Maluku, since June of last year.

One of the biggest episodes of violence took place in mid- June, involving an Army joint battalion force and armed civilians. At least 20 people, including an Army soldier, were killed in the clash.

The Maluku military commander Brig. Gen. I Made Yasa was replaced by Brig. Gen. Moestopo following widespread criticism of the military's excessive measures, which included an attack on a health clinic belonging to Laskar Jihad, a Muslim group.

Moestopo opted for a softer approach -- which he called "persuasive measures" -- by keeping in touch with leaders of both religious groups.

But the violence did not stop. The latest incident took place on Dec. 19, when nine people were killed as passengers aboard a speedboat were showered with bullets near Teluk Ambon. Just a week earlier, a bomb exploded aboard KM Kalifornia, killing 11.

The prolonged conflict in Ambon has prompted a desperate Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina to ponder acquiescing the handling of the province's problems to Jakarta.

Smarting from the Maluku lesson -- albeit a bit too late -- the central government intervened in the conflict in Poso, which has claimed 2,000 lives since 1998, by assigning Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs Yusuf Kalla to mediate peace talks.

The fifth of their kind, the negotiations were held in Malino, a hilly town 40 northeast of the South Sulawesi capital of Makassar. Both the Muslim and Christian camps agreed on a peaceful settlement and the establishment of two commissions dealing with security and social and economic matters.

The government has also promised to disarm and repatriate thousands of Laskar Jihad militiamen who have recently arrived in Poso, worsening the feud.

Like in Maluku, the prolonged dispute in Poso was triggered by a minor personal squabble back in 1998.

Human rights activists said the scuffle, which involved two youths of different religions, was left unsettled and, in time, extended into sectarian conflict in line with the race for the regency post in 1999. The Maluku violence has contributed to the escalation of conflict in Poso.

The killings continued even after three militia leaders --Fabianus Tibo, Marianus Riwu and Domingus da Silva -- were brought to justice and sentenced to death in April for a series of murders in the mid-1990s.

Despite their mutual hostilities, both parties shared the same opinion: that the conflict would have not spiraled out of control had the government took action at the earliest stage.

People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Amien Rais joined the chorus of critics against the government's lackluster moves to put and end to the Poso problem.

Critics said the government has never changed its long- standing name tag as a fire brigade sent to a place which is already long burnt out.

Reports also revealed that, despite the frequent security operations, which included weapon searches, the troops did not take enough measures to enforce the law. Both the warring groups claimed that the security forces behaved in the other's favor.

Maluku has provided yet another lesson: that a government- mediated, top-down peace agreement did not guarantee that the conflict would not rekindle.

Now is the right moment for the government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, whose appointment as the country's new leader in July was greeted with enthusiasm, to maintain a lasting peace among the people of this melting pot society by promoting tolerance and rule of law.

The use of force will allow the legacy of the New Order to repeat itself. There was a chapter in Indonesia's history when an artificial peace and order were preserved through coercion -- and it did not last.

Civil emergency vs military emergency

CIVIL EMERGENCY: 1. The governor takes charge as the supreme authority. 2. The governor has the authority to issue regulations necessary to maintain public order or security. 3. Every civilian employee in the region subject to the emergency is obliged to provide information to the governor under certain circumstances. 4. The governor has the authority to limit shows, printing, publishing, announcements or any form of information dissemination.

MILITARY EMERGENCY: 1. The military takes charge as the supreme authority. 2. The military has the right to take control in matters of public order and security. 3. The military has the right to restrict shows, printing, publishing, announcements, or any form of information dissemination. 4. The military has the right to confiscate letters and packages sent through the post office or couriers, also drafts and receipts and money sent through the such means, and to censor, to change the content of or to destroy letters or packages.