`Indonesia should learn from its failure in E. Timor'

`Indonesia should learn from its failure in E. Timor'

Former foreign minister Ali Alatas talked to The Jakarta
Post's Kornelius Purba about his views on Aceh. Now the advisor
to President Megawati Soekarnoputri, he pointed out that
Indonesia should not repeat the mistakes it made in East Timor,
especially in regards human rights issues, in resolving the Aceh
problem. The following is an excerpt from the interview:

Question: In your capacity as the advisor to President Megawati,
and with your experience in handling the problems in East Timor
and in Papua as a former foreign minister, what is your view on
the current problems in Aceh?

Answer: I have always been one of those who, from the
beginning, preferred that Aceh be resolved through peaceful
negotiations -- for example, as we have tried through the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).

We agreed in the COHA that one of the items on the agenda of
the Joint Council dialog is to review this peace deal -- to make
it better, but not to go beyond the terms of the agreement. We
defined the word "review" as meaning that we would improve upon
it. You review it, you look at it again.

COHA could have been the first good step toward resolving the
problem through a peaceful path of negotiations. But I am getting
very pessimistic now, and very concerned. I can now fully
understand the concerns of the government and the limits to their
patience because it is true that GAM, in the four months since
the COHA was implemented, did many things that went completely
against the agreement.

They never gave up their original purpose, nor have they
changed their minds about not accepting a solution based on
special autonomy for Aceh. Of course, they will have to rethink
and to renegotiate this point, for which we are prepared. If the
end objective between the two warring parties are disparate, it
is very difficult to see eye-to-eye.

Why did the negotiations between the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front) and the Philippine government succeed? The
MNLF, from the beginning, said, "OK, we drop our demands for
independence. We accept a broad-based autonomy; but we want this
and that." We needed two years to get to the agreement stage (in
which Indonesia acted as a facilitator).

Look at Cambodia -- they were fighting for years, but when
they agreed on the end objective, namely that the two sides would
form a national government, that Cambodia would be a non-aligned,
neutral country, and so on, negotiations could start. The
negotiation, from start to finish, took from 1989 to 1991.

Now, look at Sri Lanka -- they waged a ferocious war against
the government for many years. Now the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have
stopped their calls for independence; only after this could
negotiations start in regards the special autonomy for them. It
will certainly take a long time, but the end result is clear.

GAM, though, does not behave like that.

Q: What if they pretend to accept the autonomy, but still have
independence on their minds?

A: That is why we are still keeping the door open to a possible
Joint Council meeting, which has failed to materialize. But this
time we must be very clear because independence can never be
accepted -- it will not even be accepted by our neighbors, by
other countries, because they continue to declare that they are
against separatism. That is what we mean by the phrase, "We
support the territorial integrity of Indonesia." That is another
way of saying that we are against separatism.

Q: But many other countries said the same thing in regards East
Timor, didn't they?

A: No, No, they never did because East Timor was not recognized
by the UN (as part of Indonesia). They supported our efforts to
find a solution. Only Australia recognized (our sovereignty over
East Timor), but even Australia changed its position later.

Q: The President sent you to Stockholm to persuade the Swedish
government to take action against GAM leaders residing there,
didn't she?

A: I was sent there, first of all, to appraise the government of
Sweden, which has given citizenship to one of the brains (behind
GAM). But more importantly, two GAM leaders, Hasan Tiro and Zaini
Abdullah, maybe more, are there. So I asked the Swedish
government, why they still allowed them to mastermind, to lead an
armed insurrection and separatist movement against the government
of a friendly country? They are Swedish citizens who are
interfering in the affairs of other country. They are leading an
armed rebellion in Indonesia, which has caused great suffering
and difficulties for Indonesia, for the Acehnese people. Was this
allowed, according to international as well as national laws?

The Swedish government started by saying that they supported
the sovereignty of Indonesia and our efforts to find a solution
on the basis of special autonomy. But in regards this question of
the two men, Sweden was very sensitive. Besides, they (the two
GAM leaders) hadn't broken any laws in Sweden; they were law-
binding citizens. This is why Sweden needed additional evidence
from Indonesia that linked them clearly to the activities I
mentioned.

I told them that no further evidence was needed.

Q: What can the government learn from our failure in East Timor,
especially in resolving human rights violations?

A: We should learn from how we handled East Timor. We should
learn from our past mistakes. In East Timor, I believe, there
were a series of violations of human rights. Toward the end,
especially, there were a lot of things that were done wrongly,
for which we were severely criticized.

In East Timor -- we have to admit -- we failed to win the
hearts and minds of the people.

Our approach there was security -- but an approach we held
onto for too long.

Therefore, all our experiences must be lessons for us in what
we choose to do and not do.

Q: How should the government face the Aceh issue?

A: Negotiate with the Acehnese people, talk to them directly; and
therefore, we don't want to make it an international issue. But
we can ask an NGO, the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), to act as a
facilitator. Already on that score, we have received many
criticisms from within the country, but it (the facilitator) is
not from the government or the United Nations.

Q: As a senior diplomat, how do you perceive Aceh from an
international perspective?

A: The world cannot deny the sovereign right of the government to
deal with its own internal problems, especially when the internal
problem is an armed insurrection. The only way, perhaps, that we
open ourselves to foreign criticism is if we commit human rights
violations. We should be aware that we can only be faulted if we
again commit human rights violations, which, according to the
view of the West, are to be criticized.

Q: But we have human rights issues now in Aceh, don't we?

A: It can be prevented now. Let us learn from the past, let us
not repeat the same mistakes we made during the DOM (1989-1998
Military Operation in Aceh).