Indonesia raises ante in the war on terrorism

Indonesia raises ante in the war on terrorism

Endy M. Bayuni, Jakarta

The death of Malaysian terror master Azahari bin Husin in a
gun battle with police outside a bungalow in the East Java hill
resort of Batu on Wednesday marks a new phase in the war against
terror that Indonesia began three years ago.

His death will indeed be the first major breakthrough for
Detachment 88, a specially trained antiterrorist force set up by
the National Police in the wake of the first devastating bomb
attacks in Bali on Oct. 12, 2002.

Azahari, along with his fellow countryman Noordin M. Top, have
become household names in the wrong sense of the word. The
Malaysian pair has been identified as the masterminds behind a
series of major terrorist attacks in Indonesia, dating back to
the 2002 bombings of two night clubs in Bali. Since then, they
have added to their list the suicide bombing at the J.W. Marriott
hotel in Jakarta in August, 2003, the car bomb attack outside the
Australian embassy in Jakarta in September, 2004, and the suicide
bombs in two restaurants in Bali last month.

In all these attacks, their trademarks were clear to the
police -- so much so that people began to ask why two wanted
aliens could be on the run for more than three years and continue
to terrorize the nation without being found.

In the wake of the second round of bomb attacks on Bali last
month, we learned that Azahari and Noordin had been able to
recruit and train new suicide bombers to do their dirty work, as
well as raise the necessary money. They may be the two most
wanted men in Indonesia, but most definitely they have not been
running.

According to the police, they had almost cornered Noordin in a
hideout in Semarang earlier on Wednesday, but he managed to
escape just before the raid took place. Azahari, by contrast, was
not so lucky. Members of Detachment 88, led by Insp. Gen. Gorries
Mere, had the house in Batu surrounded.

There was a shootout and Azahari and two accomplices threw
bombs at the officers before one of the bombs exploded and killed
all three men inside. The police claim that Azahari blew himself
and two others up must be treated carefully. Azahari may have
trained suicide bombers, but he was not suicidal himself.

For the last three years, the failure to catch Azahari and
Noordin has been a slap in the face for the National Police,
whose task it is, along with the State Intelligence Agency (BIN),
to lead the Indonesian war on terror. Not only have they let the
two Malaysians slip through their fingers, they also seemed to be
one step behind as the pair continued to commit their evil deeds.

There have been many blunders, too, such as the raid on a
house in Bandung from which the two were able to escape, and the
wrongful arrest of several people who looked like them.

No wonder foreign experts, including Singapore's grand old man
Lee Kuan Yew, unkindly describe Indonesia as a safe haven for
those associated with Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the Southeast Asian
terrorist network with ambitions of turning the entire region
into an Islamic state. Many foreign governments have also accused
Indonesia of not playing its part in fighting the growing threat
of international and regional terrorism.

Western governments, like the United States, Australia and
Europe, have also poured money and resources in to help beef up
the capabilities of the Indonesian Police and intelligence
services in the counterterrorism arena. Members of Detachment 88,
for example, are trained by Western experts.

The failure to arrest the two Malaysians has overshadowed the
other achievements Indonesia has made in this war on terror.

From the very beginning, Indonesia was determined to stick to
the rule of law, including the presumption of innocence for
suspected terrorists, in waging this war. The country has caught
and sent to jail many terrorists -- some are even waiting on
death row now -- for their parts in the bomb attacks going back to
2003. One of these is JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who
is serving time for his part in the first Bali bombing.

This is a lot more than the United States, Australia and other
countries have done in their own campaigns against terror.
Prosecutions are rare or even non-existent in some of these
countries.

There have been times when the government came under pressure
to give the security forces, including the military, extra
powers, such as detaining people without charge and other
draconian measures that supposedly could help them pursue this
war more effectively. This did not, however, happen as the
public, the House of Representatives and the media were quick to
reject such proposals, fearing that these types of powers would
eventually be used, or rather abused, by those in power.

Even the decision by the President last month to bring the
Indonesian Military (TNI) into the campaign against terror has
been received with skepticism and warnings of the return to
the militaristic years of Soeharto, with all the consequences
that would entail.

Following the President's decision, the TNI has revived the
territorial function of its non-commissioned officers at village
level, who, during the Soeharto years, were used effectively for
the early detection of any antigovernment sentiments. We only
have TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto's word that this function
will not be abused.

At the end of the day, it is the National Police, more than
any other institution, that should lead the war on terror in this
country.

Detachment 88's achievement in ending Azahari's reign of
terror could not have been timelier, coming just as the nation
was losing confidence in the police and we were about to resign
ourselves to living with a constant terrorist threat every day.

Now more than ever, there is no room complacency.

Noordin is still at large, and he, and whoever else he has
recruited, can still do harm and could even run amock.

After Azahari's death, the police, particularly Detachment 88,
must work even harder to catch Noordin and destroy whatever is
left of his terrorist network.