Indonesia must stop its politics of hatred
By Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo
JAKARTA (JP): Lessons learned from 53 years of independence in Indonesia are characterized by only two long-term serving leaders. Both leaders allowed the growth of a personality cult, with some degree of vindictiveness toward those who opposed them. In turn, the opposition cannot let go of past experiences and maintains a cycle of revenge. What conclusions can we draw from the evolution of Indonesian politics?
Right after the declaration of independence in 1945, the country was faced with a series of secession movements; the separatists, one by one, were effectively annihilated. For reasons of building up national unity, the leadership effectively discouraged any opposition voiced by the people.
Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, imposed a strong policy to curtail any political dissent. Opposing ideas were branded as kontra revolusi (antirevolutionary) since national development was considered part of the revolutionary mission. Once branded with these "sacred words", their existence was systematically annihilated.
To avoid any repercussions, the rest of the people all played and danced to the same tune. The people were made to believe that Sukarno was an irreplaceable leader. He even allowed the growth of a personality cult, where his ideas were considered as sacred. By bending a little in the Constitution, he was made to become long-life president.
The climax was marked when the people became disturbed by a failed coup. Some politicians quickly changed their coats to join the military, supported student protesters and blamed the regime as corrupt, authoritarian and left leaning.
With the euphoria of success after crushing the communist rebellion, the new regime promptly labeled itself the New Order. The new regime claimed that the objectives of the order were to rehabilitate and develop infrastructure under the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila democracy.
In the process, the new leadership under president Soeharto kept venting hatred, particularly against former president Sukarno and his loyalists. They branded them the Old Order. Some were ruthlessly eliminated or denied involvement in national development. They were alienated and considered enemies of the state. The new regime even developed discriminatory policies, screening members of society to be free from any element of communism and the Old Order.
It was now the oppositions' time to take back what was lost during Sukarno's period. The race to join the ruling bandwagon started, and many were quick to disclaim any relationship with the Old Order.
Slowly, those who discharged the constitution came to believe that there was only one capable leader, Soeharto.
We saw again the growth of a personality cult, where life-long leadership became possible under the guise of five-year terms of uncontested national leadership elections. Consequently, the strong policy which was originally aimed to preserve national stability, was eventually used to sustain the regime.
One peculiar characteristic of both these regimes was a strong reliance upon their respective circles and cronies. The main difference was the pie of national income was still small during Sukarno's period.
With the New Order's economic prosperity, Soeharto's cronies rapidly rose to become powerful business conglomerates. These conglomerates apparently abused the facilities that were opened to them. They also influenced decisions regarding promotion of government rank and file.
In practice, they intervened at will, encroaching on the boundaries of small business activities, such as in retail and small businesses. The policy to help small businesses was purposely directed to extend the business network for these conglomerates.
When the economic crisis struck the country, it became apparent that the culprits in huge private sector borrowings were well-connected individuals.
As a result, the regime began to lose the people's trust and the country saw a demise of its orderly society. Losing their old influence in this era of reform, many politicians again took the earliest opportunity to rally behind the protesters.
The Armed Forces, which in the past functioned as political stabilizer, seemed to be put off balance whether to support or abandon the regime. Society became divided. Those who did not get a share in the past began to speak out, slandering the New Order regime.
Any attempt to correct the failure of the economy was seen with great suspicion. Strong antigovernment sentiments abruptly ended the rule of the New Order. The opposition now feels that the new government under President Habibie is just an extension of the old regime.
Although the new government is only about three months old, the new leadership has touted itself as being responsible for removing the authoritarian rule and for restoring democracy in the country.
We are now seeing another cycle of officials trying to dissociate themselves from any affiliation or connection with the Soeharto family. Some members of the business community even rejected to be identified as part of the regime.
While Habibie's government attempts to implement populist policies, the public does not see that the economy is getting any better. The new government took an easy way out by blaming the past regime, labeling it as corrupt and evil, even though they were once a part of it.
Both those who benefited and those who did not are joining in the chorus of vindictiveness. Meanwhile, the multitudinous poor continue to suffer, and suffer extremely bad.
The implications of this political rhetoric again show that the new, Habibie administration is trying to be identified as a fighter for democracy and champion for the poor.
It is attempting to show that the new civilian government will be able to redefine the role of the Armed Forces in the political arena.
In effect, they are successfully portraying the Soeharto regime as an evil and oppressive regime. Even if an election can be held next year, the elected president will inherit the chaos of the country's social, political and economic life.
This reform era could also sow the seeds of hatred among those who are adversely affected because of the political changes.
It can be concluded that for 53 years, Indonesian politics has been laden with unresolved hatred.
Sukarno imposed guided democracy and encouraged a personality cult, portraying himself as the only one who could rule the country. In doing so, he obliterated all oppositions and branded them as the enemies of the state.
When Soeharto came to power through the military backed New Order, he introduced Pancasila democracy and allowed hatred to be vented against Sukarno and Sukarnoism. Similarly, he also portrayed himself as the only one who could rule the country.
In return, he managed to build up his own circles, cronies and conglomerates. When the New Order regime began to lose its grip, the same pattern was repeated.
Today, Habibie tries to portray himself as a populist, a reformist and a democrat.
Politicians should exercise compassion. In the past, leaders have set wrong examples by encouraging the growth of personality cults with vindictive attitudes. If the people allow politicians to influence their attitudes, then hatred will haunt our social life all over again, and it will be difficult for any government to begin anew because we cannot place the past in its proper perspective.
If we allow ourselves to fester in the disagreements and sins of the past, the next leaders in Indonesia will inherit disunity and hatred. If the politics of hatred were allowed to flourish again, recovery will be far from being tenacious.
The writer is a social and economic observer and former regional development bank officer.