Indonesia must stop its politics of hatred

Indonesia must stop its politics of hatred

By Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo

JAKARTA (JP): Lessons learned from 53 years of independence in
Indonesia are characterized by only two long-term serving
leaders. Both leaders allowed the growth of a personality cult,
with some degree of vindictiveness toward those who opposed them.
In turn, the opposition cannot let go of past experiences and
maintains a cycle of revenge. What conclusions can we draw from
the evolution of Indonesian politics?

Right after the declaration of independence in 1945, the
country was faced with a series of secession movements; the
separatists, one by one, were effectively annihilated. For
reasons of building up national unity, the leadership effectively
discouraged any opposition voiced by the people.

Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, imposed a strong policy
to curtail any political dissent. Opposing ideas were branded as
kontra revolusi (antirevolutionary) since national development
was considered part of the revolutionary mission. Once branded
with these "sacred words", their existence was systematically
annihilated.

To avoid any repercussions, the rest of the people all played
and danced to the same tune. The people were made to believe that
Sukarno was an irreplaceable leader. He even allowed the growth
of a personality cult, where his ideas were considered as sacred.
By bending a little in the Constitution, he was made to become
long-life president.

The climax was marked when the people became disturbed by a
failed coup. Some politicians quickly changed their coats to join
the military, supported student protesters and blamed the regime
as corrupt, authoritarian and left leaning.

With the euphoria of success after crushing the communist
rebellion, the new regime promptly labeled itself the New Order.
The new regime claimed that the objectives of the order were to
rehabilitate and develop infrastructure under the 1945
Constitution and Pancasila democracy.

In the process, the new leadership under president Soeharto
kept venting hatred, particularly against former president
Sukarno and his loyalists. They branded them the Old Order. Some
were ruthlessly eliminated or denied involvement in national
development. They were alienated and considered enemies of the
state. The new regime even developed discriminatory policies,
screening members of society to be free from any element of
communism and the Old Order.

It was now the oppositions' time to take back what was lost
during Sukarno's period. The race to join the ruling bandwagon
started, and many were quick to disclaim any relationship with
the Old Order.

Slowly, those who discharged the constitution came to believe
that there was only one capable leader, Soeharto.

We saw again the growth of a personality cult, where life-long
leadership became possible under the guise of five-year terms of
uncontested national leadership elections. Consequently, the
strong policy which was originally aimed to preserve national
stability, was eventually used to sustain the regime.

One peculiar characteristic of both these regimes was a strong
reliance upon their respective circles and cronies. The main
difference was the pie of national income was still small during
Sukarno's period.

With the New Order's economic prosperity, Soeharto's cronies
rapidly rose to become powerful business conglomerates. These
conglomerates apparently abused the facilities that were opened
to them. They also influenced decisions regarding promotion of
government rank and file.

In practice, they intervened at will, encroaching on the
boundaries of small business activities, such as in retail and
small businesses. The policy to help small businesses was
purposely directed to extend the business network for these
conglomerates.

When the economic crisis struck the country, it became
apparent that the culprits in huge private sector borrowings were
well-connected individuals.

As a result, the regime began to lose the people's trust and
the country saw a demise of its orderly society. Losing their old
influence in this era of reform, many politicians again took the
earliest opportunity to rally behind the protesters.

The Armed Forces, which in the past functioned as political
stabilizer, seemed to be put off balance whether to support or
abandon the regime. Society became divided. Those who did not get
a share in the past began to speak out, slandering the New Order
regime.

Any attempt to correct the failure of the economy was seen
with great suspicion. Strong antigovernment sentiments abruptly
ended the rule of the New Order. The opposition now feels that
the new government under President Habibie is just an extension
of the old regime.

Although the new government is only about three months old,
the new leadership has touted itself as being responsible for
removing the authoritarian rule and for restoring democracy in
the country.

We are now seeing another cycle of officials trying to
dissociate themselves from any affiliation or connection with the
Soeharto family. Some members of the business community even
rejected to be identified as part of the regime.

While Habibie's government attempts to implement populist
policies, the public does not see that the economy is getting any
better. The new government took an easy way out by blaming the
past regime, labeling it as corrupt and evil, even though they
were once a part of it.

Both those who benefited and those who did not are joining in
the chorus of vindictiveness. Meanwhile, the multitudinous poor
continue to suffer, and suffer extremely bad.

The implications of this political rhetoric again show that
the new, Habibie administration is trying to be identified as a
fighter for democracy and champion for the poor.

It is attempting to show that the new civilian government will
be able to redefine the role of the Armed Forces in the political
arena.

In effect, they are successfully portraying the Soeharto
regime as an evil and oppressive regime. Even if an election can
be held next year, the elected president will inherit the chaos
of the country's social, political and economic life.

This reform era could also sow the seeds of hatred among those
who are adversely affected because of the political changes.

It can be concluded that for 53 years, Indonesian politics has
been laden with unresolved hatred.

Sukarno imposed guided democracy and encouraged a personality
cult, portraying himself as the only one who could rule the
country. In doing so, he obliterated all oppositions and branded
them as the enemies of the state.

When Soeharto came to power through the military backed New
Order, he introduced Pancasila democracy and allowed hatred to be
vented against Sukarno and Sukarnoism. Similarly, he also
portrayed himself as the only one who could rule the country.

In return, he managed to build up his own circles, cronies and
conglomerates. When the New Order regime began to lose its grip,
the same pattern was repeated.

Today, Habibie tries to portray himself as a populist, a
reformist and a democrat.

Politicians should exercise compassion. In the past, leaders
have set wrong examples by encouraging the growth of personality
cults with vindictive attitudes. If the people allow politicians
to influence their attitudes, then hatred will haunt our social
life all over again, and it will be difficult for any government
to begin anew because we cannot place the past in its proper
perspective.

If we allow ourselves to fester in the disagreements and sins
of the past, the next leaders in Indonesia will inherit disunity
and hatred. If the politics of hatred were allowed to flourish
again, recovery will be far from being tenacious.

The writer is a social and economic observer and former
regional development bank officer.