Indonesia must see facts in East Timor saga

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA: It is time for the Indonesian elite, and the military (TNI) in particular, to get over Australia's role in concluding the sorry East Timor episode. That means acknowledging that in 1999 it was the TNI and the Habibie Government -- not the Howard Government -- that were primarily responsible for the souring of Australia-Indonesia relations.

President B.J. Habibie was irate in December 1998 when he received a letter from John Howard suggesting that an offer of wider autonomy to East Timor should also include the possibility of independence at the end of a five-year to 10-year transition period. Instead of Howard's proposal, he instructed his cabinet to agree to give East Timor immediate independence if it so chose in the plebiscite on autonomy then being negotiated with Portugal, the original colonial power in the territory.

Habibie did not want to take care of East Timor anymore because he considered the cost too high, and because he felt he could not depend on Catholics there to remain loyal to the republic at the end of the transition period.

The manner in which he "lost" East Timor became one of the main reasons why, later in 1999, Habibie lost any chance of being re-elected as president by the People's Consultative Assembly.

It was obvious the TNI was never going to accept independence for East Timor, even though it did not protest openly against Habibie's decision. Instead, it sabotaged the process by using the clandestine operations of pro-Indonesian leaders and militia trained by its intelligence agencies throughout the previous decade.

When, against TNI expectations, the plebiscite was overwhelmingly pro-independence, the TNI allowed the militia to go on the rampage.

Western countries, including Australia, had completely failed to appreciate that the weak Habibie government could not deliver on its promises. The East Timorese got their independence but at a tremendous -- and continuing -- cost.

The East Timorese made the choice they did because of the Indonesian military's history of abuses and excesses since Indonesia annexed East Timor in 1976.

And because the TNI kept East Timor as its special domain for so long, it is possible that the military is the only part of the Indonesian elite that is today really upset with the results of the plebiscite. The damage and humiliation is confined to it.

Except for some TNI elements which organized anti-Australian demonstrations in Jakarta, the international intervention has not created a widespread or deep enmity against Australia among the Indonesian elite or the general population. The Indonesian elite has been more disturbed by Australia's rhetoric than its actual involvement in and leadership of the East Timorese peacekeeping force, Interfet.

In the end, Australia's actions and involvement in East Timor helped to limit TNI abuses and save the East Timorese from more calamities.

Australia's intervention was with UN support and Indonesia's consent, however reluctantly given. Also, the Interfet commander, Gen. Peter Cosgrove, has himself said his operations could not have been as successful without the cooperation of the TNI under Gen. Kiki Syahnakri.

Had the autonomy/independence process happened over an extended period, as suggested in Howard's 1998 letter, the situation might have been completely different. It might have prepared the parties for reconciliation, and it might have prepared the East Timorese to govern themselves. It could have prevented civil war and the violent reaction from the TNI, because the TNI needed time to come to terms with the idea of an independent East Timor.

Independence would have been the most likely outcome after a period of transition but it could have been peaceful, with all parties prepared for the outcome.

Australia-Indonesia relations are recovering. However, one aspect of the relationship that will need nurturing is military cooperation. The TNI still hopes to have the Australian military as a concerned partner, despite the recent cooling of relations.

Australia has a strategic interest in improving the relationship, because Indonesia is an important neighbor and strategic friend and partner. This is not only true in bilateral terms, but also in regional terms. Not only is Indonesia in crisis today, the region is in crisis. Cooperation between the military establishments of the two countries makes sense.

However, if this cooperation is to be deepened, the TNI has to cut its losses in East Timor and move on. That means stopping the activities of the militia along the border of West Timor, repatriating the refugees in West Timor and bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to court.

The TNI has a long way to go on this, because it is still not willing to accept completely that independence is what the East Timorese have decided on.

There is an opportunity to deepen the relationship in the future, because Indonesia is on its way to becoming a more matured democracy -- however difficult that process looks today. Since this is a cathartic period for Indonesia, it is important that Australia is patient, and assists wherever it can to make it possible for Indonesia to complete a transition that hopefully will not take too long.

The writer is a board member of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. This article first appeared in The Sydney Morning Herald.