Indonesia must see facts in East Timor saga

Indonesia must see facts in East Timor saga

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA: It is time for the Indonesian elite, and the military
(TNI) in particular, to get over Australia's role in concluding
the sorry East Timor episode. That means acknowledging that in
1999 it was the TNI and the Habibie Government -- not the Howard
Government -- that were primarily responsible for the souring of
Australia-Indonesia relations.

President B.J. Habibie was irate in December 1998 when he
received a letter from John Howard suggesting that an offer of
wider autonomy to East Timor should also include the possibility
of independence at the end of a five-year to 10-year transition
period. Instead of Howard's proposal, he instructed his cabinet
to agree to give East Timor immediate independence if it so chose
in the plebiscite on autonomy then being negotiated with
Portugal, the original colonial power in the territory.

Habibie did not want to take care of East Timor anymore
because he considered the cost too high, and because he felt he
could not depend on Catholics there to remain loyal to the
republic at the end of the transition period.

The manner in which he "lost" East Timor became one of the
main reasons why, later in 1999, Habibie lost any chance of being
re-elected as president by the People's Consultative Assembly.

It was obvious the TNI was never going to accept independence
for East Timor, even though it did not protest openly against
Habibie's decision. Instead, it sabotaged the process by using
the clandestine operations of pro-Indonesian leaders and militia
trained by its intelligence agencies throughout the previous
decade.

When, against TNI expectations, the plebiscite was
overwhelmingly pro-independence, the TNI allowed the militia to
go on the rampage.

Western countries, including Australia, had completely failed
to appreciate that the weak Habibie government could not deliver
on its promises. The East Timorese got their independence but at
a tremendous -- and continuing -- cost.

The East Timorese made the choice they did because of the
Indonesian military's history of abuses and excesses since
Indonesia annexed East Timor in 1976.

And because the TNI kept East Timor as its special domain for
so long, it is possible that the military is the only part of the
Indonesian elite that is today really upset with the results of
the plebiscite. The damage and humiliation is confined to it.

Except for some TNI elements which organized anti-Australian
demonstrations in Jakarta, the international intervention has not
created a widespread or deep enmity against Australia among the
Indonesian elite or the general population. The Indonesian elite
has been more disturbed by Australia's rhetoric than its actual
involvement in and leadership of the East Timorese peacekeeping
force, Interfet.

In the end, Australia's actions and involvement in East Timor
helped to limit TNI abuses and save the East Timorese from more
calamities.

Australia's intervention was with UN support and Indonesia's
consent, however reluctantly given. Also, the Interfet commander,
Gen. Peter Cosgrove, has himself said his operations could not
have been as successful without the cooperation of the TNI under
Gen. Kiki Syahnakri.

Had the autonomy/independence process happened over an
extended period, as suggested in Howard's 1998 letter, the
situation might have been completely different. It might have
prepared the parties for reconciliation, and it might have
prepared the East Timorese to govern themselves. It could have
prevented civil war and the violent reaction from the TNI,
because the TNI needed time to come to terms with the idea of an
independent East Timor.

Independence would have been the most likely outcome after a
period of transition but it could have been peaceful, with all
parties prepared for the outcome.

Australia-Indonesia relations are recovering. However, one
aspect of the relationship that will need nurturing is military
cooperation. The TNI still hopes to have the Australian military
as a concerned partner, despite the recent cooling of relations.

Australia has a strategic interest in improving the
relationship, because Indonesia is an important neighbor and
strategic friend and partner. This is not only true in bilateral
terms, but also in regional terms. Not only is Indonesia in
crisis today, the region is in crisis. Cooperation between the
military establishments of the two countries makes sense.

However, if this cooperation is to be deepened, the TNI has
to cut its losses in East Timor and move on. That means stopping
the activities of the militia along the border of West Timor,
repatriating the refugees in West Timor and bringing the
perpetrators of human rights violations to court.

The TNI has a long way to go on this, because it is still not
willing to accept completely that independence is what the East
Timorese have decided on.

There is an opportunity to deepen the relationship in the
future, because Indonesia is on its way to becoming a more
matured democracy -- however difficult that process looks today.
Since this is a cathartic period for Indonesia, it is important
that Australia is patient, and assists wherever it can to make it
possible for Indonesia to complete a transition that hopefully
will not take too long.

The writer is a board member of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Jakarta. This article first appeared in
The Sydney Morning Herald.