Indonesia must reduce defense dependence

Indonesia must reduce defense dependence

By Amal Ihsan Hadian

JAKARTA (JP): The Indonesian Military received bad news
shortly before its anniversary on Oct. 5. The United States
Congress managed to pass a law banning continued military aid to
Indonesia.

Since September 1999 the U.S. has been imposing an embargo on
arms and spare parts and withdrawn international military
training and education cooperation (IMET) and foreign military
funds.

Many Indonesians have criticized the stance of Congress.
However, it would not be fair to judge the Congress as the cause
of the problem. The main problem is in defense policy itself.
This is a logical consequence, given that our defense development
is highly dependent on outside parties, the prerequisite being
healthy political conditions and international relations.

This awareness should drive the military (TNI) to apply a
"mixed fleet" policy in the supply of heavy equipment such as
aircraft and warships. Any trouble in relations with one country
would therefore not disrupt defense and its development plans.

Currently almost all heavy equipment and weaponry is obtained
from the United States and western European countries. These
include rifles such as M16s (U.S.) or SS1/FNCs (Belgium) and
aircraft such as F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-5 Tigers and A-4
Skyhawks, while the newest BAe HS Hawk 100/200s are from Great
Britain, a US ally.

With a mixed fleet policy, equipment and weaponry should be
procured from sources with different political positions to avoid
uniform political views which could one day disrupt integrity and
defense building.

In the early years of the New Order Indonesia's navy and air
force fleets which had been bought from Russia had to be grounded
when the supply of spare parts was disrupted.

Ideological barriers in the purchase of equipment are no
longer relevant. The collapse of communism in Russia, the winds
of change in Eastern Europe and political changes in China have
ended the captive market in the world market for weaponry.

Also, experience under colonial rule and the struggle in
maintaining independence from 1945 to 1949 shows that no country
can be relied on in helping Indonesia's defense. The position of
each country can change in accordance its strategic view of
defense.

The US secret involvement in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion,
China's tacit support for the (now banned) Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) coup attempt in 1965, and, lastly, the strains in
Indonesia-Australian relations over East Timor all serve to prove
the premise that threats and disturbances can emerge in any form
and from any country.

In the context of regional politics, the campaign to establish
the "ASEAN collective strength system", as cited by military
researcher Bilveer Singh -- aimed at having uniform main weaponry
among ASEAN members such as F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-5 Tigers, A-
4 Skyhawks and Hawk 100/200s -- has not been effective.

The purchase of F-18 Hornets by Thailand, MiG-29s by Malaysia
and endeavors to purchase Su-30s by Indonesia signify the end of
the collective strength campaign.

Also, the establishment of an ASEAN collective strength system
may actually be at the expense of a country's interests because
countries are often persuaded to imitate neighbors' arms
buildups.

Indonesia's purchase of Hawk 100/200s from Britain is an
example; Jakarta might have made the deal because it was
following the ASEAN collective strength scenario.

The deal was entered into despite the fact that in actuality
Indonesia needed a multi-role fighter aircraft with a greater
combat range such as the A-4 Skyhawk, in order to cover the
extent of Indonesian airspace.

Another factor relevant to the mixed fleet policy is
Indonesia's technology mastery and the state of development of
its defense industry. One of the weaknesses of the mixed fleet
policy is high operational and maintenance costs because varied
weaponry requires a greater variety of maintenance equipment and
operational spare parts.

This particular weakness may be overcome by developing the
proper technology by the existing defense industry in order to
reduce dependence on imports -- which also affects the level of
operational and maintenance costs.

One success story is that of Iran when it managed to maintain
the operation of its F-14 Tomcats following the Islamic
revolution despite a US arms and spare parts' embargo.

Indonesia's high-tech industries, such as IPTN, Pindad and
Dahana, should therefore be supported and encouraged to develop
the defense industry so that Indonesia can achieve self-
sufficiency.

It is to be hoped that in the future the Army will no longer
need to import its uniforms and boots and the Navy and Air Force
no longer need to travel abroad merely to maintain and up-grade
their warships and fighters.

The writer is an observer of defense issues based in Jakarta.