Indonesia must curb TNI omnipresence

Indonesia must curb TNI omnipresence

The excessive reach of the Indonesian Military (TNI), from the
lowest level of village administration to top-level security
affairs, is to blame for conflicts of authority with the police
as well as infringement of civilian rights. An overhaul of this
territorial organization should be included in the military's
political repositioning plans, says Samsu Rizal Panggabean of the
Center for Security and Peace Studies at Yogyakarta-based Gadjah
Mada University.

Question: Your assessment of the military today?

Answer: There have been a number of changes. First, the
reduction in the number of its representatives in the House of
Representatives. I think it's something.

Second, for the first time in the last 40 years we have had
civilian ministers of defense. Third, Bakostranasda (the internal
security agency) has been dissolved.

Fourth, in the past the military always sided with Golkar, but
refrained from doing so in the 1999 elections. There are also
plans for a repositioning which, more or less, can be seen as a
sign of readiness to adjust to change. Some may think it's too
late, but at least now they have the will.

Q: What is the biggest concern in the military?

A: There are a few major problems, the first of which is the
territorial organization. TNI's territorial presence, from the
Babinsa (military officers attached to subdistricts or villages),
the Koramil (military subdistrict command), the Kodim (military
district command), the Korem (military resorts at certain
provinces), and finally the Kodam (regional command) to its
highest commanders should be reduced.

Such a territorial presence is a hindrance to police handling
domestic security problems -- in the past this has led to
friction between the two. Police investigations and law
enforcement are often "chaotic" because of the presence of
military personnel. The territorial presence also causes conflict
of authority and competition.

In addition, the (pervasive) presence has led to interference
in the lives of civilians.

Q: How are we going to reduce this presence?

A: There should be gradual efforts to do away with this hierarchy
(territorial structure). Of course it will take time.

Another thing related to this (omnipresence) is the military
doctrine of Hankamrata (the involvement of civilians in defense).
We need to review and change the doctrine. It's an outdated
concept, formed on the basis of our experience in the guerrilla
war for independence. This doctrine is actually the basis of the
territorial hierarchy now implemented by the military.

The Indonesian Military has to declare it will obey the
democratic civilian government ... (and) respect civilian
authority. This should be clearly defined in the law.

Q: Isn't the recent decision to separate the police from the
military enough to prevent conflict of authority?

A: It should have been enough. But, if we ask the police whether
they agreed to being separated from the military, they would
certainly say the question was misleading. It was not a question
of separating the police from the military but the other way
around.

In some regions, people prefer to go to military commanders
rather than the police to report a crime. That's why I strongly
suggest that the territorial hierarchy of the military be erased.

If they sincerely want to give the police authority to handle
domestic security affairs while letting the military handle
external security, why then should there be rayon, district,
resort, and regional military commands. All these koramil, kodim,
korem, and kodam assume that the enemies are among the people.

Military intelligence, too, should no longer spy on Indonesian
people or mess around with NGOs. It's external enemies that they
should deal with, not the citizens of their own country.

A clear division of tasks between the police and the military
should be clearly mentioned in the law. Otherwise, the reform
agenda will go nowhere and people will continue to doubt TNI's
repositioning plans.

Q: Does it mean the changes already undertaken were meaningless?

A: Of course not. Only, we want them (military) to be more
effective, meaning that if the government asks them to do
something, they will obey.

The government has repeatedly told the international community
that Indonesia was capable of handling the East Timor militias.
This has remained a promise so far, indicating the military's
failure to obey the government.

This is because the military is now divided. It's not
solid... it's experiencing a demoralization. In this world, a
military experiencing demoralization is the most dangerous
military. In Irian (Jaya), for example, military members fought
with members of the police mobile brigade. In Kupang and Ambon,
they fought one another.

Q: Any suggested solutions?

A: The line of command, especially in the conflict areas such as
Aceh, Irian and Ambon, is often not upheld. What the Indonesian
Military Commander says can probably reach only as far as the
district level. Even in regions such as Surakarta (Central Java)
or Jakarta, during a riot, the hierarchy of command is also
unclear.

In this case, the Indonesian Military Commander has to be
strict and punish members who violate the law. He should bring
them to court and give them fair trials. Justice should be
upheld.(Sri Wahyuni)