Indonesia backgrounder: A guide to the 2004 elections

Indonesia backgrounder: A guide to the 2004 elections

International Crisis Group
(ICG)
Jakarta

Indonesia faces at least two and probably three national
elections in 2004, including a presidential vote, but they are
unlikely to bring fundamental change. Citizens are increasingly
disillusioned with the half-decade of democracy and "money
politics" they have experienced since the collapse of Soeharto's
authoritarian New Order.

The first election, on April 5, 2004, will fill almost 16,000
seats in legislatures at the national, provincial and district
levels. The second, on July 5, 2004, will be its first direct
presidential vote ever. If, as is almost certain, no candidate
meets the criteria for election in the first round, a run-off
between the top two vote-getters will take place on Sept. 20. The
process needs to be completed before President Megawati
Soekarnoputri's term expires on Oct. 20.

Public disillusionment with the performance of democratic
government since the first post-authoritarian election in 1999
has been spreading rapidly. The elected government is widely seen
as having failed to cope with the massive challenges that the
nation is facing. Elected politicians at all levels are commonly
perceived as venal and corrupt.

And the ordinary people who constitute the poor majority
complain that democracy has not brought any improvement in their
economic welfare. Indeed, a credible public opinion poll
indicated that 58 percent of respondents believe that conditions
were better under Soeharto's New Order.

Political reformers have called for a thorough overhaul of the
constitution and the electoral system to ensure that leaders are
responsive and accountable to the voters. The most important
reform has been the adoption of direct presidential elections in
place of the indirect system that was mired in the backroom
dealing of political parties and "money politics".

Reform of elections to the legislatures has been more limited.
Apart from the removal of appointed military and police
representatives, those bodies will be elected through
proportional representation, much the same way as before.

The main difference is that the old province-based
constituencies will be reduced in size in the large provinces so
that representatives, theoretically at least, will be closer to
their constituents. This limited reform, however, may entrench
rather than overcome the political fragmentation that has
bedeviled post-authoritarian democracy.

Public opinion surveys indicate that the two leading parties
in 1999 -- President Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar, the party of
the Soeharto government -- are again likely to occupy the top
positions. However, the polls suggest that many who voted for the
underdog PDI-P in 1999 have been alienated by its behavior and
are returning to Golkar.

Among potential presidential candidates, Megawati retains the
most support, but the gap is narrowing. Golkar, however, has been
unable to capitalize on its growing support because of inability
to determine its presidential candidate. The party's chairman,
Akbar Tanjung, is appealing against a three-year prison sentence
for corruption. Meanwhile seven potential candidates (including
Akbar) remain in the race for the party's nomination, which will
be determined only in April 2004.

Six months ahead of the first round of the presidential
election, four possible scenarios suggest themselves.

If the PDI-P clearly wins most votes, it is likely that Golkar
will be satisfied with the vice-presidency and will join a
coalition supporting the re-election of President Megawati.

If Golkar wins more votes than -- or roughly the same number
as -- PDI-P, it is likely to nominate its own presidential
candidate. Following Golkar's "pre-convention" in October 2003,
retired Gen. Wiranto has emerged as a leading candidate.

The second possibility, however, could lead to a nightmare for
Golkar. If it nominates its own candidate, Megawati could respond
by offering her party's vice-presidential nomination to a Golkar
candidate, perhaps Akbar Tanjung or Coordinating Minister for
People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla. This could not only split Golkar's
votes, but lead to a major division within the party itself.

The PDI-P's nightmare scenario, on the other hand, follows
from the first scenario above. A Megawati-Golkar team would
almost certainly come out far ahead of its nearest rival in the
first round of the presidential election although without
sufficient support to win outright in that round.

The candidate running second might take only 10 to 15 percent
of the votes but could then launch an "Anyone-But-Mega" campaign
in the second round. Such a campaign could mobilize Muslim votes
against the secular-nationalist Megawati. The most dangerous
potential run-off rival for Megawati would be the current
chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, Amien Rais,
although his prospects of reaching the second round seem bleak.

Another dangerous rival would be Coordinating Minister for
Political and Security Affairs General (Ret.) Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, if his tiny Democrat Party is able to secure the
backing of one of the larger parties. In December 2003 another
possible challenger emerged, former President Soeharto's eldest
daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, but her chances look slim at
this stage.

Whatever the result of the presidential election, the next
government will be based on a coalition of rival parties. In the
absence of a strong leader capable of imposing cohesion on such a
government, its performance will be hamstrung by many of the
problems that hampered the previous three.