Indonesia, ASEAN and Australia
Indonesia, ASEAN and Australia
S.P. Seth
Sydney
Indonesia is understandably upset over Australia's recent
announcement of its plan to establish a 1,000-mile maritime
identification zone to fight terrorism and other international
crimes. (Under the plan, Canberra will be able to intercept
foreign vessels once they pass within 1,000 nautical miles of
Australia's coastline.) According to Indonesia's Foreign
Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, the plan is unacceptable because "it
breaches our maritime jurisdiction." He added, "We view this
concept as having the potential for violating international
maritime law."
Australia's Defense Minister, Senator Robert Hill who was in
Jakarta recently, disagrees but failed to convince Jakarta in the
matter, even after arguing that it would also help Indonesia
protect its offshore oil platforms. It probably didn't occur to
Senator Hill that by that logic Indonesia might as well hand over
its maritime defense to Australia.
According to one Australian maritime law expert, Rosemary
Rayfuse at the University of New South Wales (as reported in the
Australian press), there was no legal basis "whatsoever" for the
inspection or interception of vessels suspected to be carrying
illegal cargo outside of a 12-nautical mile zone from the
country's coastline. She said, "That is extraordinary (1000-mile
zone) and there is certainly no legal basis for a maritime
interdiction zone of that magnitude."
Indeed, it isn't. Indonesia aside, Malaysia isn't amused
either even though they are not affected directly. According to
its Deputy Defense Minister, Zainal Abidin Zin, "They cannot say,
for the sake of security, they have the power to intercept ships.
We are not happy with the statement showing their supremacy."
He added forcefully, "They cannot bulldoze a plan that does
not honor the sovereignty of another country." And branded
Australian Prime Minister John Howard's statement to this effect
"volatile" and warned it could lead to misunderstanding between
Australia and its neighbors. In other words, if Australia's
persists with its new plan this has the potential of becoming a
seriously contentious issue with other ASEAN countries.
The question: Why is Canberra doing it? An explanation of
sorts is implied in a recent article by Miranda Darling, a
research associate with the Centre for Independent Studies, a
right-wing think tank. She writes in the Sydney Morning Herald:
"South-East Asia has three vulnerable 'choke points'--- the
Straits of Malacca, Sunda (between Java and Sumatra) and Lombok
(east of Bali -- which are used by half the world's shipping. As
financial and security controls on land grip harder, terrorists
are using the sea to smuggle drugs and counterfeit goods to fund
their operations."
In a veiled justification of Australia's plan, she adds, "Most
attacks (on shipping) take place in waters where the piracy laws
of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea are powerless.
Policies that apply a 'nation-based' approach are founded on a
false premise because the nature of both merchant shipping and
terrorism is international", but not bound by international law-a
convoluted logic.
Canberra's extended maritime interdiction plan looks like an
extension of the Australian and United States' doctrine of pre-
emption, this time to traverse maritime boundaries.
It is worth noting that Australia is already engaged in the
task of pacifying and securing island states of South Pacific.
Under threat of withholding aid, almost all of them have been
coerced into accepting Australian direction, if not control, of
their affairs.
We have in the South Pacific this spectacle of colonialism by
stealth. These former Australian colonial enclaves are being
reclaimed because they are not considered capable of governing
themselves. It is a familiar refrain of the colonial era which,
it seemed, had been consigned to the dustbin of history. The
amazing thing is that the Australian establishment, including the
media, have accepted uncritically Canberra's new role in the
South Pacific.
Indonesia is, of course, too big. With a population of over
200 million people and a politically charged middle class, it
won't be easy. Canberra hopes to develop more cooperative
security ties with Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, and Jakarta is not averse to it.
Indeed, in his address to the APEC conference in Chile, Susilo
emphasized the need for "a new global security culture",
highlighting Indonesia and Australia as a model of sorts.
Therefore, the political climate exists. But even Susilo's new
administration will find it hard to ignore Canberra's new
maritime doctrine of securing Australia in someone else's
backyard.
As for a new security pact or understanding between Australia
and Indonesia, Jakarta wants it to be a comprehensive package of
defense and economic assistance. According to Indonesia's Defense
Minister Juwono Sudarsono, "I would like him (the then visiting
Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill) to consider the fact
that assistance in security entails assistance in terms of
economic recovery for the poor and deprived."
He added, "(By) providing sustenance for the poor and
deprived and increasing their betterment in terms of economic
life there will be less inclination for these young people to
turn to international terrorism."
In a sense, Sudarsono was making an important point not only
about Indonesia but the ASEAN region as a whole. Which is that
Canberra needs to engage comprehensively with ASEAN countries,
and not just to pick and chose. For instance, Canberra wants to
be part of an ASEAN free trade regime, and be represented in its
deliberations. But, at the same time, it wouldn't sign a non-
aggression pact (Treaty of Amity and Co-operation) with ASEAN.
Canberra argues that it would curb its ability to criticize
human rights violations and undermine the US alliance. But this
doesn't stand up because some of the ASEAN countries are US
allies and their non-aggression commitment doesn't affect their
alliance.
Basically, Canberra wants to keep its options open in dealing
with the region. And that creates doubts. Which tend to be
reinforced with plans like the 1000-nautical mile maritime zone
to intercept foreign vessels, if Canberra so decided.
According to Marty Natalegawa, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry
spokesperson, "There can be no more efficient and effective way
for Australia to dispel misperceptions some quarters may have of
its intentions in South-East Asia than to simply accede to the
(ASEAN non-aggression pact)."
The author is Freelance Writer and can be reached at
SushilPSeth@aol.com