Indonesia and the North Korean crisis: Is there a role for ARF?

Indonesia and the North Korean crisis: Is there a role for ARF?

No role for Indonesia in Korean peninsula

Paulo Gorjao
Lecturer
Lusiada University
Portugal
paulogorjao@yahoo.com

During the recent Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum held
in Jakarta, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer
sought Indonesian support for a meeting of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Regional Forum to debate
possible ways to solve the North Korean Crisis. According to
Downer, the main ASEAN' Regional Forum (ARF) advantage is the
fact that North Korea is one of the participants since 2001.
Consequently, Downer thinks that ARF might allow at least some
"progress on the issue of North Korea".

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Marty
Natalegawa concurred with Downer, and said that Foreign Affairs
Minister Hassan Wirayuda shared the view that ARF should take a
leading role since "the disputing parties are all members". But
is the idea workable? And about Indonesia itself what role it can
play to end the crisis in Korean Peninsula?

Jakarta has been following events between Pyongyang and
Washington since the nuclear crisis escalated in late January. In
February, Indonesia sent a special envoy, the veteran Ambassador
Nana Sutresna, in a fact-finding mission to North Korea. Sutresna
held talks with North Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Paek Nam-
sun on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and also delivered
a personal letter from Indonesian President Megawati
Soekarnoputri to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il offering
help to end the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, he also met the North Korean ceremonial head of
state, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's
Assembly, Kim Yong-nam.

Following his meetings in Pyongyang, Sutresna traveled to
Seoul to inform South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Choi Sung-
hong of the outcome of his visit. As he had done in Pyongyang,
Sutresna also offered Seoul Indonesia's help to end the nuclear
crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

While acknowledging Jakarta's willingness to help, North Korea
kept insisting on direct talks with the United States to resolve
the crisis, and no substantive output was achieved as a result of
Sutresna's meetings in Pyongyang.

Also in February, and in order to further pressure North
Korea, Megawati met Paek Nam-sun in Kuala Lumpur one day before
the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement summit held in
Malaysia. Once again, Megawati offered Indonesia's help to end
the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea kept
rejecting it.

Despite increasing pressure from several countries (but not
from China, which is by far its greatest political and economic
supporter) North Korea refused thus far any multilateral approach
as mechanism for negotiations and keeps saying that only
bilateral talks with the United States will solve the crisis. In
turn, and despite some senior state officials' contradictory
statements, Washington continues rejecting bilateral talks with
Pyongyang as the first step. As an alternative to bilateral
talks, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell proposed a
"P5-plus-5 Framework", which would put at the same table the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the two Koreas.

North Korea thus far has not accepted this multilateral
mechanism for negotiations, and at this stage DEPLU is fully
aware that it will be extremely difficult to make Pyongyang state
officials change their minds concerning possible alternatives to
bilateral talks with the United States without more pressure from
Beijing.

Yet, the United States cool response and lack of urgency, the
truth is that North Korea must be diplomatically dealt with at
once, and it does not seem likely that ARF will fulfill a
relevant role as far as the solution of the crisis is concerned.
Several reasons seem to contribute to this assessment.

Indeed, the major players (China, Japan, the two Koreas,
Russia, and the United States) are ARF participants. However, the
table is too big and heterogeneous. The United States certainly
will not accept to be pressured by countries such as Brunei
Darussalam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, or Vietnam. In
other words, ARF does not have the right size or composition. ARF
include not only the major players but also players from a
different and lower league.

Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that Washington will
react more positively to private bilateral contacts with state
officials from countries such China, Japan, South Korea, and
Russia. Private bilateral contacts are potentially more fruitful
than will be the public multilateral approach provided by ARF.

Therefore, it remains unexplained the motive why the
Indonesian Government thinks that North Korea, which has been
thus far highly resistant to multilateral approaches, will be
willing to accept this multilateral mechanism as a possible
impasse-breaking device. This is even more astounding bearing in
mind that thus far ARF has not yet played any sort of meaningful
role in this crisis, as well as in prior Asian crises.

Ironically, there are already more countries and international
institutions seeking to play a role than direct parties in the
crisis. As usual, those actors with more political and economic
power will probably prevail since they have bigger carrots and
sticks.

Unfortunately, Indonesia has not yet fully recovered from the
economic crisis as well as from the political transition. Thus,
once it was rejected Indonesia's initial offer to play a mediator
role in the crisis, and since ARF is not a credible player, this
means that Jakarta has lost its diplomatic window of opportunity.

The writer is Visiting fellow in November/December 2002 at the
Australian Defense Studies Center