Indonesia able to put religious discord to rest: Scholar

The following is an interview with Greg Barton Ph.D., an Australian expert on liberal Islam in Indonesia.

JAKARTA (JP): For more than two years Indonesia has seen numerous outbreaks of unrest in many of its provinces. Some of this unrest appears to have had a religious dimension, with places of worship being burned down.

The ongoing conflict between Muslims and Christians on the eastern island of Ambon continues unabated, claiming hundreds of lives and forcibly displacing tens of thousands of people from the beautiful Mollucan islands.

Many Indonesians who are accustomed to living peacefully in a pluralistic society are perplexed by this violence. What has happened to this nation of 200 million people, comprising more than 300 ethnic groups embracing all the world's major religions? Some people have begun to doubt whether Indonesia will remain intact.

But not Greg Barton. This 36-year-old university lecturer and frequent visitor to Indonesia is optimistic about the future of the country, particularly the relationship between Muslims and Christians.

In a recent interview with The Jakarta Post, Barton, who has observed political Islam in Indonesia for more than a decade, attributed Indonesian Muslim's appreciation for other religions to prominent scholars like Gus Dur and Nurcholish Madjid.

Pure religious conflicts are very rare, according to Barton, and rather than despairing, he sees positive things resulting from what appear to be religious conflicts in Indonesia. For example, religious leaders closing ranks and establishing channels of communication.

Barton, who teaches religious studies, Asian studies and social studies at the School of Social Inquiry, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Geelong Victoria, Australia, has published a number of books about Islam in Indonesia.

Among his books are Studia Islamika (1995, 1997, 1999), Islam Radikal (Radical Islam, 1997) and Nahdlatul Ulama: Islamic Traditionalism & Modernity (1996). His new book, Gagasan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Ideas), will soon be published by Paramadina. Another book, Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia, is due out next year.

Question: Is it true that the role of Islam is diminishing in Indonesian politics?

Answer: It depends on what point of view you see. If you see the parties that won in the elections, Golkar and the United Development Party (PPP) still got the most votes. Well, you can say they are old parties, so the results were not surprising.

The reformist parties were the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN).

I suspect a lot of santri (devoted Muslims) voted for PKB and PAN, but also for PDI Perjuangan. So there are three parties that are doing quite well. Two of them have Islamic connections; the third does not have Islamic connections, but I'm sure Gus Dur's endorsement of Mega (Megawati Soekarnoputri, the chairwoman of PDI Perjuangan) has helped it a lot.

So, Islam is still very influential but on the other hand, PBB (the Crescent Star Party) and PK (the Justice Party) can be said to have failed.

So, I think for reformist parties, Islam has played a decisive role. Islamists or conservative Islamic interests have been shown to be a much-exaggerated force.

I think the traditional mainstream section of the santri community has overwhelmingly endorsed reformers and nonsectarian parties, and has played a decisive role.

Q: So, Islam still plays an important role?f

A: I think the role of Islam has been quite important but sometimes people only see Islam as a bad news story; it is only counted when it is doing something negative. I think it is important to acknowledge that it has made a contribution that has been very positive, that may have gone unnoticed precisely because of people having a negative image of Islam.

Q: Could you give a rough estimate of the number of sectarian and nonsectarian Muslims?

A: It is quite difficult because we don't have a census. NU (Nahdlatul Ulama -- the country's largest Muslim organization) and Muhammadiyah each definitely reach and command tens of millions (of followers). The only real data we have came from the June 7 elections based on the percentage of voters.

The ultraconservative Islamist parties have done extremely badly. They are a very small minority, and yet the reformist parties like PAN and PKB, and to some extent PDI Perjuangan, have appealed to, and have drawn upon, a sort of a liberal santri segment of the population, who voted for them apparently precisely because they are nonsectarian and represent a moderate, tolerant expression of Islam.

Reading that data it seems to me that there is an overruling vote in favor of the position established by people like Gus Dur (founder of PKB) or Nurcholish Madjid (noted Muslim scholar), and I think it is fair to say that even Amien Rais, who in the past did not take the same view, for example, as Nurcholish Madjid, has ended up taking this sort of liberal position partly because of personal conviction and partly because he understands the majority of the community does not support this reaction in politics. (The majority of the community) is supporting a democratically oriented expression of religion.

Q: Could you be more specific on this question of liberal Islam?

A: If you look back historically at the position of Amien Rais, as far as five years ago, even three years ago, there was a big difference between Amien and Nur, for example.

One knows that Nurcholish stands for liberal Islam and Paramadinah (a foundation founded by Nurcholish) is often criticized. People say it was just a middle-class and not very influential foundation.

Even many of my academic colleagues have said to me these people are very interesting, but they are not that important because they are just an elite; they are just a small minority.

There is circumstantial evidence in the case of the way Amien reoriented himself to suggest that he was responsible for a broader social movement, and that suggests that the position articulated by these outstanding liberals is, in fact, more widely supported than people had thought.

The best example is PDI Perjuangan, who I think a lot of santri supported. The evidence of this, I think, is that -- it is hard to get definite figures -- PDI Perjuangan did well in Central and East Java.

A lot of people were a bit uncomfortable with PKB because it is too old-fashioned and too conservative and narrow. So my point is that those who voted for PDI Perjuangan made a concrete statement in favor of nonsectarian politics, and specifically in support of Islam and nonsectarian politics.

I would like to think that the June 7 general election is evidence that really sectarian or divisive or ultraconservative political Islam is not very saleable. PBB has been a big disappointment. All right, maybe in the future the star and crescent (PBB) will do better because new parties still have to establish themselves, and to be fair PAN did not do as well as they might have, but I still think the evidence suggests very strongly most Indonesians don't want sectarian politics to the extent that there is a link between religion and politics.

Q: But don't you think the numerous Islamist rallies in Jakarta suggest otherwise?

A: I think there are now very mistaken views that when there are rallies in Jakarta, and you see groups like, for example, Front of Islam Defenders, one can jump to the conclusion that Indonesia is falling under a sea of Islamist influence.

What's interesting about the June 7th elections was that when people actually voted, those extremists were a very small minority. I think that most of what we have seen, in terms of the unrest, has not been caused by religion.

The Acehnese, a strongly Islamic province, are protesting because the military has been too brutal. It has terrorized them; there has been too much injustice. The Acehnese do not know what has happened to their sons and husbands. Economically they have always got a bad deal and politically they have not been able to express themselves.

Sometimes the foreign press portrays it as some kind of (Islamic) fundamentalist jihad or holy war. Actually it has something to do with the issues of justice.

Q: What about Ambon?

A: Ambon is a little more difficult because you have seen Muslims and Christians fighting it out. It seems to me it is more like a religious conflict, but I think Ambon is basically a conflict between the original inhabitants of the city and the newcomers, and the fact that the newcomers gained control of sections of the economy in a certain way. I think it is essentially a social and economic thing. There is always the conspiracy theory question.

Q: Were some of these cases of unrest provoked?

A: In some places I think there may have been agitation. In other areas, for example, the Banyuwangi (East Java) 'ninja' killings, that is clearly completely manipulated because you don't spontaneously get people dressing up in black uniforms, getting up in the middle of the night to kill kiai (Muslim scholars). It clearly has the hallmarks of a paramilitary group or a group connected with the military, deliberately trying to provoke unrest and religious clashes.

The same thing was said with the Situbondo (East Java) church burning in 1996. Often, any evidence suggests that the people who did these things were not locals. I think there is sometimes some genuine spontaneous elements. In Sambas (Kalimantan), it is more spontaneous or more automatic. In the case of Sambas, for example, you have Christians and Muslims working together, but then also in many cases local Malays and another group, say Christian Dayaks, (worked together). So it does not have to be a religious divide.

Q: And East Timor?

A: People asked me in Australia recently about East Timor: Is this a religious conflict? I said I don't think so. It is primarily something to do with the brutality of the military. Even if Bishop Belo's house (in Dili) is burned or some priests killed, these things are done to provoke a response not because of some reaction to religious sentiment.

Q: Could you draw a parallel between religious conflicts in other countries?

A: It is very hard to find cases of really purely religious conflicts throughout the world, if indeed it does happen. It happens sometimes, for example, in the Middle East to some extent, but it is quite rare. I don't think it has much to do with Indonesia; I think the unrest per se has to do with the economic process and political uncertainty, frustration and sometimes it has been deliberately provoked rather than being truly religious.

In fact we can argue that local religious communities have been very effective in stopping the violence from escalating. Many of the things we saw in Java last year and the year before, when people went out of control and destroyed, it could have spread like a fire. In fact, the sort of fires that occurred erupted, flared up and then died down. This would suggest that the actual material is not that combustible and that the fire does not spread very easily. I think that's because the local people don't want to have that sort of violence.

Very often, the people who take the lead role in opposing violence are religious leaders. So those examples have been evidence of the strength of the communities, not examples of violence breaking out.

Q: How do you compare Indonesia with countries like Pakistan, India or Bangladesh, which also have sizable Muslim populations?

A: To be fair to the Soeharto government -- not that I would like to defend it too strongly -- one of the things that was a real achievement under Soeharto was the Ministry of Religious Affairs. There were some exceptional ministers of religious affairs, particularly Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali. Their contribution to the IAIN (State Academy of Islamic Studies) system is really outstanding. I think it is a key factor in producing liberal intellectuals.

Also, the contribution of reformists within NU, people like Gus Dur and others. Lately, I think (Minister of Religious Affairs) Malik Fadjar has done a very good job.

So in a sense I wouldn't argue for a shift or change of policy. It is more a question of keeping up the good work. I think one of the key factors is education. I think the reform in IAIN is very important, and, if the reform we see in Syarif Hidayatullah (IAIN Jakarta) and Sunan Kalijaga (IAIN Yogyakarta) could be extended to the other campuses that would even strengthen things further.

The most important contribution for the new members of the Cabinet and the political leaders is to show that they are a wise leadership by refraining from resorting to religious imagery or symbolism in attacking their opponents.

Q: Why do you think the belief that the nation will fall apart is very strong in the minds of the people?

A: I think there are a few factors. One is I think the people genuinely believed it. There was a genuine conviction that things would fall apart. I think that Soeharto himself probably did to some extent genuinely believe that we have to be very careful. So to some extent, both Sukarno and Soeharto were very good with nation building.

It is fair to acknowledge what was achieved, and to be positive and give credit when credit is due. But also we have to be cynical as well and say that as the economy developed from the 1970s onward, it was clear that the role of the military, in a sense, was greatly reduced because you no longer needed military officers to run companies.

Civilians could do it very well and the military was left with a kind of crisis as to its mission. It pushed the military to maintain a set of myths about the centrality of their role and their indispensability: A combination of genuine sentiment and cynical mythmaking.

I think Soeharto himself was both genuine in his concern for the future of the nation, but also cynical vis-a-vis the politicians who understood well the importance of keeping alive certain myths.

Q: What should the new government do, considering the country has been hit by a series of disturbances?

A: To continue many things the previous government did. IAIN's contribution was very good and it should be strengthened. In the past, in Syarif Hidayatullah we had Harun Nasution, now we have Azyumardi Azra. If we have another six Azyumardi Azras they will make a large contribution around the country.

As I said, religious conflicts rarely occur in the world. Basically (these conflicts) almost always stem from something else, like social or economic issues. If we don't pay attention to social or economic issues, it will rise to a conflict which takes on a religious character or color, and in due course may end up as a genuinely religious conflict.

If you want to keep the religious conflict alive in Indonesia, it is easy. Just allow the military to keep on brutalizing people and allow the lack of justice to go on unresolved.

If you want to stop it, you could set up a council of truth and reconciliation like the one in South Africa. There needs to be a more equitable distribution of wealth. One of the strengths of the Soeharto regime was nation building, but it was done in a most brutal way.

Another way to do it is to launch socioeconomic reforms, political reforms and military reforms ... there is no reason Indonesia shouldn't get better and better.

And one of the most encouraging things is that everything that I have said has already been said by people in PDI Perjuangan and PKB. I mean these are not new things.

There are good reasons for rational optimism, because the strength of civil society in Indonesia, even if it is still very nascent, undeveloped and embryonic, seems to me to have a very good basis. If the future government is brutal, then we can blame the government for a lot of things, because the raw material is there to make things good.

Q: What is the prospect of sectarianism in Indonesia?

A: In the long term, whether sectarianism will have large numbers of followers or not depends very much on how wise and sound the government is.

If the government neglects to take care of regional development and urban poverty then small protest groups will grow bigger. So it all depends on us. If we don't manage our society well, extremist groups will flourish.

Good government also encourages groups like the ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) to transform personally.

Q: Are you optimistic or pessimistic about political development in Indonesia?

A: I am encouraged by the development in Indonesia. Indonesia, like many other countries, is religious. I mean specifically Islam, but not just Islam, but all kinds of religions. I mean, 30 years ago sociologists told us that religion would die out within the 20th century, now we are days away from the 21st century and religion is more popular than ever.

I think it is a deep human need. Whether it is cultural or tolerant, or whether it is narrow or reactionary, it depends on other factors.

In Indonesia, the proportion of people who might be defined as santri has increased. People are more interested in being more pious and in studying (Islam).

People used to criticize the likes of Nurcholish Madjid and Paramadina, but such people (as Nurcholish) have been quite successful in saying that people's increase in piety is accompanied by an increase in knowledge.

Book publishers like Mizan, and in bookstores also, one will find books on Islam alongside books on Christianity. So a rising wave of religion has been accompanied by a rising wave of knowledge. The contribution of liberal intellectuals has been quite significant. It boils down to men like Nurcholish Madjid. They have produced a second generation of followers. They have written and encourage others to write. They have set up non- governmental organizations and that effect has been positive in reaching society. On the whole they have played a very positive role.

Q: What about political Islam in neighboring countries, in Malaysia, for example?

A: What has happened in Malaysia, I think, is much more artificial. (Prime Minister) Dr. Mahathir has tried, with the Islamic National University, to develop something. Malaysia has made a heavy-handed use of religion for political purposes.

Indonesia, by comparison, is much more authentic and much more natural and healthy (in its expression), and I think we should be encouraged by it.

Q: It seems that all these encouraging developments in Indonesia have somehow evaded the view of the minority, as the expression of their fears sometimes testifies...

A: Soeharto genuinely believed that without the Army things would break up, but he also cynically manipulated it. For example, to keep the Chinese living in fear. Indonesia, in the next century, needs something better than that. A greater degree of openness and more informed opinions.

It would be a very good thing if Indonesians of all sorts of ethnic background had more public discussions. That would promote greater awareness and understanding. I think it is going to be a great thing.

I was very struck when I talked to the late Romo Mangunwijaya (a Catholic priest and social worker) several years ago. I asked what was his feelings about development were. I guess it was in 1997. He said, "You know, for a long time I had been critical of the church." And Gus Dur has said the same thing to me, independently.

So after the Situbondo church burning, people began to talk to each other. Local Muslim leaders and local Christian leaders. Now we have a much healthier relationship than before the church burning. Now the church hierarchy also recognizes the need to do this. It is a small example of how basic things, like having religious leaders know each other by name and have some sort of relationship, matter.

Q: As an Australian scholar, how do you see the present relationship between Indonesia and Australia?

A: I am absolutely certain that we can recover and have much better relations in the future. In the Soeharto period, the Labor government particularly tried hard to forge a good relationship with Indonesia. Some of this worked, but there was always a rather limited relationship because of the nature of politics, which was a combination of liberal democratic notions with an authoritarian military backing. There has always been something unequal in the relationship.

If it becomes a genuine function of democracy, the friendship that was there during the Soeharto period can be less artificial, less brutal and more genuine. At the people-to-people level, there have always been good feelings. Basically Indonesians and Australians like each other.

In Australia, there has been some anti-Indonesia sentiment after the ballot in East Timor. I have never heard any talk, or very little talk at all, about Indonesia as a Muslim society, so I'd like to believe there is some level of maturity. And I have hope, because if you look at some Australian schools, Indonesian is taught and many Australians travel to Indonesia.

There has been a generational change, and (Australian Prime Minister) John Howard in particular belongs to a past age. Long before the East Timor issue came out, Howard was widely criticized for being too romantic about the 1950s and there was some doubts about his possible racist views.

People became very disappointed recently when he failed to respond efficiently and vigorously to Pauline Hanson. There were many politicians, including liberal politicians, who were much more vigorous in facing Pauline Hanson. I think that is kind of a generational thing.

Also, Australia has been particularly insensitive, particularly Howard, in using unnecessarily harsh language. (hbk)