Indonesia: A nation facing crisis of trust in the state

By Meuthia Ganie-Rochman

JAKARTA (JP): The breakdown of the New Order regime has been followed by the sudden rise of demands from several regions, ranging from the clamor for more autonomy to that of independence from the republic. This tendency seems irrevocable and shows the urgent need to rethink the country's principles of nationhood. Aceh is the case which attracts most attention because it could lead other regions to articulate their own demands.

In the current discourse, the opinions agreeing with Aceh's demand for referendum are fairly counterbalanced by those who are opposed. Parties agreeing with the demand seem to see no other choice, considering the wide support of the Acehnese and witnessing how articulate Aceh's intellectuals are in formulating their demands in front of government representatives. Besides, almost everybody now agree on the grave injustices experienced by the Acehnese during the New Order government that triggered the demand.

Those opposed to the demand for referendum often argue that the demand could be accommodated by giving the Acehnese justice through the punishment of any parties involved in criminal acts against humanity in the province and by giving them wide-ranging autonomy. They have warned of a "doomsday" scenario for this republic if other regions make a similar demand. Sometimes such arguments imply an appeal to the Acehnese of their faith in the republic. They also argue that the Indonesian provinces still have no capability to manage the economy and politics independently, while they are under pressure of the global economy.

The arguments against a referendum probably have some grain of truth. But there are some aspects which have been ignored, and this may hamper efforts to prevent regional separation.

The first aspect which is often ignored is the fact that the country's form of nation-state is never "final". The interaction between the formation of nation-state and regions, as well as social groupings, for example, is still in a reconstructive process.

It is true that the concept of nation-state -- which was shaped by the new dynamics in the international economic and political relations hundreds of years ago -- has been considered as the proper unit for political and economic reasons. But the process of state formation has been followed by the process of homogenization in the fields of administration, national symbols, as well as social, economic and political structures. This process of homogenization has also meant the marginalization of other social structures based on locality, ethnicity and social groupings. These other social structures become secondary in importance, subdued and sometimes considered as illegitimate at the national level.

This tendency would not have created so many problems if the nation-state was believed to provide something positive that individual groups could not attain. It means that there must be elements of trust and capability perceived by these groups. Once the nation-state is strengthened, however, the interaction process between the national government and these groups should not be halted and considered as finished. It is precisely because homogenized structures could not really accommodate the dynamics of "others". It goes without saying that the homogenized structures were often used to serve the self-interest of certain groups.

The centralized state inherited since the colonial time limits our horizon in the above aspect. It does not give a good lesson of the need to continuously reconstruct the structure of communication between the central government and its regions.

Moreover, the experience of centralization has made our thinking about central-regional relations somewhat limited. For example, ideas on autonomy only accommodate economic and administrative governance aspects.

A snowballing in demands posed by other regions is thus not surprising. Another important aspect ignored in the public discourse concerns the state's existence, direction and capability. Along with the fall of Soeharto, there has been considerable reconstruction of state institutions. The state, for example, no longer dominates societal groups.

In contrast, what is happening now is the political penetration by various political groups into the state. The direction of politics, therefore, depends on the power play between these groups. In political science, this is referred to as the state having lost its autonomy.

Along with it, the state has lost much of its internal cohesion. It is not only because the state has lost its financial capacity, but also because of the breakdown of internal control within the bureaucracy and other state bodies like state enterprises. The problem has become worse since the new government inherited many institutional illnesses, such as rampant corruption, inefficiency, huge debt, a disordered civil service and unclear state programs.

All these conditions are fostering deep anxiety throughout the nation. In the past, despite all government weaknesses and sins, at least we knew the pattern and we adjusted ourselves to it in order to survive. Now the situation is more confusing, although we have a more democratic and sensible government.

Questions have inevitably emerged: Will the state be capable of stopping the country's economic failings? Will political groups within the state be able to take professional steps to save the country? Or, how will the political process be in the future?

Scandals and unresolved issues only exacerbate the situation. First, the reconstruction of the banking system is perplexing. This happens despite the fact that a healthy banking system is the base for the recovery of the economy. Second, doubts linger about the present Cabinet. In the middle of the crisis, some figures in the Cabinet are considered as merely expressing too many political compromises. This makes people concerned about any "hiccups" that may intervene in the process of reform.

The third pertains to the structure of relations between the central government and regional administrations. With the history of political exclusion experienced by many regions, it is understandable if the regions are not enthusiastic with the concept of representation in national politics. Until now, no scheme can assure that the regional interests will influence decisions to be taken at the national level. This is not merely related to the number of representatives but also to the structures of bureaucracy and political rules.

High indebtedness is another problem. Despite the huge size of the country's debt, many economists believe the government still has no clear views about its resolution.

Meanwhile, some economists doubt the institution of taxation, and others are pessimistic about the country's production capacity and competitiveness. In such a situation, natural resources will again be exploited to support the economy. From the regional perspective, financial prospects under a unitary state are not encouraging. The thought that the regional resources will be used to repay debt is not an exaggeration.

In short, we, as a nation, are facing a crisis of trust in the state. This also pertains to the relations between the central government and the regions. Within this context, it is understandable if any offer from the central government, as long as it still depends on the political process at the central level, will receive a negative response from the regions.

Regional demands must be located within a wider framework of relationships between the central government and the regions. It should not be based on emotional consideration. The central government, in the effort to maintain the country's unity, absolutely needs to convince the regions about the positive outcomes of being together. There must be clear common goals to be achieved based on the fair sharing of burdens and results. And, more basically, the people must be convinced that the government is capable and reliable.

The writer teaches at the School of Sociology, University of Indonesia, in Jakarta.