Indonesia: A nation facing crisis of trust in the state
Indonesia: A nation facing crisis of trust in the state
By Meuthia Ganie-Rochman
JAKARTA (JP): The breakdown of the New Order regime has been
followed by the sudden rise of demands from several regions,
ranging from the clamor for more autonomy to that of independence
from the republic. This tendency seems irrevocable and shows the
urgent need to rethink the country's principles of nationhood.
Aceh is the case which attracts most attention because it could
lead other regions to articulate their own demands.
In the current discourse, the opinions agreeing with Aceh's
demand for referendum are fairly counterbalanced by those who are
opposed. Parties agreeing with the demand seem to see no other
choice, considering the wide support of the Acehnese and
witnessing how articulate Aceh's intellectuals are in formulating
their demands in front of government representatives. Besides,
almost everybody now agree on the grave injustices experienced by
the Acehnese during the New Order government that triggered the
demand.
Those opposed to the demand for referendum often argue that
the demand could be accommodated by giving the Acehnese justice
through the punishment of any parties involved in criminal acts
against humanity in the province and by giving them wide-ranging
autonomy. They have warned of a "doomsday" scenario for this
republic if other regions make a similar demand. Sometimes such
arguments imply an appeal to the Acehnese of their faith in the
republic. They also argue that the Indonesian provinces still
have no capability to manage the economy and politics
independently, while they are under pressure of the global
economy.
The arguments against a referendum probably have some grain of
truth. But there are some aspects which have been ignored, and
this may hamper efforts to prevent regional separation.
The first aspect which is often ignored is the fact that the
country's form of nation-state is never "final". The interaction
between the formation of nation-state and regions, as well as
social groupings, for example, is still in a reconstructive
process.
It is true that the concept of nation-state -- which was
shaped by the new dynamics in the international economic and
political relations hundreds of years ago -- has been considered
as the proper unit for political and economic reasons. But the
process of state formation has been followed by the process of
homogenization in the fields of administration, national symbols,
as well as social, economic and political structures. This
process of homogenization has also meant the marginalization of
other social structures based on locality, ethnicity and social
groupings. These other social structures become secondary in
importance, subdued and sometimes considered as illegitimate at
the national level.
This tendency would not have created so many problems if the
nation-state was believed to provide something positive that
individual groups could not attain. It means that there must be
elements of trust and capability perceived by these groups. Once
the nation-state is strengthened, however, the interaction
process between the national government and these groups should
not be halted and considered as finished. It is precisely because
homogenized structures could not really accommodate the dynamics
of "others". It goes without saying that the homogenized
structures were often used to serve the self-interest of certain
groups.
The centralized state inherited since the colonial time limits
our horizon in the above aspect. It does not give a good lesson
of the need to continuously reconstruct the structure of
communication between the central government and its regions.
Moreover, the experience of centralization has made our
thinking about central-regional relations somewhat limited. For
example, ideas on autonomy only accommodate economic and
administrative governance aspects.
A snowballing in demands posed by other regions is thus not
surprising. Another important aspect ignored in the public
discourse concerns the state's existence, direction and
capability. Along with the fall of Soeharto, there has been
considerable reconstruction of state institutions. The state, for
example, no longer dominates societal groups.
In contrast, what is happening now is the political
penetration by various political groups into the state. The
direction of politics, therefore, depends on the power play
between these groups. In political science, this is referred to
as the state having lost its autonomy.
Along with it, the state has lost much of its internal
cohesion. It is not only because the state has lost its financial
capacity, but also because of the breakdown of internal control
within the bureaucracy and other state bodies like state
enterprises. The problem has become worse since the new
government inherited many institutional illnesses, such as
rampant corruption, inefficiency, huge debt, a disordered civil
service and unclear state programs.
All these conditions are fostering deep anxiety throughout the
nation. In the past, despite all government weaknesses and sins,
at least we knew the pattern and we adjusted ourselves to it in
order to survive. Now the situation is more confusing, although
we have a more democratic and sensible government.
Questions have inevitably emerged: Will the state be capable
of stopping the country's economic failings? Will political
groups within the state be able to take professional steps to
save the country? Or, how will the political process be in the
future?
Scandals and unresolved issues only exacerbate the situation.
First, the reconstruction of the banking system is perplexing.
This happens despite the fact that a healthy banking system is
the base for the recovery of the economy. Second, doubts linger
about the present Cabinet. In the middle of the crisis, some
figures in the Cabinet are considered as merely expressing too
many political compromises. This makes people concerned about any
"hiccups" that may intervene in the process of reform.
The third pertains to the structure of relations between the
central government and regional administrations. With the history
of political exclusion experienced by many regions, it is
understandable if the regions are not enthusiastic with the
concept of representation in national politics. Until now, no
scheme can assure that the regional interests will influence
decisions to be taken at the national level. This is not merely
related to the number of representatives but also to the
structures of bureaucracy and political rules.
High indebtedness is another problem. Despite the huge size of
the country's debt, many economists believe the government still
has no clear views about its resolution.
Meanwhile, some economists doubt the institution of taxation,
and others are pessimistic about the country's production
capacity and competitiveness. In such a situation, natural
resources will again be exploited to support the economy. From
the regional perspective, financial prospects under a unitary
state are not encouraging. The thought that the regional
resources will be used to repay debt is not an exaggeration.
In short, we, as a nation, are facing a crisis of trust in the
state. This also pertains to the relations between the central
government and the regions. Within this context, it is
understandable if any offer from the central government, as long
as it still depends on the political process at the central
level, will receive a negative response from the regions.
Regional demands must be located within a wider framework of
relationships between the central government and the regions. It
should not be based on emotional consideration. The central
government, in the effort to maintain the country's unity,
absolutely needs to convince the regions about the positive
outcomes of being together. There must be clear common goals to
be achieved based on the fair sharing of burdens and results.
And, more basically, the people must be convinced that the
government is capable and reliable.
The writer teaches at the School of Sociology, University of
Indonesia, in Jakarta.