India's nuclear option enters a final stage

By Brahma Chellaney

NEW DELHI (JP): The contrast between the United States and India, the world's most powerful and most populous democracies, could not be more stark. The former officially states that: "Deterrence through the threat of use of nuclear weapons will continue to be our top military strategy." India on the other hand has the dubious distinction of being the only country to openly conduct a nuclear test but shy away from a nuclear military posture.

The United States this week conducted the first of a new series of underground nuclear tests at a subcritical level, exploiting a loophole in the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and exposing it as neither comprehensive nor an authentic test ban. Spurning criticism from the European Parliament that it will create "a crisis of confidence" in the treaty which it helped to fashion, America is planning to conduct similar tests indefinitely.

Ignoring domestic protests, America tested the earth- penetration capability of the newest weapons in its nuclear arsenal by dropping two of the bombs (containing depleted, rather than enriched, uranium for testing purposes) on land owned by Native Americans in Alaska earlier this month. The B61-11 bomb is designed to explode and kill enemies hidden underground.

Also in March, without any forewarning to residents of Florida, the U.S. military test-fired four D-5 missiles, each capable of carrying eight nuclear warheads. Many residents of the state mistook the bright lights for UFOs.

This action packed month contrasts starkly with India's decades of strategic indecision. India is still debating whether it should use its nuclear capability to produce weapons, a debate that began when China first conducted nuclear tests in 1964, about the same time that New Delhi acquired the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

After almost 34 years, India is still debating the same issue and still trying to evaluate the advantages of deploying a defense strategy that is now more than half a century old. During this period the world has changed completely.

When India began debating the nuclear option, the tensions of the Cold War had not yet peaked. The Cold War ended almost a decade ago, a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is changing the nature of war and American is searching for new technologies of mass-destruction. But India is still trying to make up its mind! Through indecisiveness, India has allowed a dangerous asymmetry to grow with neighboring China and inspired Beijing to build up Pakistan's nuclear capability through covert assistance.

Had India persisted with tests after its sole controlled nuclear explosion in 1974, the U.S.-led nonproliferation regime would have been irreparably damaged. However, to the surprise of the rest of the world, the regime was strengthened when India did not conduct further tests. Why Indira Gandhi's government made this decision is destined to remain a riddle of history.

Successive Indian governments since then have been unwilling to muster the political will to embark on nuclear armament. However, despite not having used the nuclear capability to defend national security, India has increasingly become the target of Western technology sanctions.

The international costs of the unexercised option have been spiraling, yet India has tacitly honored the terms of the nonproliferation regime by not manufacturing weapons or conducting tests.

Now for the first time India has a government which seems interested in correcting this self-debilitating posture. India appears set to end its nuclear ambivalence and move toward a less obscure posture under the new coalition government led by Hindu nationalists.

However, the mere intent of the new government to reassess Indian state security has created a stir. Foreign officials are beginning to descend upon New Delhi to investigate this "provocative" and "destabilizing" development. The United States is already waving the sanctions card.

The new government has resolved to "re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons." This unambiguous goal has been endorsed by all 13 parties in the governing coalition, emphasizing the broad-based political support for such a course.

This is an important development, which was reinforced by a written statement released by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, stating that: "We will exercise all options, including the nuclear option, to protect India's sovereignty and territorial integrity." No Indian prime minister has ever before made such a categorical commitment.

This development is part of a process of growing Indian assertiveness in recent years. In 1996, India stood up to the United States and firmly rejected the CTBT, saying the treaty contained too many loopholes. Without India's signature, the treaty cannot take effect.

In recent years, India has twice come close to conducting nuclear tests, only to retreat at the 11th hour.

Contemporary India is now at a point where the detrimental effects of nuclear inaction far outweigh the costs of taking action to develop a weapons capability.

With global disarmament efforts at a standstill and the world's nuclear powers opposed to United Nations sponsored disarmament negotiations, New Delhi has been facing rising domestic calls to shed its policy of nuclear restraint.

India's external security environment has deteriorated sharply since its sole nuclear test. Since then, neighboring Pakistan has emerged as a nuclear power, backed by covet assistance from China, who has itself developed a lethal nuclear arsenal.

After decades of indecision it will not be easy for the new government to suddenly change course. A review of state technical capacity will first need to be undertaken.

Indian cannot develop nuclear arms overnight. Vajpayee, 71, has himself stated that "there is no timetable."

The threat of additional sanctions, however, is unlikely to deter a determined India from going ahead with its plans. The fact that has already been targeted by U.S.-inspired export controls has made nuclear restraint a strategic liability for India.

If India does develop an overt nuclear capacity, it will have to time its actions propitiously.

With the five big nuclear powers currently modernizing their arsenals, India could time its own moves with actions elsewhere, such as U.S. "subcritical" nuclear tests, Chinese missile tests or revelations about developments in neighboring countries' nuclear arsenals.

The grave dangers faced by nations without nuclear defenses were emphasized in a report published earlier this month which revealed that America's post-Cold War nuclear doctrine has increasingly targeted non-nuclear states. This strategy is endorsed by the president. The report, based on documents obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, shows America has actively sought to expand its ability to target non- nuclear nations and has plans for nuclear strikes against unarmed states.

According to the U.S. Strategic Command's partially declassified Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence report, the threat of a nuclear strike "should create fear in an opponent's mind of extinction."

India's nuclear policy has now entered a decisive phase. A small deterrent force is increasingly seen as affordable and of indispensable use to the nation. When smaller countries have nuclear shields, why should the world's second largest country be left defenseless to the threat of genocidal weapons?

However, if India continues to fumble, there will be no tangible nuclear weapons option left. This holy cow will then end up as a dead cow on India's shoulder.

The writer is a professor of strategic affairs at the privately-funded, independent think-tank, the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.

Window: The grave dangers faced by nations without nuclear defenses were emphasized in a report published earlier this month which revealed that America's post-Cold War nuclear doctrine has increasingly targeted non-nuclear states.