India-ASEAN strategic partnership

Salman Haider, The Statesman, Asia News Network, Calcutta

At the start, India and ASEAN were no more than distant cousins. They were friendly enough -- deep-rooted cultural and historical links were not to be denied. But the Cold War divided them. Each saw in the other an inclination towards the Cold War adversary from which it felt itself distant.

Also, in their economic policy, they followed different paths. ASEAN was early to liberalize, and reaped the benefit of accelerated growth and a rapidly improving standard of living. By comparison, India looked like a stick-in-the-mud traditionalist, lost in a jungle of regulations. It was left behind in the race and ASEAN looked elsewhere for partners, whether in the countries of the Pacific Rim or in ASEM with Europe.

India felt excluded from these significant developments at its doorstep, the more so as its own initiatives in Saarc and the Indian Ocean did not get very far. Yet, India also saw that Southeast Asia never ceased to be wary of the Chinese giant hovering above, and was thus constantly in search of a counterweight.

It was only at the start of the 1990s that Manmohan Singh's liberalizing budgets opened new possibilities. Both sides were quick to respond: India turned away from its westward fixation to "Look East", and ASEAN gave the needed encouragement. Its procedural defenses were cautiously lowered: India found itself accepted as a sectoral dialogue partner, then a full dialogue partner, part of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Post Ministerial Conference, and eventually its head of government was invited to a Summit with his ASEAN counterparts.

These measured steps have had the effect of bringing India within ASEAN's consultative circle, so that there is a constantly expanding web of contact and communication. It cannot yet compare with the free flowing intra-ASEAN exchanges, so frequent and informal, but yet a network of personal associations between leaders and officials helps bind the parties more closely.

As relations mature and advance, the two sides seem ready for further progress. There is a sense of real potential, and a strategic dimension to the relationship is discerned and spoken of. As yet, however, it is not clear what this implies. Obviously, there is no strategic arrangement of the traditional type on offer -- alliance and alignment are matters of the past. Yet, India and ASEAN have complementary strengths and capacities, and they are developing more structured, long-term exchanges in a wide number of fields.

In economic matters, the path seems clear enough. Expanded contact means that they now know much more about how to conduct business with each other. The governments have cleared the way by adopting far reaching measures like India's open skies policy for ASEAN's airlines, and the recent motor rally from India's North- east to the heart of ASEAN which showed that overland transit could be the next big thing in the region.

The challenge of refining and reshaping the political relationship has its own complexities. ASEAN has developed a real partnership with China, though the huge imbalance in power and size underlines the need for balancing relationships. Within Asia, India is an obvious choice.

Yet, there is the risk of friction, for all problems between India and China are not resolved, and there are differences in their perception of key areas lying between them like Myanmar. Yet, all the parties from within and outside the region have a joint interest in stability and peace, and in suppressing the scourge of terrorism.

A more active India is now taking its place within the big power structure that seeks to provide predictability and reassurance to the entire region. For now, the strategic partnership need be pitched no higher.

The writer is a former foreign secretary, Government of India.