India and the nuclear threat

This is in reference to your April 26 article India and the threat of nuclear war.

Mr. Jonathan Power may be right in pointing out that Kashmir probably should not have become part of India, if the sub- continent would have been divided on the basis of religion. The fact is that neither the Indian Union nor the Indian National Congress accepted the partition based on religion. If it would have been so, along with Kashmir, the whole Moslem population now in India should have never been in India.

Secondly, the author blames New Delhi for not honoring the UN Security Council's demand for a free vote on Kashmir. But, he fails to point out that the basic condition according to the same resolution was that the forces from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir should be pulled out, which was never done. And, if India wanted to act against the wishes of Kashmiri people at that time, then it would never have taken the issue to the United Nations.

However, solving the Kashmir issue involves joining both the Indian-held and the Pakistan-held Kashmir. It is a fact that people who were seen for many centuries as one are divided between two nations. The situation can be compared to that of Germany during the Cold War when one people were divided and longed to be united. The need of the hour is to keep all the discussions of the past aside and start afresh.

The question of whether China has developed its nuclear arsenal to confront India or not becomes immaterial when considering the question of India's security. The author mentioned that Russia and America come first on the target list of Beijing. India will have to keep its nuclear deterrence vis-a- vis China to avoid being caught between two giants. Because after all, India stands for the ideals of democracy, of which the U.S. is a vehement supporter.

India's giving up of the nuclear option on the insistence of the U.S. can be interpreted as India being an ally of the U.S. In such a scenario, China will find it easier to attack India instead of the U.S. The 1962 Chinese incursions into India strengthen such a view. Hence, under any circumstances India can neglect the Chinese nuclear ability only at its own peril.

The author recommends that U.S. policy-makers offer India a place on the Security Council if it agrees to give up its bomb. If the U.S. can delink human rights and trade for China, and military aid with the nuclear development of Pakistan, I fail to understand the necessity for linking two differing issues for India. In the final analysis, a veto-yielding place on the Security Council for a non-nuclear India cannot guarantee its security.

It may be pointed out that the U.S. has never accepted the claim of India on its territory occupied by China during the 1962 incursion. Hence, there does not exist any basis for the view that the U.S. can be depended upon. Moreover, even if the U.S. rushes help to India in the event of a breakout, it will be only after a huge loss has occurred in India. On the other hand, nuclear deterrence avoids the breakout itself.

While analyzing such a discussion, one cannot ignore the fact that after independence, India had not gone for military buildup until the Chinese invasion. It was only after the 1962 incident that India realized that sufficient military strength is essential to avoid undue invasions.

RAJESH KUMAR

Jakarta