In search of a new 'dream team' government

By Emil Salim

The following article is based on a presentation given at the 36th Leadership Forum seminar on "The Ideal Profile of the New Government", in Jakarta on July 29, 1999, organized by the Center for Corporate Leadership.

JAKARTA: In retrospect, president Soeharto announced his resignation, in May 1998, not at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) building, but at Merdeka Palace, because the students had occupied the MPR.

This symbolized the ineptness of the MPR to uphold credible democracy. However, it also raises the question of whether the resignation is constitutional. And hence, it has cast doubts on the legitimacy of the current President.

As a result, Indonesia's President has been suffering a legitimacy problem ever since. The only way out is to convene as soon as possible another MPR session, now scheduled for November, to elect a legitimate president. But prior to this, a new election has to be held (on June 7) to replace the "old" MPR. It should be remembered that this very MPR was the one that reelected Soeharto only two months before he fell from grace.

Since then the nation has faced a dilemma: On the one hand you need new regulations that make it possible for more political parties to take active roles in elections, but on the other hand new regulations can only be made by the "old" MPR, which has lost its legitimacy.

It is a tribute to the Indonesian people, who rejected the unconstitutional way of the coup d'etat, but followed the democratic path instead. The risk, however, is that the law agreed upon by the House of Representatives (DPR) could have a biased flavor in favor of the majority faction in the DPR, Golkar, which is considered the villain in this political turmoil.

The government's proposal to employ the "district system" in place of the proportional system for the elections was received with suspicion and was eventually rejected. A compromise was later adopted in which the proportional system was amended by choosing legislative candidates from districts.

Also important is the quotient applied to constituents outside Java. In Irian Jaya, 70,000 votes account for one candidate, compared to 350,000 votes for one candidate in Java. No "senate" type provincial representation in the Indonesian Constitution has given rise to the necessity to accommodate provincial representation by changing the quotient.

But this also gave the ruling Golkar party an advantage because of its better nationwide organization and voter inertia to change their voting behavior in the absence of complete information from the 48 political parties in the provinces outside Java.

Also significant is the 38 seats (7.4 percent of the total seats) granted to the Indonesian Military, whose 600,000 members did not vote in the elections.

Perhaps the most significant change is the organization of elections in which the government played a backseat role. The selection of 48 parties from a list of 140 parties was done by the "Team of 11", consisting of non-governmental organizations and respected figures. The general election was managed by the General Elections Commission (KPU), comprising 48 party representatives plus five government representatives. The elections were conducted by the National Election Committee.

This arrangement of organizing the elections has the risk that political interests may creep into the process. And this is revealed in the fact that 27 parties with 6.7 million votes refused to sign the election results last week. The President, however, considered the outcome of the general election still valid, because 17 parties with 98.3 million votes endorsed the outcome of the elections, while 4 parties with 630,000 votes were absent.

The election results show the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) won 154 seats, the National Awakening party (PKB), 51 seats, the National Mandate party (PAN), 3O seats, totaling 241 seats representing the reform group, 48 percent of total seats. Golkar won 120 seats and the United Development Party (PPP), 57 seats, totaling 177 seats representing the government group, with 35 percent of total seats, and the remaining 15 parties obtained 41 seats, 8 percent the total seats.

In terms of number of votes, however PDI Perjuangan, PKB and PAN obtained a much larger share compared to Golkar and PPP.

With such election results, what conclusions can be drawn?

First, the voters want change, indicated by the total number of votes cast in favor of the reform group, as compared to the government group. The Habibie government is supported by Golkar, PPP and PDI (the government-backed Indonesian Democratic Party), which obtained 179 seats together, compared to 246 seats obtained by PDI Perjuangan, PKB, PAN and PKP. If the number of votes is counted, government parties have significantly lost people's confidence.

Second, PDI Perjuangan got people votes at a two-to-one ratio compared to Golkar, which reflected the protest vote against Golkar, whose government has treated PDI Perjuangan unfairly. PDI Perjuangan was the underdog in the political arena that earned the support of the common people, who were oppressed by the previous regime.

Third, during the election campaign, the emphasis was put on choosing a personality as a party's presidential candidate, rather than a party's platform. PDI Perjuangan had put forward Megawati, Golkar nominated Habibie, PKB, rather shyly, Abdurrahman Wahid and PAN elected Amien Rais. The results show that these elections became a contest between Megawati and Habibie's supporters. The rejection of Megawati based on gender considerations is mainly an afterthought, and crept up after the election results rolled in, and was not considered beforehand.

Fourth, although the incumbent President used his power discretely to throw money to politicians in the form of pensions to soon-to-be-retired DPR members, and has allegedly used social safety net funds for political purposes -- although this was never contested in the court -- voters rejected Golkar in significant numbers. It is only because of the smaller voter quotient outside Java and its established political infrastructure, that Golkar obtained a large proportion of seats in the parliament.

Fifth, in the nation's first democratic elections in 1955, four major political parties -- namely the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Masyumi, and Nahdlatul Ulama -- emerged. The majority of the vote was captured by the nationalist-communist-democratic wing of PNI and PKI. This time around a similar pattern emerges, where PDI Perjuangan and Golkar together captured 274 seats (55 percent of the total), reflecting the mood of voters more in favor of nationalist-socialist-democratic ideas as compared to religion- dominated parties.

The outcome of the general election needs to be reflected in the MPR. This will be influenced by the way provincial representatives and functional group representatives are chosen. Also important is to what extent rules and proceedings of MPR sessions are set. In previous MPR sessions, parties have dominated as a single entity, with members not having the right to voice their opinions or vote as individuals. Those who deviate from the party's rule can be recalled. This is important where voting on the choice of people is concerned.

Meanwhile, the reformist group is split by a PDI Perjuangan and PKB alliance against the "axis force" of Amien Rais, who has brought PAN into the "Islam group" to join PPP and other Islam- based parties.

It is useful to note that PKB and PAN are based on Pancasila and leave their doors open for non-Muslims, while PPP is based on Islam.

Although the political landscape is divided into several political parties, within the parties we can find further divisions into several informal factions. In Golkar there is the Habibie and the "anybody-but-Habibie" faction. In PKB we have the Abdurrahman Wahid faction and the traditional ulema faction. In PAN we notice the faction in favor of pluralism and inclusiveness and the Islam faction. Also, PDI Perjuangan has factions of old diehards and newcomers who joined the party only last year.

The elapse of time between the election date (June 7) and the MPR session (Oct. 1, 1999), opens opportunities for alliances between parties. The rule of politics that there is "no permanence of friends and allies, but only permanence in interests" prevails also prior to the presidential elections. The interest of the various parties is clearly how to obtain power in the government, either by having the presidency, an elevated, more powerful vice presidency, ministerial posts, as well as chairmanship of the MPR and the House of Representatives.

The noise that one hears currently is at the surface of political events, and reflects more voices trying to obtain bargaining chips on the negotiation table among political "king- makers".

And events are fluid, nothing is certain now. The events can go in the direction of a Megawati presidency, a Habibie presidency or a Gus Dur presidency.

The ideal profile of the new government, however, moves into the direction of a "dream team" of Megawati-Amien Rais as president and vice president supported by PDI Perjuangan, PKB, PAN, Golkar's "anybody-but-Habibie" faction and the military.

The Cabinet will have politicians for political positions, such as home affairs, foreign affairs, defense, judicial affairs, state secretary, etc. While economic positions will he occupied by professionals, including Golkar's young technocrats.

The dominating criteria in selecting members of this new government is a clean, no corruption, collusion or nepotism (KKN), track record and the ability to work in a team.

The vice president may have more meaningful responsibilities, which will be part of the negotiations between the Megawati group and the Amien Rais group. Although Gus Dur is eligible for the presidential position, this position may be too risky for his health.

Active generals may not be nominated as was the case in the past. The trend is toward the gradual and honorable fading away of the military from a political role. For the time being, the position of defense minister may still be in the hands of the military, as compensation for their support.

The Cabinet needs to become a lean one of less than 25 ministers, because of the need to decentralize many previous central government activities to the provinces.

The economic policy will basically follow the economic recovery program as agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Program and Consultative Group on Indonesia. The difference will be in emphasis and style. Negotiations with the IMF and World Bank will be tougher. Priorities will shift into the direction of a development strategy that makes Indonesia less dependent on foreign loan. Debt rescheduling will be a major goal.

The issue of KKN will be more in focus. In this context the issue of the past president is a complicated and an emotionally loaded one, which puts the military in a difficult position.

The new government has also to cope with preparations for the coming ASEAN Free Trade Areas to be accomplished within three years.

But most urgent is the need for the new government to handle the crises in Aceh, West Kalimantan, Maluku, East Timor and Irian Jaya. Also, a proper arrangement with the military in combination with national reconciliation is of utmost importance.

With such a load of issues on the new government's shoulders, it is clear that the nation needs a new, trustworthy and credible government under new leadership, reflecting the changing mood seen in the general election.

The writer formerly served in the Cabinet with a number of ministerial portfolios.