In search of a new 'dream team' government

In search of a new 'dream team' government

By Emil Salim

The following article is based on a presentation given at the
36th Leadership Forum seminar on "The Ideal Profile of the New
Government", in Jakarta on July 29, 1999, organized by the Center
for Corporate Leadership.

JAKARTA: In retrospect, president Soeharto announced his
resignation, in May 1998, not at the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) building, but at Merdeka Palace, because the
students had occupied the MPR.

This symbolized the ineptness of the MPR to uphold credible
democracy. However, it also raises the question of whether the
resignation is constitutional. And hence, it has cast doubts on
the legitimacy of the current President.

As a result, Indonesia's President has been suffering a
legitimacy problem ever since. The only way out is to convene as
soon as possible another MPR session, now scheduled for November,
to elect a legitimate president. But prior to this, a new
election has to be held (on June 7) to replace the "old" MPR. It
should be remembered that this very MPR was the one that
reelected Soeharto only two months before he fell from grace.

Since then the nation has faced a dilemma: On the one hand you
need new regulations that make it possible for more political
parties to take active roles in elections, but on the other hand
new regulations can only be made by the "old" MPR, which has lost
its legitimacy.

It is a tribute to the Indonesian people, who rejected the
unconstitutional way of the coup d'etat, but followed the
democratic path instead. The risk, however, is that the law
agreed upon by the House of Representatives (DPR) could have a
biased flavor in favor of the majority faction in the DPR,
Golkar, which is considered the villain in this political
turmoil.

The government's proposal to employ the "district system" in
place of the proportional system for the elections was received
with suspicion and was eventually rejected. A compromise was
later adopted in which the proportional system was amended by
choosing legislative candidates from districts.

Also important is the quotient applied to constituents outside
Java. In Irian Jaya, 70,000 votes account for one candidate,
compared to 350,000 votes for one candidate in Java. No "senate"
type provincial representation in the Indonesian Constitution has
given rise to the necessity to accommodate provincial
representation by changing the quotient.

But this also gave the ruling Golkar party an advantage
because of its better nationwide organization and voter inertia
to change their voting behavior in the absence of complete
information from the 48 political parties in the provinces
outside Java.

Also significant is the 38 seats (7.4 percent of the total
seats) granted to the Indonesian Military, whose 600,000 members
did not vote in the elections.

Perhaps the most significant change is the organization of
elections in which the government played a backseat role. The
selection of 48 parties from a list of 140 parties was done by
the "Team of 11", consisting of non-governmental organizations
and respected figures. The general election was managed by the
General Elections Commission (KPU), comprising 48 party
representatives plus five government representatives. The
elections were conducted by the National Election Committee.

This arrangement of organizing the elections has the risk that
political interests may creep into the process. And this is
revealed in the fact that 27 parties with 6.7 million votes
refused to sign the election results last week. The President,
however, considered the outcome of the general election still
valid, because 17 parties with 98.3 million votes endorsed the
outcome of the elections, while 4 parties with 630,000 votes were
absent.

The election results show the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) won 154 seats, the National Awakening
party (PKB), 51 seats, the National Mandate party (PAN), 3O
seats, totaling 241 seats representing the reform group, 48
percent of total seats. Golkar won 120 seats and the United
Development Party (PPP), 57 seats, totaling 177 seats
representing the government group, with 35 percent of total
seats, and the remaining 15 parties obtained 41 seats, 8 percent
the total seats.

In terms of number of votes, however PDI Perjuangan, PKB and
PAN obtained a much larger share compared to Golkar and PPP.

With such election results, what conclusions can be drawn?

First, the voters want change, indicated by the total number
of votes cast in favor of the reform group, as compared to the
government group. The Habibie government is supported by Golkar,
PPP and PDI (the government-backed Indonesian Democratic Party),
which obtained 179 seats together, compared to 246 seats obtained
by PDI Perjuangan, PKB, PAN and PKP. If the number of votes is
counted, government parties have significantly lost people's
confidence.

Second, PDI Perjuangan got people votes at a two-to-one ratio
compared to Golkar, which reflected the protest vote against
Golkar, whose government has treated PDI Perjuangan unfairly. PDI
Perjuangan was the underdog in the political arena that earned
the support of the common people, who were oppressed by the
previous regime.

Third, during the election campaign, the emphasis was put on
choosing a personality as a party's presidential candidate,
rather than a party's platform. PDI Perjuangan had put forward
Megawati, Golkar nominated Habibie, PKB, rather shyly,
Abdurrahman Wahid and PAN elected Amien Rais. The results show
that these elections became a contest between Megawati and
Habibie's supporters. The rejection of Megawati based on gender
considerations is mainly an afterthought, and crept up after the
election results rolled in, and was not considered beforehand.

Fourth, although the incumbent President used his power
discretely to throw money to politicians in the form of pensions
to soon-to-be-retired DPR members, and has allegedly used social
safety net funds for political purposes -- although this was
never contested in the court -- voters rejected Golkar in
significant numbers. It is only because of the smaller voter
quotient outside Java and its established political
infrastructure, that Golkar obtained a large proportion of seats
in the parliament.

Fifth, in the nation's first democratic elections in 1955,
four major political parties -- namely the Indonesian National
Party (PNI), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Masyumi, and
Nahdlatul Ulama -- emerged. The majority of the vote was captured
by the nationalist-communist-democratic wing of PNI and PKI. This
time around a similar pattern emerges, where PDI Perjuangan and
Golkar together captured 274 seats (55 percent of the total),
reflecting the mood of voters more in favor of
nationalist-socialist-democratic ideas as compared to religion-
dominated parties.

The outcome of the general election needs to be reflected in
the MPR. This will be influenced by the way provincial
representatives and functional group representatives are chosen.
Also important is to what extent rules and proceedings of MPR
sessions are set. In previous MPR sessions, parties have
dominated as a single entity, with members not having the right
to voice their opinions or vote as individuals. Those who deviate
from the party's rule can be recalled. This is important where
voting on the choice of people is concerned.

Meanwhile, the reformist group is split by a PDI Perjuangan
and PKB alliance against the "axis force" of Amien Rais, who has
brought PAN into the "Islam group" to join PPP and other Islam-
based parties.

It is useful to note that PKB and PAN are based on Pancasila
and leave their doors open for non-Muslims, while PPP is based on
Islam.

Although the political landscape is divided into several
political parties, within the parties we can find further
divisions into several informal factions. In Golkar there is the
Habibie and the "anybody-but-Habibie" faction. In PKB we have the
Abdurrahman Wahid faction and the traditional ulema faction. In
PAN we notice the faction in favor of pluralism and inclusiveness
and the Islam faction. Also, PDI Perjuangan has factions of old
diehards and newcomers who joined the party only last year.

The elapse of time between the election date (June 7) and the
MPR session (Oct. 1, 1999), opens opportunities for alliances
between parties. The rule of politics that there is "no
permanence of friends and allies, but only permanence in
interests" prevails also prior to the presidential elections. The
interest of the various parties is clearly how to obtain power in
the government, either by having the presidency, an elevated,
more powerful vice presidency, ministerial posts, as well as
chairmanship of the MPR and the House of Representatives.

The noise that one hears currently is at the surface of
political events, and reflects more voices trying to obtain
bargaining chips on the negotiation table among political "king-
makers".

And events are fluid, nothing is certain now. The events can
go in the direction of a Megawati presidency, a Habibie
presidency or a Gus Dur presidency.

The ideal profile of the new government, however, moves into
the direction of a "dream team" of Megawati-Amien Rais as
president and vice president supported by PDI Perjuangan, PKB,
PAN, Golkar's "anybody-but-Habibie" faction and the military.

The Cabinet will have politicians for political positions,
such as home affairs, foreign affairs, defense, judicial affairs,
state secretary, etc. While economic positions will he occupied
by professionals, including Golkar's young technocrats.

The dominating criteria in selecting members of this new
government is a clean, no corruption, collusion or nepotism
(KKN), track record and the ability to work in a team.

The vice president may have more meaningful responsibilities,
which will be part of the negotiations between the Megawati group
and the Amien Rais group. Although Gus Dur is eligible for the
presidential position, this position may be too risky for his
health.

Active generals may not be nominated as was the case in the
past. The trend is toward the gradual and honorable fading away
of the military from a political role. For the time being, the
position of defense minister may still be in the hands of the
military, as compensation for their support.

The Cabinet needs to become a lean one of less than 25
ministers, because of the need to decentralize many previous
central government activities to the provinces.

The economic policy will basically follow the economic
recovery program as agreed with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations
Development Program and Consultative Group on Indonesia. The
difference will be in emphasis and style. Negotiations with the
IMF and World Bank will be tougher. Priorities will shift into
the direction of a development strategy that makes Indonesia less
dependent on foreign loan. Debt rescheduling will be a major
goal.

The issue of KKN will be more in focus. In this context the
issue of the past president is a complicated and an emotionally
loaded one, which puts the military in a difficult position.

The new government has also to cope with preparations for the
coming ASEAN Free Trade Areas to be accomplished within three
years.

But most urgent is the need for the new government to handle
the crises in Aceh, West Kalimantan, Maluku, East Timor and Irian
Jaya. Also, a proper arrangement with the military in combination
with national reconciliation is of utmost importance.

With such a load of issues on the new government's shoulders,
it is clear that the nation needs a new, trustworthy and credible
government under new leadership, reflecting the changing mood
seen in the general election.

The writer formerly served in the Cabinet with a number of
ministerial portfolios.