In search of a compromise

In search of a compromise

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

Last year four national leaders met in Yogyakarta. Political
analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono reviews what people can hope for
-- and whether there is any hope -- in the next meeting.

JAKARTA (JP): The burning issue of the day is certainly
whether or not the top leaders of this country -- President
Abdurrahman Wahid, Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri Speaker
of the People's Consultative Assembly Amien Rais, and Speaker of
the legislature Akbar Tanjung -- will be able and willing to make
a political compromise.

Such a compromise is thought to be the only way out of what
appears like a political deadlock that has characterized
Indonesian politics.

The deadlock is clear in the continuous tug of war between the
President and the legislative bodies, the House of
Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR). In consequence, little progress has been made, if any, in
the nation's efforts to get out of the multidimensional crisis,
and thus to get on with reform.

Hence on the top of the nation's political agenda before the
end of the month -- the day the DPR is to convene its plenary
session in which it will pass its final judgment on the
President's response to its first Memorandum of Feb. 1 and
consider the possibility of a second memorandum -- is whether and
when the four top leaders will meet.

If the so-called Yogya meeting among the same four leaders at
the initiative of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X last year was of any
indication, there seems to be little that can be expected from a
similar meeting this time around. Indeed, there were no
preconditions set for the Yogya meeting.

Now, however, there have been talks about conditions for the
meeting. Both President Abdurrahman and Vice President Megawati
have indicated their willingness to attend provided there is a
clear agenda, no matter which other political leaders may be
invited.

It is not clear if it has anything to do with the issue of the
meeting or even if it is true, but Megawati has reportedly set
three conditions for her takeover of the presidency to replace
the President in the possible, now even more probable event of
the latter stepping down for whatever reason and by whatever
means: that she would carry on until the end of the term, 2004;
that there would be no annual sessions of the MPR; and that there
would be no new vice president to be elected to replace her.

President Abdurrahman has denied that Megawati has set any
such conditions. But who or what is to be believed in Indonesia
today? Indonesian politics is almost beyond rational and
scholarly analysis.

One is forced to rely on not much more than the gossip and
rumor markets, and resort to conspiracy theories instead of
reliable information and scholarly or scientific framework for
meaningful analysis. Politicians are beyond the pale, the people
at large confused, scared, and suffering.

On the face of it, however, the set of three conditions seems
sensible and understandable. As the prime winner of the 1999
general election, Megawati's chance to be elected president was
nipped in the bud by the Islamic based political parties because
of her sex.

Unfortunately, she did not win a single majority, which would
have been necessary to assure her of victory in the presidential
election based on the fundamentally undemocratic 1945
Constitution.

This serves to explain the election of Abdurrahman, who as
member of the MPR from the fictitious "functional group" did not
even contest the election.

Indeed, in the interest of greater certainty, the smooth
running of government, national stability, and economic recovery,
as President, Megawati would deserve a fair treatment by the
legislature, free from constant harassment as in the case of
Abdurrahman. A guarantee for her presidency right to the end of
her term would ensure a better chance of success for such efforts
towards those ends.

The absence of a vice president, most probably from the
previously hostile Islamic based political parties -- which
however have assured her of support for her candidacy for the
office of president to replace Gus Dur, however unnecessary that
expression of support may be -- would more likely stand in her
way. The same consideration may apply to the annual sessions of
the MPR, which would more likely disturb than assist in the
functioning of her presidency.

In short, the three conditions would tend to strengthen her
presidency and her government.

With similar obstacles to those faced by President
Abdurrahman, Megawati would have to deal with bigger problems and
challenges. Her government would be weaker than the present
government under Abdurrahman. The national crisis would further
worsen, and the people would suffer more.

It would be a tragedy that having just embarked on a process
of reform, the nation should experience a successive change of
leadership under emergency circumstances. It would then be even
harder to imagine how the nation could survive. In centuries
past, a number of old nations and states have disappeared from
the map. Should it happen to Indonesia as a nation at its
infancy?

On the other hand, however, Megawati's conditions would create
the impression that she wanted to be president virtually with
dictatorial powers. In this climate of reform, that would be
hardly acceptable to the people, not just the political parties.

Moreover, with or without conditions, by constitution,
Megawati would automatically take over in the event that
President Wahid should step aside. She would not need to set any
conditions.

If she is not ready to take over, then let the MPR elect
another candidate, and let the politicians learn democracy the
harder way. The problem is that the people would always pay the
price.

If only the current political elite is really prepared to make
sacrifices for the security and welfare of the whole nation, it
would not be inconceivable for them to accept Megawati's
conditions.

However, the untimely revelation of the conditions, regardless
of whether they were really set by Megawati, may bring greater
pressure on the President, which may well push him to behave like
a wounded bull. And this could well further encourage his jihad
supporters.

Perhaps more importantly, if what the leaders are seeking is a
genuine compromise, would Megawati give her concession in return,
in the form of a commitment never to run again for the presidency
at end of her term in 2004?

If she is still interested in running for the presidency, she
should forget about her conditions, and go ahead to take up the
challenge, ready for the rough road ahead. She should fight like
a true democrat.

How I wish the four leaders would together make such a
commitment and let an entirely new generation of politicians take
over! But what a dream!