Mon, 16 Apr 2001

In search of a compromise

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

Last year four national leaders met in Yogyakarta. Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono reviews what people can hope for -- and whether there is any hope -- in the next meeting.

JAKARTA (JP): The burning issue of the day is certainly whether or not the top leaders of this country -- President Abdurrahman Wahid, Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly Amien Rais, and Speaker of the legislature Akbar Tanjung -- will be able and willing to make a political compromise.

Such a compromise is thought to be the only way out of what appears like a political deadlock that has characterized Indonesian politics.

The deadlock is clear in the continuous tug of war between the President and the legislative bodies, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). In consequence, little progress has been made, if any, in the nation's efforts to get out of the multidimensional crisis, and thus to get on with reform.

Hence on the top of the nation's political agenda before the end of the month -- the day the DPR is to convene its plenary session in which it will pass its final judgment on the President's response to its first Memorandum of Feb. 1 and consider the possibility of a second memorandum -- is whether and when the four top leaders will meet.

If the so-called Yogya meeting among the same four leaders at the initiative of Sultan Hamengkubuwono X last year was of any indication, there seems to be little that can be expected from a similar meeting this time around. Indeed, there were no preconditions set for the Yogya meeting.

Now, however, there have been talks about conditions for the meeting. Both President Abdurrahman and Vice President Megawati have indicated their willingness to attend provided there is a clear agenda, no matter which other political leaders may be invited.

It is not clear if it has anything to do with the issue of the meeting or even if it is true, but Megawati has reportedly set three conditions for her takeover of the presidency to replace the President in the possible, now even more probable event of the latter stepping down for whatever reason and by whatever means: that she would carry on until the end of the term, 2004; that there would be no annual sessions of the MPR; and that there would be no new vice president to be elected to replace her.

President Abdurrahman has denied that Megawati has set any such conditions. But who or what is to be believed in Indonesia today? Indonesian politics is almost beyond rational and scholarly analysis.

One is forced to rely on not much more than the gossip and rumor markets, and resort to conspiracy theories instead of reliable information and scholarly or scientific framework for meaningful analysis. Politicians are beyond the pale, the people at large confused, scared, and suffering.

On the face of it, however, the set of three conditions seems sensible and understandable. As the prime winner of the 1999 general election, Megawati's chance to be elected president was nipped in the bud by the Islamic based political parties because of her sex.

Unfortunately, she did not win a single majority, which would have been necessary to assure her of victory in the presidential election based on the fundamentally undemocratic 1945 Constitution.

This serves to explain the election of Abdurrahman, who as member of the MPR from the fictitious "functional group" did not even contest the election.

Indeed, in the interest of greater certainty, the smooth running of government, national stability, and economic recovery, as President, Megawati would deserve a fair treatment by the legislature, free from constant harassment as in the case of Abdurrahman. A guarantee for her presidency right to the end of her term would ensure a better chance of success for such efforts towards those ends.

The absence of a vice president, most probably from the previously hostile Islamic based political parties -- which however have assured her of support for her candidacy for the office of president to replace Gus Dur, however unnecessary that expression of support may be -- would more likely stand in her way. The same consideration may apply to the annual sessions of the MPR, which would more likely disturb than assist in the functioning of her presidency.

In short, the three conditions would tend to strengthen her presidency and her government.

With similar obstacles to those faced by President Abdurrahman, Megawati would have to deal with bigger problems and challenges. Her government would be weaker than the present government under Abdurrahman. The national crisis would further worsen, and the people would suffer more.

It would be a tragedy that having just embarked on a process of reform, the nation should experience a successive change of leadership under emergency circumstances. It would then be even harder to imagine how the nation could survive. In centuries past, a number of old nations and states have disappeared from the map. Should it happen to Indonesia as a nation at its infancy?

On the other hand, however, Megawati's conditions would create the impression that she wanted to be president virtually with dictatorial powers. In this climate of reform, that would be hardly acceptable to the people, not just the political parties.

Moreover, with or without conditions, by constitution, Megawati would automatically take over in the event that President Wahid should step aside. She would not need to set any conditions.

If she is not ready to take over, then let the MPR elect another candidate, and let the politicians learn democracy the harder way. The problem is that the people would always pay the price.

If only the current political elite is really prepared to make sacrifices for the security and welfare of the whole nation, it would not be inconceivable for them to accept Megawati's conditions.

However, the untimely revelation of the conditions, regardless of whether they were really set by Megawati, may bring greater pressure on the President, which may well push him to behave like a wounded bull. And this could well further encourage his jihad supporters.

Perhaps more importantly, if what the leaders are seeking is a genuine compromise, would Megawati give her concession in return, in the form of a commitment never to run again for the presidency at end of her term in 2004?

If she is still interested in running for the presidency, she should forget about her conditions, and go ahead to take up the challenge, ready for the rough road ahead. She should fight like a true democrat.

How I wish the four leaders would together make such a commitment and let an entirely new generation of politicians take over! But what a dream!