Impact of Sept. 11 on strategic balance in Asia Pacific
Jusuf Wanandi, Founder, Member, Board of Trustees Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has brilliantly made use of Sept. 11 for his political revival and initiative against opposition party PAS. The main problem he might be facing is how to reform the madrasah schools that have been developed along the Pakistan model and are mainly under PAS supervision and influence.
Indonesia is completely different in this regard because, for many years, Muhammadiyah has never had exclusively "Muslim curriculum schools", but has offered "normal" schools with Muslim teaching, while Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has been opened up to also teach subjects similar to secular schools.
In the case of Singapore, it was a shock for the leadership when they learned about Jemaat Islamiyah (JI) activities and their plan to attack U.S. interests in Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia. Political stability and security is the mainstay of Singapore's attractiveness to foreign investment and such terrorist activities could damage that credibility. That is why the leadership reacted swiftly and severely against these activities. It also showed that regional terrorism, induced by global terrorism, is already present in Southeast Asia.
The leadership in Singapore is more active in fighting terrorism and in aligning themselves closely with the U.S. in fighting global terrorism. But as the U.S. should understand, Singapore should learn to appreciate the diversities of political Islam, and should not become paranoid. To learn more about Islam is an important challenge for the U.S. and for Singapore's leaders.
As is the case in Indonesia, it is the mainstream Muslims that should be encouraged to try to influence and guide the Muslim communities towards moderation and openness through democratic means.
It is important to distinguish domestic conflicts such as political strife, insurgencies, ethnic or religious conflicts from global terrorism. These conflicts have their roots in domestic socio-political and economic problems and should be also be solved through domestic socio-political, economic, and security approaches. The rule of law and human rights concerns should be attended to as they would be in the fight against global terrorism. Exceptions can be made in survival cases, but used only in a limited fashion, temporarily and with adequate transparency to prevent abuses.
In Northeast Asia the key questions are: Are efforts against terrorism going to change the strategic picture permanently or not? And what complications are to be faced in fighting global terrorism in that region?
On the Korean peninsula, the fight against terrorism has brought about some complications because North Korea, who has been dubbed a member of the "axis of evil" by President Bush and has been given new pressures by the U.S., will complicate the "sunshine" policies of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. In fairness, that policy has had limited results so far for Korea.
Bush's accusation was mainly directed at North Korea's political system that is responsible for so much misery of its own people, the possibility of North Korea not abiding by the non-proliferation agreements she has signed and by the sales of missiles technology and Weapons of Mass Destruction to "rogue" countries that could endanger the region and the U.S.
In the case of Japan, the strengthening of the alliance and the opening for Japan to become a "normal" country are important developments. However Japan also has to undertake political and economic reforms and be again on par with the U.S. economy in productivity and vitality.
In China's case, it should be a lot more difficult to maintain the earlier goodwill between China and the U.S. due to Sept. 11, because there of so many tough problems between the two. Basically this is a challenge for the two big countries, one a superpower and the other becoming one, to deal with each other normally. There is not enough trust and confidence between the two governments and leaderships.
The most important question is Taiwan, but other matters such as sophisticated arms sales and technology transfers by China to other countries, especially those considered rogue ones by the U.S. such as Iran and Iraq, human rights violations and religious freedom are also important. Even the U.S. presence in Central Asia, which has been accepted so far, could arouse questions about the encirclement of China as well as the increase of a U.S. presence in East Asia.
In the meantime, the rhetoric of the relationship that was brittle earlier, has calmed down since Sept. 11, and constant relations at the highest level have been maintained despite some serious issues on Taiwan, especially sophisticated arms sales to Taiwan and the visits of Taiwan's high ranking defense officials to the U.S.
Visits by China's leaders to countries considered to be supporting terrorism also created question marks in the U.S. By becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China appears to have become more and more a conservative member of the regional and international community by willing to abide by international rules as well as the regional order and institutions, which bodes well for future relations with the US.
The changes in the Asia-Pacific region due to Sept. 11 are among others:
U.S. leadership is becoming more assertive in the Asia-Pacific region after being somewhat dormant since the end of the Cold War. What this will mean to the region is still unclear, because how this administration is going to change things will be decisive: Will this new leadership be more positive towards cooperation and more multilaterally inclined due to the need for coalition building in the war on terror. There is hope that the U.S. wants to become more patient to give breathing room to some countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, to face global terrorism on their own terms, since the priorities are varied and domestic complications are understood.
On North Asia, America's more assertive leadership could be a problem in relation to North Korea, but this has to be settled between the two countries themselves. In relation to China's ascendancy, the U.S. might be prone to misinterpreting it, although it might not be at all a Chinese problem. So, in North East Asia while the existing relations might be maintained, a more assertive U.S., might bring about new tensions. But a more multilateralist attitude on the part of the U.S. might alleviate some of the existing tensions.
Regional efforts to face global terrorism will be important. First, this is more palatable for domestic constituencies in individual countries and helps alleviate pressure from the U.S. to do some of the things that are not necessarily a top priority for individual countries or the region or sub-region. Regional cooperation will be more important if the U.S. becomes more unilateral in its approach in the future. The request by the U.S. to cooperate against global terrorism will put additional pressure on regional institutions to get their act together.
Each of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region has to reconcile its own priorities with the need to fight global terrorism. In most cases, U.S. support might be important, especially cooperating and supporting in the fields of intelligence, police work and money-laundering. Consolidating each society should be the main task of individual countries, especially Muslim ones. They have the difficult, but critical, task to influence political Islam to become moderate, open and democratic.
In the end, the struggle is really for ideas and visions. In this case, Sept. 11 has also been a wake-up call for many Muslim countries as well. Their challenge is to transform Islam into a religion of peace, moderation, openness, and democratic values, and to make the world understand and accept it. So, there is a new challenge for every individual country after Sept. 11, namely to keep their country together, keep them peaceful and developing well and to be able to withstand extremist ideas and religions.
The article is an extract from Jusuf Wanandi's paper for the Asia Pacific Roundtable on June 3, in Kuala Lumpur.