Impact of Sept. 11 on Asia Pacific region

Jusuf Wanandi, Founder and Member Board of Trustees Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

The impact of Sept. 11 on the Asia Pacific region can be discussed within the context of the new global strategic development and how this will unfold in the future. This necessitates some exercises in speculation about those future developments.

This will involve an examination, though not exclusively, about U.S. future strategies. It also involves an examination of how U.S. allies, friends and foes will react to future U.S. policies and strategies, and the outcome of the dynamics of the mix between those policies and strategies.

After Sept. 11, President Bush and his administration re- ordered their priorities and strategies around two targets.

First, was how to get rid of global terrorism and groups or states that support them? At the very least, the objective was to subdue them so they could not become a major threat to the U.S. and its global interests.

Second, was how to prevent weapons of mass-destruction (WMD) being used against the U.S. and its interests? This includes nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

With the above as background, what can be said about the Asia Pacific region? What has really changed and what is going to continue? What is temporary and what is permanent in the region after Sept. 11?

In the first phase of the fight against global terrorism, namely to get at al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Bush administration was rather successful, based on cooperation and coalition building with allies and friends. In particular, relations with other great powers and with a number of Muslim countries have improved.

Russia has established its credentials particularly in getting closer to the West and the U.S., especially in allowing military bases to be established in Central Asia, as well as allowing intelligence support. Chechnya has almost been forgotten and a new agreement on cooperation with NATO is being finalized.

Japan has strengthened the alliance by a new law on security and by sending some supporting ships to the Middle East -- this is the first time Japan's Self Defense Force (SDF) has been mobilized beyond its borders. This move, considered a first step toward becoming a "normal" country has been acquiesced by her neighbors.

China, which also faces the threat of terrorism and wishes to establish normal relations with the U.S., also cooperated in political support and the exchange of intelligence.

India, who has been preparing for some time to get closer to the U.S. strategically, has made use of the events to support the U.S., while expecting U.S. support for Kashmir.

Among Muslim countries, Pakistan has fully supported the U.S. despite some internal opposition, through intelligence, as a staging base for military operations, politically, etc. And so have other countries in the Middle East with their military bases, although more limited than Pakistan. Politically, the support from Muslim countries has been crucial.

In the Asia Pacific region, political support has been given at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, at the ASEAN Summit, and the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, and Korea) Summit. Moreover, ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, started to cooperate among themselves to fight regional terrorism. This cooperation has been, in particular, between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as among the military. The Sept. 11 attacks have strengthened the presence of the U.S. and its cooperation with East Asia in many layers; regionwide (APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum), sub-region wide (ASEAN or part of it) and bilaterally.

But since the region is so wide and diverse, the intensity and variety of cooperation might differ from one sub-region to another and from one country to another.

Domestic complexities could constrain them from cooperating publicly or openly, especially in the case of countries with Muslim majorities such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Others face Muslim insurgents and are in need of assistance, such as the Philippines. Other countries in Southeast Asia that have very small numbers of Muslims like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and even Thailand have been less concerned domestically, came aboard rather late and are involved mainly in political terms.

Take Indonesia as an example. The government is weak and law enforcement agencies are also weak and corrupt. The crisis has created an enormous challenge to dealing with poverty, employment, regional insurgences, law and order, restructuring the economy, huge debt (domestic and foreign), and weak governance. Some small radical Muslim groups have been agitating against the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.

However, the large mainstream Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are not supporting these groups. As for the government and the U.S., the best course is to give support to mainstream Muslim organizations to lead the Muslim community toward modernization, moderation, openness and democratic values.

In the meantime, the government has to be firm on law and order, strengthen the police and military when necessary, to take legal action against any criminal acts or illegal agitation and activities by any radical group. NU and Muhammadiyah support such actions. The police need to have better training, and this is where the U.S. can assist. This includes a gradual fostering of normal relations with the military.

Established intelligence cooperation should also be strengthened. With these policies, the U.S. will strengthen the government in dealing with global terrorism but also at a pace comfortable to them. In the end, the best contribution the Indonesian government and society can give to the fight against global terrorism is to keep the majority of Muslims, moderate, open and democratic.

If Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, could show to the world and especially other Muslim nations how Muslims can be moderate, open and democratic, and develop economically at the same time, then this should give a tremendous boost to the struggle for the right ideas, vision and soul of Islam.

The situation in the Philippines differs from Indonesia. They have a problem of Muslim insurgents in the south. Although Muslims consist of less than 10 percent of the population, at present they are in a majority in a few districts in the southern Philippines.

The problem of these radicals, such as the Abu Sayyaf group, is a problem of criminality and extortion plus kidnapping. They have had relations with al-Qaeda cells before and that relationship could be revived. More importantly, however, is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government is currently negotiating a political deal with them. If they are also found to be connected to al-Qaeda than this is more worrying because they are much stronger than the Abu Sayyaf group.

The article is an extract from Jusuf Wanandi's paper for the Asia Pacific Roundtable on June 3, in Kuala Lumpur.