Impact of Sept. 11 on Asia Pacific region

Impact of Sept. 11 on Asia Pacific region

Jusuf Wanandi, Founder and Member Board of Trustees Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

The impact of Sept. 11 on the Asia Pacific region can be
discussed within the context of the new global strategic
development and how this will unfold in the future. This
necessitates some exercises in speculation about those future
developments.

This will involve an examination, though not exclusively,
about U.S. future strategies. It also involves an examination of
how U.S. allies, friends and foes will react to future U.S.
policies and strategies, and the outcome of the dynamics of the
mix between those policies and strategies.

After Sept. 11, President Bush and his administration re-
ordered their priorities and strategies around two targets.

First, was how to get rid of global terrorism and groups or
states that support them? At the very least, the objective was to
subdue them so they could not become a major threat to the U.S.
and its global interests.

Second, was how to prevent weapons of mass-destruction (WMD)
being used against the U.S. and its interests? This includes
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

With the above as background, what can be said about the Asia
Pacific region? What has really changed and what is going to
continue? What is temporary and what is permanent in the region
after Sept. 11?

In the first phase of the fight against global terrorism,
namely to get at al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Bush
administration was rather successful, based on cooperation and
coalition building with allies and friends. In particular,
relations with other great powers and with a number of Muslim
countries have improved.

Russia has established its credentials particularly in getting
closer to the West and the U.S., especially in allowing military
bases to be established in Central Asia, as well as allowing
intelligence support. Chechnya has almost been forgotten and a
new agreement on cooperation with NATO is being finalized.

Japan has strengthened the alliance by a new law on security
and by sending some supporting ships to the Middle East -- this
is the first time Japan's Self Defense Force (SDF) has been
mobilized beyond its borders. This move, considered a first step
toward becoming a "normal" country has been acquiesced by her
neighbors.

China, which also faces the threat of terrorism and wishes to
establish normal relations with the U.S., also cooperated in
political support and the exchange of intelligence.

India, who has been preparing for some time to get closer to
the U.S. strategically, has made use of the events to support the
U.S., while expecting U.S. support for Kashmir.

Among Muslim countries, Pakistan has fully supported the U.S.
despite some internal opposition, through intelligence, as a
staging base for military operations, politically, etc. And so
have other countries in the Middle East with their military
bases, although more limited than Pakistan. Politically, the
support from Muslim countries has been crucial.

In the Asia Pacific region, political support has been given
at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, at the
ASEAN Summit, and the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, and Korea) Summit.
Moreover, ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines, started to cooperate among themselves to fight
regional terrorism. This cooperation has been, in particular,
between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as
among the military. The Sept. 11 attacks have strengthened the
presence of the U.S. and its cooperation with East Asia in many
layers; regionwide (APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum), sub-region
wide (ASEAN or part of it) and bilaterally.

But since the region is so wide and diverse, the intensity and
variety of cooperation might differ from one sub-region to
another and from one country to another.

Domestic complexities could constrain them from cooperating
publicly or openly, especially in the case of countries with
Muslim majorities such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Others face
Muslim insurgents and are in need of assistance, such as the
Philippines. Other countries in Southeast Asia that have very
small numbers of Muslims like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar,
and even Thailand have been less concerned domestically, came
aboard rather late and are involved mainly in political terms.

Take Indonesia as an example. The government is weak and law
enforcement agencies are also weak and corrupt. The crisis has
created an enormous challenge to dealing with poverty,
employment, regional insurgences, law and order, restructuring
the economy, huge debt (domestic and foreign), and weak
governance. Some small radical Muslim groups have been agitating
against the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.

However, the large mainstream Muslim organizations such as
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are not supporting these
groups. As for the government and the U.S., the best course is to
give support to mainstream Muslim organizations to lead the
Muslim community toward modernization, moderation, openness and
democratic values.

In the meantime, the government has to be firm on law and
order, strengthen the police and military when necessary, to take
legal action against any criminal acts or illegal agitation and
activities by any radical group. NU and Muhammadiyah support such
actions. The police need to have better training, and this is
where the U.S. can assist. This includes a gradual fostering of
normal relations with the military.

Established intelligence cooperation should also be
strengthened. With these policies, the U.S. will strengthen the
government in dealing with global terrorism but also at a pace
comfortable to them. In the end, the best contribution the
Indonesian government and society can give to the fight against
global terrorism is to keep the majority of Muslims, moderate,
open and democratic.

If Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, could show to the
world and especially other Muslim nations how Muslims can be
moderate, open and democratic, and develop economically at the
same time, then this should give a tremendous boost to the
struggle for the right ideas, vision and soul of Islam.

The situation in the Philippines differs from Indonesia. They
have a problem of Muslim insurgents in the south. Although
Muslims consist of less than 10 percent of the population, at
present they are in a majority in a few districts in the southern
Philippines.

The problem of these radicals, such as the Abu Sayyaf group,
is a problem of criminality and extortion plus kidnapping. They
have had relations with al-Qaeda cells before and that
relationship could be revived. More importantly, however, is the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government is
currently negotiating a political deal with them. If they are
also found to be connected to al-Qaeda than this is more worrying
because they are much stronger than the Abu Sayyaf group.

The article is an extract from Jusuf Wanandi's paper for the
Asia Pacific Roundtable on June 3, in Kuala Lumpur.