'Ideological map' in Indonesian politics

'Ideological map' in Indonesian politics

J. Soedjati Djiwandono
Political analyst
Jakarta

Later on, the Islamic-based political parties set up an
"Islamic caucus" to promote unity among the Islamic parties,
which seemed as remote as ever. Even the two largest Islamic
organizations, the NU and the Muhammadiyah, are never united
beyond occasional appearances. They are mostly at odds with each
other in many respects, religious or otherwise. The NU-based PKB
itself has been split into two wings.

Need for coalition?

With the general election just a around the corner, no single
political party seems sure of its potential to win a single
majority, a prospect no better than the 1999 election. The
electoral law is thus a compromise between PDI Perjuangan and
Golkar. The Golkar first proposed that a presidential candidate
should be a university graduate, which would prevent Megawati's
nomination for the presidency.

On the one hand, the PDI Perjuangan's first proposal was that
no one found guilty of a crime with a sentence of three years
imprisonment should be nominated to the presidency, clearly aimed
at preventing Akbar Tandjung from presidential nomination.

Finally they reached a compromise: A presidential candidate
should at least be a senior high school graduate, thus making the
way open to Megawati's nomination. At the same time, the PDI
Perjuangan agreed to a condition that one with a sentence of
three years imprisonment could be a presidential candidate, which
would then pave the way for Akbar's presidential candidacy.

Indeed, for certain reasons, the Golkar seems willing to go
ahead with Megawati with a position of second fiddle in case
Megawati turns out to be a formidable rival candidate for
President. Short of winning a single majority, PDI Perjuangan's
choice of coalition would be either the Golkar party, or a major
Muslim party. The United Development Party (PPP) is clearly a
party with strong Muslim support and aspiration. But it has been
split between the Hamzah Has faction and the PPP Reformasi under
Zainuddin M.Z.

In case of the need for a Muslim partner, therefore, the other
option would be with the PKB, not the PPP. Thus, despite a split
in the PKB, Taufik Kiemas, husband of President Megawati and a
chairman of PDI Perjuangan, has recently met with Alwi Shihab,
leader of one wing of PKB, presumably with the thought of a
possible "coalition" with PDI Perjuangan if need be in support of
Megawati's presidency. Despite its Islamic-base, the PKB is more
nationalist than Islamic in orientation. Moreover, the Alwi
Shihab wing is closer to former president Abdurahman Wahid (Gus
Dur), who remains a political as well as religious figure of
stature in the country. It seems doubtful, nevertheless, if Gus
Dur would ever support Megawati.

Continued alignment, different strategy

Basically, the post-2004 election ideological alignment of
Indonesian politics is likely to remain an antagonism of
Nationalism versus Islam. However, even the issue of Islamic
syaria, which some Islamic parties would like to see re-inserted
in the 1945 Constitution through an amendment to Article 29 on
religion, has failed to unite the Islamic parties or the Muslim
community.

It is important to note, moreover, that in spite of reformasi,
it remains a taboo to change the Preamble of the 1945
Constitution, which embodies the Pancasila ideology as has been
formulated since the Proclamation of Independence. The Islamic
parties, therefore, have tried to resort to an indirect method.
Without any mention of the syaria, they have resorted to a trick
with considerable success. This is what they are likely to
continue to do in years to come. Failing to have the syaria re-
inserted into the constitution, they may continue to imbue
legislation with the spirit of the syaria, if without once making
mention of the "syaria" itself.

In fact, under Soeharto's New Order, the pattern of decision-
making in the legislative bodies, invariably took the form of
"deliberations towards unanimity" (mufakat) And the Islamic
parties already succeeded in having the marriage law of 1979
passed by mufakat, while the minority parties avoided being
accused of practicing "tyranny by minority" by openly opposing
the move. At the same time, while implicitly imposing the
profession of a religion, which was against religious freedom,
without mentioning the word "syaria", the marriage bill looked
innocuous, and the Islamic parties in effect exploited the fear
as well as naivety of the "nationalist" parties. The same was
true of the law on the national system of education of 1988,
which made religious education in schools compulsory.

The latest pattern of decision-making in the legislature, in
this era of reform, is the "no-voting" method. This is not the
same as Soeharto's style of unanimity. It is one in which a
consensus is assumed to have been reached during the "lobby",
thus outside formal sessions, among the different factions in the
House - not the individual House members.

Thus the House speaker simply asks with disgusting nonchalance
if the members present could agree on the enactment of the bill
under discussion, and the members responded almost in unison,
"agree", without the speaker in the least bothering to check if a
majority of those present votes for the bill and how many, if
any, against.

That was the case of the controversial new law on the national
system of education. It was the most dishonest way of decision-
making, especially in the light of such a strategically important
legislation.

It was definitely not a decision based on unanimity, for the
entire faction of the PDIP, the largest in the House, did not
even attend the session. At least one faction, no matter how
small, the faction of National Unity of Indonesia, did express
opposition to the enactment of the law and proposed a
postponement.

Secondly, it was doubtful if it was a valid decision, for the
final session was considered to have met the quorum required,
which was not based on the actual number of members attending
that final session, but reportedly on the quorum reached at the
first of the series of general sessions when it was first
convened.

Thirdly, because there was neither voting nor unanimity, there
was no record on the members' respective performance, so that in
effect the members are not accountable to the people. But under
the present system, House members are responsible to their
parties, which they represent, rather than the people, in spite
of their designation.

Finally, it was an unjust procedure of decision-making in view
of the controversy of the bill. To force its enactment would
amount to a tyranny by the majority, especially because the
controversial issues relate to state intervention in matters of
human rights, particularly freedom of religion, and thus in human
conscience. Otherwise a majority decision through a democratic
mechanism would be valid and legitimate, not a tyranny by the
majority.

That, however, may well be the coming pattern of decision-
making in the legislative bodies: the inclusion of the spirit of
the Islamic syaria, if without an explicit mention of it. The
plan to revise the criminal code based on Islamic law, if not
explicitly stated, is a sign of gloomy things to come. While the
world is progressing fast towards modernity, Indonesia is going
for centuries' backwards.***