Fri, 03 Jun 1994

Human rights concept

I feel that Bilveer Singh's article entitled Asian human rights versus the West tends to perpetuate rather than dispel the myths surrounding the supposed differences of perception of human rights by Westerners and by Asians. While differences certainly exist, I do not think they are of the nature that he suggests.

For example, he states that Western countries focus on individual rather than collective rights, while Third World countries do the opposite. In reality, it is Western governments' insistence on certain collective rights, such as the right to environmental and industrial hygiene and the rights of trade unions to form national federations, which has been a major point of controversy in this area.

He also states that Third World governments are obliged to emphasize economic rights over political rights, since "economic growth and development are prerequisites for the exercise and implementation of human rights." This is far from the case. While economic growth can help in the easier enforcement of many rights, it is hardly a precondition. In 1989 the people of Rumania and other East European countries enjoyed, almost overnight, a sudden and vast improvement in safety from many kinds of human rights abuses, but this was not preceded by economic growth; it resulted from a struggle for freedom and a change in Soviet foreign policy brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The writer also presents Third World governments as trying to "reconcile" economic growth and political rights as if the two were somehow incompatible. While I do not doubt that it is possible to boost the former while granting only limited amounts of the latter, in general a freer society stimulates rather than impedes economic development. Japan and Germany both grew stronger in the late 1930s under fascistic regimes, but their advances were hugely more impressive after World War II when citizens benefited from guarantees against repression.

Another dubious dichotomy is presented between rights and duties. We are told that in times of national crisis "the citizen's sense of duty (not to put pressure on the government) will...help the state put off its problem." We might as well also be told that in normal times the citizen's sense of duty will help the state to ignore its problems altogether. What is clear on this issue is that a society where people feel a duty to help their fellow citizens as well as themselves is more likely to achieve harmony and prosperity than one where they only help themselves. But harmony and prosperity also require the government to have a sense of duty to respect the freedom of its subjects; to quote Confucius: "being liberal, you will win the people."

On the issue of timing, we are misled to believe that the West argues for the immediate implementation of rights. Yet even when Bill Clinton decided to link renewal of China's MFN status to human rights he did not demand immediate implementation. He only asked for signs of improvements.

This brings us to the question of conditionality, which the writer says reveals the messianism of western countries. It would be more realistic to say that there have to be some criteria for the allocation of overseas aid budgets and human rights in one which has come into vogue. In the past, the first goal of aid was to buttress governments considered valuable allies against Communism, while a second was to reward countries which reciprocated by buying large quantities of arms. These aims were advantageous for ASEAN countries, but morally questionable. For one thing, they deflected aid away from those who most needed it, and for another some of the regimes which were thus sustained in power were repugnant. Using the criterion of human rights has the advantages of providing leverage to improve people's political situation and of channeling aid towards governments which are more likely to use the resources effectively and efficiently for the benefit of their people.

JOHN HARGREAVES

Jakarta