Howard's way: Humiliating others
Allan Behm, Director, Knowledge Pond, Canberra
It seems to be "hey-diddle-diddle" time again, except it is not the dish that is running away with the spoon. Rather, it is the tongue running away with the brain. Senator Hill's musings of a week ago have now taken much firmer root in Australian policy with the Prime Minister's weekend excursion into defense strategy. While Howard is evidently Australia's pre-eminent political talent, one wonders whether he might have done better to get some well-crafted advice before setting off on this particular tangent.
The Prime Minister's remarks are extraordinary, not simply for their provocation of regional sensibilities, but for their misinterpretation of President Bush's new doctrine of pre-emption and their radical departure from some long-held tenets of Australian foreign and defense policy.
In articulating his doctrine of unilateral pre-emption, President Bush said that the U.S. would use its military force against states that harbored terrorist organizations. Although the proposition has questionable strategic value, it is probably politically defensible within the terms of the UN Charter. But President Bush did not take the next bold step. Howard has.
To launch an attack against targets on the territory of another state unilaterally is an act of war. Howard has, understandably, couched his new doctrine in the context of the hypothetical "if other alternatives were not available". But the fact is that other alternatives, including doing nothing, are always available.
Can one imagine Prime Minister Blair, President Chirac or Chancellor Schroder pursuing this line of reasoning, even less this line of public utterance? Strategic relationships in Europe would be in turmoil, NATO would dissolve, and half a century's careful and patient diplomacy would be for nothing. Should we be surprised that the reaction in Southeast Asia is any different?
A policy of unilateral pre-emption against non-state targets, such as terrorist cells, on the territory of another state is a fundamental discontinuity in Australian policy for three main reasons.
First, and perhaps of most significance, the Australian Defense Force is neither structured nor equipped for foreign adventures that would pit its capabilities against those of a regional country. And make no mistake, an attack on the territory of a neighboring state without its full agreement would put Australian forces against determined opposition. Even a one-off air strike would invoke profound consequences.
Second, unilateral pre-emption by Australia flies in the face of more than 50 years' diplomacy and regional defense relationship management. From the Korean War, through the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation with Indonesia and the Vietnam War, and up to the International Force for East Timor (Interfet) Operation in East Timor in 1999, Australia has always operated its defense force on the territory of other states with their agreement, and with clear mandates. Indeed, under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) arrangements, Australia invested substantially in establishing and developing cooperative security and counter-terrorism arrangements with Thailand and the Philippines.
Of course, SEATO folded in 1972. Nonetheless, the principle whereby the nations on whose territory the ADF might operate are, at the very least, permissive (where they are not directly cooperative) has continued to inform Australia's regional defense relationships for over thirty years. It has also informed our diplomatic practice. Put at its simplest, harmonization, regional economic cooperative arrangements and free trade agreements are unachievable if any potential member retains a pocket veto exercisable through unilateral military force -- for whatever reason.
Finally, a strategy of unilateral pre-emption, particularly if pursued by a militarily small nation such as Australia, serves only to frustrate the achievement of the security objectives that pre-emption might appear to realize. While pre-emption might win the small battle of destroying a terrorist cell, it creates the very serious risk of losing the larger war against an aggrieved state. In such circumstances, the best outcome would probably be stalemate. The worst would probably be strategic isolation within the region, and all the additional resources that would, as a consequence, be needed for defense.
A doctrine of unilateral pre-emption is a significant departure from the legacy created by Menzies, Gorton and Fraser (and Whitlam, Hawke and Keating, for that matter). Australia has sought to play a constructive and cooperative role in South East Asia, supporting prosperity and security by addressing opportunities and problems collaboratively. Notwithstanding the uncertainty on which terrorism feeds for its effectiveness, to depart from our traditional approach to diplomacy is to undermine the best defense we have against terrorism -- strong democratic practice based on the rule of law and peaceful relationships between states.