Howard's preemptive strike against Australia's foreign policy

Jeremy Webb Brisbane

Just when Prime Minister John Howard seemed to be emerging as a crafty international statesman biding his time to reunite Australia with its Asian neighbors he has thrown up a preemptive strike against these very policies he is pursuing. That road block, ironically, is his doctrine of the right of preemptive strike against terrorist activities in other (regional) countries which could be deemed to threaten Australia's national interest. Stubborn adherence to this policy -- thrown up in the heat of an election campaign last year -- and the fallout of not being able to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), may well lead to Australia's exclusion from the post ASEAN leaders summit this year.

There are three issue here: does it matter if Australia does not attend the summit; does Australia's foreign policy accord with the treaty and in particular does Australia really need to have a preemptive strike doctrine?

On the latter point Howard is arguing that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and its commitment not to use preemptive military action, was conceived by ASEAN countries pre Sept. 11 and therefore does not account for the new world of international terrorism. It is also true that the treaty enshrines the Bandung declaration and its non-aligned principles which may not always fit today's regional architecture of international relations. In addition it requires signatories not to interfere in the internal affairs of its signatories.

But it is of course up to Australia to interpret the treaty as it sees fit. Japan has does just this in signing the treaty by simply assuming it does not conflict with its alliance with the U.S. And given ASEAN members current pressure on Myanmar to liberalize its non-democratic ways, the non-interference in internal affairs agreement is clearly already being interpreted flexibly. Australia obviously could do likewise (as will no doubt New Zealand, China and Japan are all signatories of the treaty).

It is also clear that Australia's use of pre-emption in the form of an attack on terrorists in another Asian country without the latter's consent, is well nigh inconceivable. It should not therefore be taken as a reason for refusing to sign the TAC. If the inconceivable did occur then any country would probably move to protect itself with or without constraining treaties.

In any case pre-emption is a major not a small/medium power tool of international relations. Major powers can act with greater impunity and usually can weather diplomatic storms created by pre-emption. Australia is not in this exalted class. As a small player it needs to rely on rigorous rules of international diplomacy, highly developed negotiating skills or, as a last resort, powerful allies to secure its ends in international diplomacy.

So does Australia need to attend the summit? And can it continue to hold its preemptive doctrine without damaging its regional standing? Some are arguing that because Indonesia has publicly backed Australia's place at the summit the damage of our preemptive doctrine is being exaggerated.

But Indonesia's backing of Australia is a product of extraordinary circumstances. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been preoccupied with the complex process of crafting a new relationship with Australia -- desperately overdue following decades of fractured relations.

There is also some return of thanks being provided for the $1 billion Australian Tsunami aid package. The real question is, however, how hard the President will go into bat for Australia with other ASEAN members. Given secrecy and consensus rules here he won't have to expend too much capital if Malaysia stand firm on what would appear to be an indefensible issue.

Just how important then is it for Australia to be at the post ASEAN summit? From an economic pragmatist's point of view not a lot. Australia is negotiating free trade agreements with key ASEAN countries -- including Indonesia and Malaysia -- and with ASEAN itself. It has achieved an extraordinary past decade of growth well above the world's average and in particular was able to survive largely unscathed from the Asean economic crisis in the latter part of the 1990s. Its trade and investment patterns are largely still outside ASEAN -- China and Japan are by far Australia's largest regional trade and investment partners.

But the future political and economic architecture of the ASEAN region is now being shaped in a century which is being touted as the Century of Asia. Australia does need to be part of its formulation. There are huge issues for Australia none more so than how the burgeoning growth of China in economic and military terms will be accommodated by the Southeast Asian region of which Australia is geographically a part.

Also important is the task of fully repairing relations with Malaysia -- a country which is home to the most orthodox of Muslims within ASEAN and therefore the country most sensitive to Australia's direct support of U.S. Middle East polices. Howard's pre-emption policy is seen by Malaysians as an extremist extension of its pro-U.S. anti-terrorist policies.

Australia has been waiting decades for developments in the ASEAN region to turn in its favor and allow it to achieve what it sees as its chosen place as a close and cooperative partner. It would be extraordinary if Howard's pride stood in the way of allowing Australia to grasp the opportunity now it has arrived.

It is therefore not surprising that over the last week there have been clear signs that Howard is becoming progressively more isolated on this issue. Foreign minister Downer is reported to be a less than enthusiastic supporter, while New Zealand is reported to be working to persuade Australia it has nothing to lose and everything to gain by acceding to the treaty and ditching pre- emption. The only thing standing in the way it would seem is the pride of a third term Prime Minister used to getting his way.

The writer is president of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Queensland, and as a former diplomat has served in Indonesia.