Howard govt's new course in Asia

Howard govt's new course in Asia

By James Cotton

Australia's white paper on foreign policy contains
continuities as well as significant changes from the past.

SINGAPORE: The Australian government's new white paper, "In
the National Interest", is the first ever document from Canberra
setting down the fundamentals of the nation's foreign policy.
While there are many continuities with the past, there are some
important changes of emphasis.

Australia will rely less on multilateral strategies and more
on bilateral ties, especially with the United States. While the
Asean Regional Forum (ARF) receives a favourable mention, it is
seen as complementary to and not as a replacement for Australia's
more traditional security guarantees. And promotion of human
rights will not be permitted to prejudice trade.

According to the document, the most important trends in the
next 15 years will be the impact of globalisation, and the
continuing economic rise of East Asia. Australian policy must be
managed with these in mind. As to the former, continuing trade
liberalisation will be required; as to the latter, Australia's
trading and other relationships must be framed so as to adjust to
life in a region increasingly populated with wealthy and powerful
Asian neighbours.

A number of strategies are suggested to achieve the latter,
and it is clear the government has thought long and hard on this
subject. Globalisation, however, is less satisfactorily dealt
with. The drafters believe that policies determined by and
between states will be sufficient, whereas now many analyses of
this issue see the need for a fresh approach precisely because
the reach and scope of the state are being undermined.

Such management requires a mix of strategies, national,
bilateral, and multilateral, and the preference of the drafters
is for bilateralism. The strong emphasis on bilateral
relationships in the document -- "bilateral relationships are the
basic building block for effective regional and global
strategies" -- serves several purposes. The drafters are clearly
unhappy with much that has passed for multilateral efforts in the
past.

In the future, support for multilateral measures must be
"selective" and must clearly serve the national interest, which
is defined in terms of the nation's physical security and
economic well-being, including employment.

The United Nations, commitment to which was of course a major
aspect of former minister Gareth Evans' activist foreign policy,
is criticised as lacking focus and in need of reform. The
implication here would seem to be that future Australian
commitments will be commensurate both with the progress of reform
and the extent to which the national interest is furthered.

The ARF is assessed more positively, though its agenda is
characterised as only just beginning to include the hard issues.
Moreover, to describe it as "the most significant" of the
"regional security institutions" is clearly to reduce its status:
in the Evans-Keating era it was -- along with Apec -- one of the
"two pillars" of Australia's regional engagement.

It has been suggested that the timing of this document may
have been crucial in this evaluation. Asean enlargement has
raised questions in Australia about the future effectiveness of
the grouping, and the impact this will have upon the functioning
of the ARF. Efforts devoted to multilateral strategies are not,
however, necessarily wasted. In this connection, the document
devotes considerable and positive coverage to Apec and its role
in the delivery of further prosperity to Australia.

Most importantly, the shift to bilateralism allows the
drafters to place the strongest emphasis upon Australia's
security links with America. Canberra's ties with Washington are
stronger than with any other power, and the US will remain the
strongest player in world politics within the time frame examined
in the document.

In particular, the US "will -- continue to see its best
interests being served by maintaining its strategic engagement in
East Asia", and as this engagement is "a crucial stabilising
influence", the national interest will be served by cultivating
ties with Washington.

However, other bilateral relationships will condition
Australian policy, and in addition to the relationship with the
US, the document singles out relations with China, Japan and
Indonesia as by far the most important.

The presence of Indonesia on this list is no surprise, and
maintains a security priority of the Keating government. But if
China and Japan are major regional players, then for all of
Australia's key relationships to be in step, both must find
congenial the nature and extent of the US presence. In two brief
passages in the document this is left an open question, which
leaves the reader with the impression that if Australia had to
choose, it would opt for reliance upon the US connection.

When in opposition the Howard team was sometimes critical of
the failure of the government to consult widely in the community
and to pay sufficient attention to popular concerns and anxieties
when making foreign policy. Accordingly, the document stresses
the need for wide involvement in what is called, "public
diplomacy".

Yet, without adverting to these debates directly, the document
seeks to lead the Australian public in respect of three important
matters in which community views are by no means settled.

The first concerns the rise of East Asia itself. So much
attention is paid to it in the document because there is still
some unease about its implications, and ignorance about its
importance.

Secondly, the categorical rejection of racial
discrimination ... along with comments on the importance of the
country's international image ... can only be read as a response
to the Pauline Hanson phenomenon.

Thirdly, the argument, presented graphically as well as in
prose, that trade liberalisation creates jobs and leads to
greater prosperity is emphasised again because public support for
this proposition is not strong.

Prime Minister John Howard has left his personal mark on the
white paper. The statement that "Australia does not need to
choose between its history and its geography" is one of his
favourite themes. Elsewhere in the document, however, his
countrymen are being asked to make hard choices, and some at
least favour one or the other of these two factors. A true
measure of the rise of East Asia would seem to favour the factor
of geography, while the renewed emphasis upon ties with the US
marks a return to a historical pattern established in the 1940s.
If Washington and Beijing or Tokyo fall out, they will be hard
choices indeed, and all the more difficult for receiving no
consideration in this text.

Professor James Cotton is Professor of Political Science,
University of Tasmania, Hobart.