Howard govt's new course in Asia

By James Cotton

Australia's white paper on foreign policy contains continuities as well as significant changes from the past.

SINGAPORE: The Australian government's new white paper, "In the National Interest", is the first ever document from Canberra setting down the fundamentals of the nation's foreign policy. While there are many continuities with the past, there are some important changes of emphasis.

Australia will rely less on multilateral strategies and more on bilateral ties, especially with the United States. While the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) receives a favourable mention, it is seen as complementary to and not as a replacement for Australia's more traditional security guarantees. And promotion of human rights will not be permitted to prejudice trade.

According to the document, the most important trends in the next 15 years will be the impact of globalisation, and the continuing economic rise of East Asia. Australian policy must be managed with these in mind. As to the former, continuing trade liberalisation will be required; as to the latter, Australia's trading and other relationships must be framed so as to adjust to life in a region increasingly populated with wealthy and powerful Asian neighbours.

A number of strategies are suggested to achieve the latter, and it is clear the government has thought long and hard on this subject. Globalisation, however, is less satisfactorily dealt with. The drafters believe that policies determined by and between states will be sufficient, whereas now many analyses of this issue see the need for a fresh approach precisely because the reach and scope of the state are being undermined.

Such management requires a mix of strategies, national, bilateral, and multilateral, and the preference of the drafters is for bilateralism. The strong emphasis on bilateral relationships in the document -- "bilateral relationships are the basic building block for effective regional and global strategies" -- serves several purposes. The drafters are clearly unhappy with much that has passed for multilateral efforts in the past.

In the future, support for multilateral measures must be "selective" and must clearly serve the national interest, which is defined in terms of the nation's physical security and economic well-being, including employment.

The United Nations, commitment to which was of course a major aspect of former minister Gareth Evans' activist foreign policy, is criticised as lacking focus and in need of reform. The implication here would seem to be that future Australian commitments will be commensurate both with the progress of reform and the extent to which the national interest is furthered.

The ARF is assessed more positively, though its agenda is characterised as only just beginning to include the hard issues. Moreover, to describe it as "the most significant" of the "regional security institutions" is clearly to reduce its status: in the Evans-Keating era it was -- along with Apec -- one of the "two pillars" of Australia's regional engagement.

It has been suggested that the timing of this document may have been crucial in this evaluation. Asean enlargement has raised questions in Australia about the future effectiveness of the grouping, and the impact this will have upon the functioning of the ARF. Efforts devoted to multilateral strategies are not, however, necessarily wasted. In this connection, the document devotes considerable and positive coverage to Apec and its role in the delivery of further prosperity to Australia.

Most importantly, the shift to bilateralism allows the drafters to place the strongest emphasis upon Australia's security links with America. Canberra's ties with Washington are stronger than with any other power, and the US will remain the strongest player in world politics within the time frame examined in the document.

In particular, the US "will -- continue to see its best interests being served by maintaining its strategic engagement in East Asia", and as this engagement is "a crucial stabilising influence", the national interest will be served by cultivating ties with Washington.

However, other bilateral relationships will condition Australian policy, and in addition to the relationship with the US, the document singles out relations with China, Japan and Indonesia as by far the most important.

The presence of Indonesia on this list is no surprise, and maintains a security priority of the Keating government. But if China and Japan are major regional players, then for all of Australia's key relationships to be in step, both must find congenial the nature and extent of the US presence. In two brief passages in the document this is left an open question, which leaves the reader with the impression that if Australia had to choose, it would opt for reliance upon the US connection.

When in opposition the Howard team was sometimes critical of the failure of the government to consult widely in the community and to pay sufficient attention to popular concerns and anxieties when making foreign policy. Accordingly, the document stresses the need for wide involvement in what is called, "public diplomacy".

Yet, without adverting to these debates directly, the document seeks to lead the Australian public in respect of three important matters in which community views are by no means settled.

The first concerns the rise of East Asia itself. So much attention is paid to it in the document because there is still some unease about its implications, and ignorance about its importance.

Secondly, the categorical rejection of racial discrimination ... along with comments on the importance of the country's international image ... can only be read as a response to the Pauline Hanson phenomenon.

Thirdly, the argument, presented graphically as well as in prose, that trade liberalisation creates jobs and leads to greater prosperity is emphasised again because public support for this proposition is not strong.

Prime Minister John Howard has left his personal mark on the white paper. The statement that "Australia does not need to choose between its history and its geography" is one of his favourite themes. Elsewhere in the document, however, his countrymen are being asked to make hard choices, and some at least favour one or the other of these two factors. A true measure of the rise of East Asia would seem to favour the factor of geography, while the renewed emphasis upon ties with the US marks a return to a historical pattern established in the 1940s. If Washington and Beijing or Tokyo fall out, they will be hard choices indeed, and all the more difficult for receiving no consideration in this text.

Professor James Cotton is Professor of Political Science, University of Tasmania, Hobart.