Howard faces dilemma on E. Timor

Howard faces dilemma on E. Timor

By Hilman Adil

This is the second of two articles on Australia's policy on
East Timor.

JAKARTA (JP): The ambivalent Australian posture reemerged in
its reaction toward Indonesia's announcement that it would allow
East Timor to become independent if the people rejected an offer
of autonomy. Again, it appeared that considerations based on real
politik prevailed by giving priority to commercial and strategic
interests.

While East Timor's independence is popular with the Australian
public and would possibly remove a disturbing element in
Indonesia-Australian relations, it could also pose substantial
security challenges in the event of a fragmentation of the
Indonesian Republic with Irian Jaya and Aceh or other provinces
following suit.

As Alan Dupont of the Australian National University stated:
"Australia would clearly prefer to have to deal with one country
rather than with two countries or even more countries ... If that
(fragmentation) were to happen, and I don't rate that likely, but
nevertheless it is a possibility, then Australia's strategic
environment to our immediate north is going be complicated."

After the announcement of a major shift in Indonesia's East
Timor policy, defense thinking in Canberra is now focused on the
need to make changes in its policies to meet the evolving
situation in Indonesia. Particularly in the context of the Timor
Gap Treaty signed in 1989 and the Agreement on Maintaining
Security signed in December 1995, new arrangement are needed to
protect Australian corporate interests in Indonesia and East
Timor.

In his article, Woolcott's concern was that "apart from an
issue of regional significance, such as the possible fracturing
of Indonesia, the changes could lead to substantial financial
implications for the government if the Timor Gap Treaty ... were
to unravel." He feared that if Australian recognition of de jure
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor were abandoned, the treaty
could be nullified, resulting in substantial financial claims.

It is for this reason that Australia, it seems, would rather
prefer an arrangement where East Timor would have a high degree
of autonomy but remain legally part of Indonesia. On the question
of self-determination for people in East Timor, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Downer, in his statements, remains vague and
undefined. He did not specify on what is meant by self-
determination, not when it should be realized. The new shift in
Australia's policy also appears to be highly inconsistent, given
that it supports self-determination without a referendum while
retaining Indonesian sovereignty.

Minister Downer's statement on Jan. 12 did not specify what
was meant by an "an act of self-determination", and whether this
included support for a plebiscite administered by the United
Nations. He also declined to specify when self-determination
should take place, suggesting only "at some future time". He also
sees no need for the Australia government to adjust its support
for Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

The Howard government's preference for autonomy instead of
independence for East Timor seems to be influenced by two hard
realities: (a) Even if the Habibie government seems to be
prepared to grant independence to East Timor, some elements in
the Armed Forces are not prepared to accept it. The fear in
Australia is that even if the Indonesian government ordered its
Army occupation out of East Timor, there is a reasonable
possibility of serious bloodshed. (b) East Timor resources are
extremely limited.

So far, the province is dependent on outside subsidies (90
percent), of which the central government supplies around two-
third, with the rest coming from Western donors, including
Australia.

The Indonesian government's subsidy will be terminated if East
Timor becomes independent. Therefore, the Australian government
will have to be prepared for another Papua New Guinea on its
border, in terms of the proportional level of resources that
would be required to sustain East Timor as a viable independent
state.

It is in this context that a compromise solution, that is East
Timorese autonomy within Indonesian sovereignty, becomes
increasingly attractive to Canberra.

The convergence and closeness of political security and
commercial interests of both countries apparently have much
influenced their perception toward a solution of the problem.
From Indonesia's point of view, despite an official's statement
describing the province as "an appendix which has to be removed",
wider autonomy rather than outright independence might placate
nationalist demands and the Armed Forces resentment to keep the
territory as an integral part of the Indonesian Republic.

Indonesia's move to cut loose East Timor from the rest of
Indonesia is interpreted in Australia as merely an attempt to
cling to the province by raising the prospect of a swift and
destabilizing withdrawal of Indonesian personnel and funding.

In effect, it is calling the bluff of Western powers and East
Timorese leaders who have opposed Indonesian rule.

Another interpretation is that behind the offer of
independence, there is some expectation that in the event of
disagreement among the East Timorese leaders to establish an
independent state, and rather to avoid a civil war, they would
ultimately return to be part of Indonesia again.

However, this would have grave consequences for their future
status in terms of a much reduced bargaining position vis-a-vis
the central government in any future demand for independence or
special status within the Indonesian republic.

The writer is a senior researcher in international affairs at
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.