How well do we know Chinese policy?

Kim Jong-han, The Korea Herald, Asia News Network, Seoul

The law firm for which I work is one of those giant international companies with over 1,000 lawyers worldwide. About 100 of the lawyers are located in the three China offices (Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong), and many of them are Chinese. They are bright and well-educated, and many are graduates of the famous Beijing University. Some finished at the top in the Beijing University Law School.

Whenever I have a chance to get together with them, I always raise topics about China-Korea relations, hoping to hear the views of these brilliant Chinese minds on Korea and the rapidly evolving bilateral relations. Actually, although I do want to hear their views, I often tease them about China's recent "bullying tactics" against Korea.

"Why is China trying to revise history on Goguryeo? That is so unfair. Goguryeo is definitely part of Korea," I often comment to my smiling Chinese colleagues. I also frequently ask, "Why is China intimidated by little, weak North Korea? Why can't your country with so much power and resources force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program?" Our conversations usually start with my teasing and end with defensive, apologetic comments from the Chinese lawyers.

In one of our recent gatherings, however, I heard something very surprising and unexpected from a number of my Chinese colleagues. After yet another teasing about how China is helpless in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, my Chinese colleagues responded that I was missing the point. They explained that China does have the necessary power to influence the North Korean government but is purposely withholding its influence in order to extract concessions from the United States on the Taiwan independence issue.

Rather naively, I asked what the Taiwan independence issue has to do with the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Their explanation went something like this:

"To China, the Taiwan independence problem is much more important than the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States believes China holds the key in resolving the nuclear standoff and is pleading for China's help. China has something that the United States wants. At the same time, China regards the Taiwan government's secessionist effort as a very serious matter, and U.S. support for Taiwan as a key obstacle in resolving this matter to China's satisfaction.

China believes it has bargaining leverage with the United States. In other words, China can help the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue if the United States cooperates with China on the Taiwan matter. However, the United States has shown inflexibility on Taiwan. So, China is not going to rush into resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Instead, it is going to drag out the North Korean issue as long as possible until it can extract concessions from the United States on Taiwan."

When I heard the explanation from my Chinese colleagues, I was stunned. I had never heard such a theory expounded in Korea or the United States, and had not thought of it myself. However, my Chinese colleagues said this is not one of their creative theories but an accurate assessment of China's current foreign policy shared by many in China. I wondered quietly why, if this is a correct portrayal of Chinese foreign policy, so many South Korean and U.S. foreign policy experts didn't know about it.

Then, this past week, I read articles on a recent trip to China by influential U.S. Republican Congressman Kurt Weldon from Pennsylvania. Weldon reportedly said he had learned while in China that Beijing is unwilling to use its influence on North Korea in order to keep it as leverage on the Taiwan issue against the United States.

I was surprised that although they are only lawyers, my Chinese colleagues may, indeed, have expert insights on a complex foreign policy issue. However, I was more surprised at how ignorant so many South Korean and U.S. foreign policy experts may be. In both the United States and South Korea, there are literally hundreds of so-called China experts, Korean experts and foreign policy experts.

They have all uniformly sung the same song: China can help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and is exerting its newfound diplomatic clout, not knowing that it's quite possible China is actually going through a charade and is not willing to exert its influence at this time.

Of course, it is quite possible that what my Chinese colleagues and Weldon said may not be accurate, and their similar comments just may be a coincidence. However, one has to wonder why there has been such a lack of progress on the North Korean nuclear issue even though China on the surface has been so active in hosting the six-party talks and has been so "aggressive" in trying to help defuse the crisis.

Perhaps, it's not a question of a lack of influence but more a lack of will. Whatever the truth, it is surprising that no prominent South Korean or U.S. foreign policy expert has put forward before the assessment advanced by my Chinese lawyer friends and Weldon.

In any event, all this has given me a fresh question for all those China experts in Seoul and Washington. How well do they understand China?